Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018), popularly known as the Sabarimala case, is the landmark 5-judge Constitution Bench decision in which the Supreme Court held by a 4:1 majority that the exclusion of women aged 10 to 50 years from the Sabarimala temple violated Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. The majority held that the practice of excluding menstruating-age women amounted to a form of untouchability based on a biological characteristic, and that the right to worship is available to women on equal terms with men. Justice Indu Malhotra delivered a notable dissent upholding religious autonomy under Article 26. This case is essential for CLAT, judiciary mains, and UPSC Law Optional examinations on the conflict between religious freedom and gender equality.
Case snapshot
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case name | Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala |
| Citation | (2019) 11 SCC 1 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Bench | 5-judge Constitution Bench (CJ Dipak Misra, Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra) |
| Date of judgment | 28 September 2018 |
| Subject | Constitutional Law — Religious Freedom, Gender Equality, Untouchability |
| Key principle | Exclusion of menstruating-age women from a public temple constitutes gender-based discrimination and a form of untouchability; the right to worship under Article 25 is available to women equally |
Facts of the case
The Sabarimala temple in Kerala, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, had a centuries-old practice of prohibiting the entry of women between the ages of 10 and 50 years — the menstruating age group. The practice was based on the belief that Lord Ayyappa was a "naishtika brahmachari" (eternal celibate) and that the presence of women of menstruating age would violate the deity's celibacy. This exclusion was given statutory backing by Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted the exclusion of "women at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship." In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL challenging this practice as unconstitutional. The matter was referred to a 5-judge Constitution Bench after a 3-judge Bench identified a conflict between Articles 25 (freedom of religion) and 26 (right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs) on the one hand, and Articles 14, 15, 17, and 21 on the other.
Issues before the court
- Whether devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala constitute a distinct religious denomination under Article 26?
- Whether the exclusion of women aged 10-50 is an "essential religious practice" protected under Article 25?
- Whether Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Rules, which permits exclusion of women based on custom, violates Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25?
- Whether the practice of excluding women based on a biological characteristic constitutes "untouchability" under Article 17?
What the court held
Not a distinct religious denomination — The majority (CJ Misra, Justices Nariman, Khanwilkar, Chandrachud) held that devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala do not constitute a separate religious denomination under Article 26. They are Hindu devotees and the temple is a Hindu temple open to all Hindus. Therefore, the temple board cannot claim the autonomy rights available to religious denominations to manage their own affairs.
Exclusion not an essential religious practice — The majority held that the exclusion of women of menstruating age is not an "essential religious practice" of Hinduism. The practice is based on notions of impurity attached to menstruation, not on any core theological doctrine. Essential religious practices must be integral to the religion; the exclusion of women is a customary practice that is not foundational to the worship of Lord Ayyappa.
Rule 3(b) struck down — The majority struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 as violating Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination on the ground of sex), 25(1) (right of all persons equally entitled to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion), and 21 (right to dignity).
Gender-based exclusion as untouchability — Justice Chandrachud, in his concurring opinion, held that the exclusion of women based on menstruation constitutes a form of "untouchability" within the meaning of Article 17, which abolishes untouchability "in all its forms." Untouchability is not restricted to caste-based exclusion but extends to any practice that treats a group as impure or polluted based on an inherent biological characteristic.
Justice Malhotra's dissent — Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, holding that questions of deep religious faith should not be subjected to constitutional morality by the Court. She held that the practice was an essential part of the religious character of the Sabarimala temple, that the Court should not interfere with the internal affairs of religious institutions, and that the petition filed by a non-worshipper organisation should not have been entertained.
"Patriarchy in religion cannot be permitted to trump the right to worship. Biological or physiological reasons cannot be accepted as a ground for restricting the freedom of religion of women." — Chief Justice Dipak Misra
Key legal principles
Constitutional morality versus popular morality
The majority, particularly Justice Chandrachud, drew a critical distinction between constitutional morality and popular morality. Constitutional morality demands that the constitutional values of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination override customs and practices — even deeply held religious ones — that perpetuate exclusion. Popular morality, based on tradition and custom, cannot justify the denial of fundamental rights.
Expanded concept of untouchability under Article 17
Justice Chandrachud's interpretation of "untouchability" in Article 17 as extending beyond caste to gender-based biological exclusion was a significant doctrinal expansion. By holding that the exclusion of women based on menstruation falls within "untouchability in all its forms," the judgment created a constitutional basis for challenging any practice that treats a class of persons as impure or polluted based on inherent characteristics.
