In Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat (2026), the Supreme Court reaffirmed a long-standing principle of Indian evidence law: confessional statements recorded by customs officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, are admissible as substantive evidence because customs officers are not "police officers" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This 41-year-old case finally reached its conclusion, providing a definitive restatement of the law on statutory officer confessions.
Case snapshot
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case name | Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat |
| Citation | Diary No. 32292011 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Bench | Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta |
| Date of judgment | 23 February 2026 |
| Subject | Criminal Law — Evidence / Confessions |
| Key principle | Customs officers are not police officers; confessions to them are admissible if voluntary |
Facts of the case
On 30 April 1985, Customs officers in Mandvi, Gujarat, excavated two pits opposite a Government Guest House and recovered jute sacks containing 777 foreign wristwatches and 879 watch straps valued at Rs 2,22,190. Investigation traced the smuggled goods to a vessel named Safina-Tul-Firdaus H.M.V. 643, identified as arriving from abroad in February 1985. Seven individuals were charged, including ship owners Amad Noormamad Bakali and Aamad Alimamad Paleja. A key witness, Hussein Mamad Bhadala, provided a confessional statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act but subsequently died in Customs custody. The defence alleged severe custodial torture caused his death, and an FIR was filed against Customs officers for murder-related charges. The case wound through Indian courts for over four decades before reaching the Supreme Court.
Issues before the court
- Whether confessional statements recorded by customs officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act are admissible as substantive evidence, or barred by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act?
- Whether a confession from a witness who died in custody, allegedly through torture, retains evidentiary weight?
- What is the burden of proof regarding the voluntariness of statements recorded by statutory officers?
What the court held
Customs officers are not police officers under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court reaffirmed the settled position that customs officers exercise limited investigative powers under a special statute and do not fall within the definition of "police officers" for the purpose of Section 25. Therefore, confessions recorded by them are not hit by the ban on police confessions.
Voluntariness is the determinative test. The Court held that the admissibility of a statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act hinges entirely on whether it was made voluntarily, without coercion, threat, or inducement. If the accused alleges coercion, the burden is on them to establish it on facts.
Corroborative evidence strengthens confessional statements. The Court held that independent discoveries — the recovery of contraband, seized cash, and panchnamas — constituted corroborative evidence under Sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Evidence Act, strengthening the evidentiary value of the confessional statement.
Conviction upheld but sentence reduced. Given the appellants' advanced age, the four-decade delay in proceedings, and the lack of direct conscious possession evidence, the Court reduced the sentences to time already served.
"A confession made to a police officer is inadmissible in court. A confession made to a customs officer, if deemed voluntary, is admissible." — The Court, reaffirming the distinction
Key legal principles
Distinction between police officers and statutory officers
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act bars confessions made to a "police officer." The rationale is to prevent custodial coercion. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held since Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal (1968) and Illias v. Collector of Customs (1969) that officers of statutory bodies like the Customs Department, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, or Excise Department are not "police officers" for this purpose. Their investigative powers, though real, are derived from special statutes and are limited in scope compared to the plenary powers of police under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Amad Noormamad Bakali reaffirms this position with a fresh application to modern facts.
Section 108 of the Customs Act — power to summon and examine
Section 108 empowers a Customs officer to summon any person to give evidence or produce documents relevant to a Customs inquiry. Statements made under this section are treated as judicial proceedings. The Court confirmed that such statements, when voluntary, carry full evidentiary weight as substantive evidence in both departmental adjudication and criminal prosecution.
Voluntariness as the sole safeguard
Since the Section 25 bar does not apply, the only safeguard against coerced confessions to customs officers is the requirement of voluntariness under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution need not affirmatively prove voluntariness unless the accused raises a specific allegation of coercion. Once raised, the court examines the totality of circumstances — length of interrogation, access to legal counsel, conditions of custody, and surrounding evidence.
Significance
This judgment is significant for two reasons. First, it provides a definitive 2026 restatement of the 60-year-old principle distinguishing customs confessions from police confessions, settling any residual doubt about the law. Second, the extraordinary facts — a key witness who died in custody, four decades of litigation, and two appellants who died during Supreme Court proceedings — highlight the tension between enforcement powers and civil liberties in customs and revenue investigations. The ruling occurs against the backdrop of Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India (2024), where a three-judge bench upheld the interrogation powers of statutory officers while mandating procedural safeguards. For exam purposes, this case is the most recent and authoritative statement on the admissibility of confessions to non-police statutory officers.
Exam angle
This case is essential for Judiciary Prelims and Mains (Evidence Law), UPSC Law Optional, and AIBE. The Section 25 distinction between police and non-police officers is one of the most frequently tested evidence law topics.
MCQ format: "A confession made to a customs officer is: (a) Always inadmissible under Section 25 Evidence Act (b) Admissible if voluntary, as customs officers are not police officers under Section 25 (c) Admissible only if corroborated by independent evidence (d) Admissible only with a Magistrate's authorisation." Answer: (b)
Descriptive format: "Examine the legal distinction between confessions made to police officers and confessions made to customs officers in Indian evidence law. Discuss with reference to Ramesh Chandra Mehta (1968), Illias (1969), and Amad Noormamad Bakali (2026)." (Judiciary Mains / UPSC Law Optional)
Key facts to memorize: Two-judge bench (Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta); Section 108 Customs Act; Section 25 Evidence Act; 41-year-old case (1985-2026); 777 watches smuggled; voluntariness is the key test; customs officers are NOT police officers
Related provisions: Section 25 Evidence Act (confession to police inadmissible), Section 24 Evidence Act (confession by inducement, threat, or promise), Section 108 Customs Act (power to summon), Section 132 Customs Act (power of search), corresponding BSA 2023 provisions (Sections 22 and 23)
Follow-up cases: Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal (1968) — foundational ruling; Illias v. Collector of Customs (1969) — customs vs police distinction; Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India (2024) — procedural safeguards for statutory officers
Frequently asked questions
Why are confessions to customs officers admissible but confessions to police officers are not?
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act bars confessions made to a "police officer" to prevent custodial coercion. The Supreme Court has consistently held that customs officers are not "police officers" under this section because they exercise limited investigative powers under a special statute, not the plenary powers of police under the CrPC. Therefore, the Section 25 bar does not apply to them. However, such confessions must still be voluntary under Section 24.
What is Section 108 of the Customs Act?
Section 108 empowers a Customs officer to summon any person to give evidence or produce documents during a Customs inquiry. The proceedings are deemed judicial proceedings, and statements made under this section can be used as substantive evidence in both departmental adjudication and criminal prosecution. The key condition is that the statement must be voluntary.
How did the court handle the witness who died in custody?
The defence alleged that the key witness (Bhadala) died due to custodial torture by Customs officers. While an FIR was filed, the Court held that the confessional statement was obtained voluntarily and that the accused failed to establish coercion on facts. The independent corroborative evidence (recovered contraband, cash seizures, panchnamas) supported the voluntariness finding.
What are the corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act corresponds to Section 23 of the BSA 2023, and Section 24 corresponds to Section 22 of the BSA 2023. The principle that customs officers are not "police officers" applies equally under the new code. Students should note both old and new section numbers for exams.
Is this the first case on customs confessions?
No. The foundational cases are Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal (1968) and Illias v. Collector of Customs (1969), both Constitution Bench decisions. Amad Noormamad Bakali (2026) is the most recent reaffirmation by a two-judge bench, applying the same principle to a case that spanned over four decades.