Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) was the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed whether Parliament can amend fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The 5-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 is not "law" within the meaning of Article 13(2), and therefore Parliament has the unrestricted power to amend fundamental rights. This case is the starting point of the amendment power trilogy — Shankari Prasad (1951) to Golaknath (1967) to Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — tested in virtually every constitutional law examination.
Case snapshot
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case name | Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India |
| Citation | AIR 1951 SC 458 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Bench | 5-judge Constitution Bench (CJ Patanjali Sastri, Fazl Ali, Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das JJ.) |
| Date of judgment | 5 October 1951 |
| Subject | Constitutional Law — Amending Power, Article 368, Article 13 |
| Key principle | Constitutional amendments under Article 368 are not "law" under Article 13(2); Parliament can amend fundamental rights |
Facts of the case
After Independence, the Indian government undertook large-scale agrarian reforms, including the abolition of zamindari (feudal landlordism). The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was enacted to insert Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule into the Constitution. Article 31A protected agrarian reform laws from challenge on grounds of violation of Articles 14, 19, and 31 (right to property). The petitioner, Shankari Prasad Singh Deo, was a zamindar from Bihar whose landed estate was affected by these reforms. He challenged the First Amendment before the Supreme Court under Article 32, arguing that it violated the fundamental right to property under Articles 14, 19, and 31, and that Article 13(2) prohibited the State from making any "law" that takes away fundamental rights.
Issues before the court
- Whether the word "law" in Article 13(2) includes a constitutional amendment made under Article 368?
- Whether Parliament's amending power under Article 368 is subject to the limitations imposed by Part III (fundamental rights)?
- Whether the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, is void for abridging the right to property under Articles 14, 19, and 31?
What the court held
"Law" in Article 13(2) does not include constitutional amendments — The Court drew a distinction between ordinary legislative power under Articles 245-246 and the constituent power (amending power) under Article 368. Article 13(2) states that the State shall not make any "law" that takes away fundamental rights. The Court held that "law" here refers to laws made in exercise of ordinary legislative power, not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power. Constitutional amendments are a different species of law-making altogether.
Parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights — Since Article 368 confers constituent power to "amend the Constitution" without any express limitation regarding fundamental rights, Parliament can modify, abridge, or even repeal fundamental rights through the amendment process. The Article 13(2) bar does not apply.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, is valid — Since the First Amendment was duly passed following the procedure prescribed by Article 368, and since constitutional amendments fall outside the scope of Article 13(2), the challenge to Articles 31A, 31B, and the Ninth Schedule failed.
"The terms of Article 368 are perfectly general and empower Parliament to amend the Constitution without any exception whatever. In the context of Article 13, 'law' must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power." — Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri, for the unanimous Court
Key legal principles
Constituent power vs. legislative power
The most important distinction drawn in this case is between constituent power (the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368) and ordinary legislative power (the power to make laws under Articles 245-246). Ordinary laws are subject to Article 13 and must not violate fundamental rights. Constitutional amendments, however, are an exercise of a higher-order power — the constituent power — and are therefore immune from the Article 13(2) limitation. This distinction remained the cornerstone of amendment jurisprudence until Golaknath (1967).
Unlimited amending power
The Shankari Prasad holding established that Parliament's power under Article 368 is plenary and unlimited. There is no part of the Constitution that is beyond the amending power — including fundamental rights. This position was reaffirmed in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) before being reversed by the 11-judge Bench in Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), and then substantially restated (with the basic structure limitation) in Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
Article 13(2) — scope of "law"
The Court interpreted "law" in Article 13(2) restrictively. Article 13(1) covers pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights. Article 13(2) covers post-constitutional laws. But in both clauses, "law" means ordinary legislation — not constitutional amendments. This interpretation was the foundation for all subsequent land reform legislation that was placed in the Ninth Schedule to shield it from judicial review.
Significance
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India is historically significant because it allowed the newly independent Indian state to carry out sweeping agrarian reforms and social justice measures without being blocked by fundamental rights challenges — particularly challenges based on the right to property. The decision gave Parliament confidence to enact transformative legislation and to use the constitutional amendment process to overcome judicial objections. It is also the genesis of the amendment power debate that continued through Sajjan Singh (1965), Golaknath (1967), and culminated in the Basic Structure doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati (1973). Without Shankari Prasad, the Ninth Schedule would never have survived, and the entire architecture of India's land reform programme would have collapsed.
Exam angle
This case is essential for Judiciary Prelims (constitutional law MCQs on Article 368 and amendment power) and UPSC Law Optional (Paper I — amending power essay questions).
- MCQ format: "In Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951), the Supreme Court held that — (a) Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights (b) Constitutional amendments are 'law' under Article 13(2) (c) Article 368 amendments are not 'law' under Article 13(2) (d) Basic structure of the Constitution cannot be amended." Answer: (c)
- Descriptive format: "Discuss the evolution of the law on Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights from Shankari Prasad (1951) to Kesavananda Bharati (1973)." (Judiciary Mains / UPSC Law Optional)
- Key facts to memorize: 5-judge unanimous Bench; decided 5 October 1951; challenged the First Amendment Act; distinguished constituent power from legislative power; overruled by Golaknath (1967) on the amending power question; Golaknath itself was partly overruled by Kesavananda Bharati (1973)
- Related provisions: Article 13(1) and (2), Article 31 (right to property — now repealed by 44th Amendment), Article 31A, Article 31B, Ninth Schedule, Article 368
- Follow-up cases: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) — reaffirmed Shankari Prasad; Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) — overruled on point that Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — Parliament can amend fundamental rights but cannot destroy basic structure
Frequently asked questions
What was the main issue in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India?
The central issue was whether the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted Articles 31A, 31B, and the Ninth Schedule, violated fundamental rights under Part III. The petitioner argued that Article 13(2) prohibits any "law" that abridges fundamental rights, and a constitutional amendment is such a "law." The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Article 368 amendments exercise constituent power, which falls outside the scope of Article 13(2).
Was Shankari Prasad overruled?
The specific holding that Parliament can amend fundamental rights was effectively reversed by the 11-judge Bench in Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), which held that Parliament has no power to amend Part III. However, Kesavananda Bharati (1973) restored Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights subject to the basic structure limitation — partially reviving the Shankari Prasad position while adding a new constraint that Shankari Prasad had not contemplated.
What is the difference between constituent power and legislative power?
Constituent power is the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368. Legislative power is the power to make ordinary laws under Articles 245-246. Shankari Prasad held that Article 13(2) restricts only legislative power, not constituent power. This distinction means that while an ordinary law violating fundamental rights is void under Article 13(2), a constitutional amendment abridging those same rights is valid because it exercises the higher-order constituent power.
Why is this case important for exam preparation?
Shankari Prasad is the starting point of the "amendment power trilogy" (Shankari Prasad — Golaknath — Kesavananda Bharati) that is tested in nearly every constitutional law examination. Understanding this case is essential to explain how the Court's position on Parliament's amending power evolved from unlimited power (1951) to no power over fundamental rights (1967) to limited power subject to basic structure (1973).