Essential religious practices test applied
The judgment applied the "essential religious practices" test (from Shirur Mutt, 1954) to determine whether the exclusion of women was protected under Article 25. By holding that the exclusion was not essential to the religion, the Court allowed constitutional rights to prevail over the claimed religious practice.
Significance
The Sabarimala judgment was one of the most socially significant constitutional decisions of the 21st century in India. It generated unprecedented public debate about the relationship between religious freedom and gender equality, the role of the judiciary in reforming religious practices, and the scope of "essential religious practices." The judgment was immediately followed by political protests and resistance to implementation. On 14 November 2019, a 5-judge Bench (3:2 majority) referred the review petitions to a larger 7-judge Bench, framing broader questions about the interplay between Articles 25 and 26, the essential religious practices doctrine, and the scope of judicial intervention in religious affairs. The 7-judge Bench reference remains pending as of 2026, leaving the substantive legal position in a state of uncertainty.
Exam angle
This case is essential for CLAT (Legal GK / Constitutional Law), Judiciary Mains (Constitutional Law), and UPSC Law Optional (Paper I — Freedom of Religion).
- MCQ format: "In the Sabarimala case (2018), the Supreme Court struck down the exclusion of women by a majority of: (A) 5:0 (B) 4:1 (C) 3:2 (D) 4:0"
- Descriptive format: "Critically examine the conflict between Articles 25-26 (religious freedom) and Articles 14-15 (equality) as analysed in the Sabarimala judgment. Was the dissent of Justice Malhotra constitutionally sound?" (Judiciary Mains)
- Key facts to memorize: 5-judge Bench, 4:1 majority, decided 28 September 2018, Rule 3(b) struck down, Justice Malhotra sole dissenter, review referred to 7-judge Bench (pending), women aged 10-50 excluded, essential religious practices test applied, untouchability interpretation expanded
- Related provisions: Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, 25, 26; Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act, 1965
- Follow-up cases: Review petition referred to 7-judge Bench (pending as of 2026); related to essential practices debate in Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta (2004) and Shirur Mutt (1954)
Frequently asked questions
Can women currently enter Sabarimala temple?
Legally, yes. The Supreme Court's 2018 judgment struck down Rule 3(b) and declared that women of all ages have the right to enter the Sabarimala temple. However, the practical situation is complicated. Review petitions were referred to a 7-judge Bench in November 2019, and that larger Bench has not yet delivered its judgment as of 2026. The 2018 judgment has not been stayed and remains operative, but implementation has been inconsistent due to social resistance and the pending reference.
What is the essential religious practices test?
The essential religious practices test, developed from Sri Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner (1954), is the judicial standard for determining whether a religious practice is protected under Articles 25 and 26. The test asks whether the practice is "essential" and "integral" to the religion — meaning the religion would lose its fundamental character without it. In the Sabarimala case, the majority held that the exclusion of menstruating-age women was not essential to the worship of Lord Ayyappa, as the deity is worshipped in other temples where women are not excluded, and the restriction is based on notions of ritual purity rather than core theology.
Why was the review referred to a 7-judge Bench?
On 14 November 2019, a 5-judge Bench (Chief Justice Gogoi, Justices Nariman, Khanwilkar, Chandrachud, and Malhotra) considered the review petitions by a 3:2 majority and referred several broader questions to a 7-judge Bench. These include: the interplay between Articles 25 (individual religious freedom) and 26 (denominational rights), the scope of the essential religious practices doctrine, the extent to which courts can interfere with religious practices, and whether the Sabarimala question should be considered alongside similar issues from other religions (entry of women into mosques, practice of female genital mutilation among Dawoodi Bohras).
How did Justice Chandrachud's concurrence differ from the other majority opinions?
Justice Chandrachud's concurring opinion was doctrinally the most far-reaching. While all four majority judges agreed that women must be allowed to enter, Justice Chandrachud went further by: (a) holding that the exclusion constitutes "untouchability" under Article 17, extending untouchability beyond caste to gender-based biological exclusion, (b) invoking "constitutional morality" as a standard that overrides popular morality and religious custom, and (c) arguing that individual religious freedom under Article 25(1) must prevail over group rights under Article 26 when the group practice violates fundamental rights.