Between 7 and 13 September 2026, the Supreme Court laid down a three-stage test for attributing criminal intent to a company, the Punjab and Haryana High Court struck down Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as unconstitutional, and SEBI and RBI jointly launched "Demat 2.0" — a pilot settling tokenised corporate bonds in the wholesale digital rupee while insisting nothing about the legal character of a security has changed.
Why This Week Matters for Exam Aspirants
Five Supreme Court judgments in six days give this week unusual density for Judiciary Mains and LLM entrance candidates. Three turn on doctrines that examiners return to again and again: corporate attribution of mens rea (Sanofi), the limits of incorporation-by-reference in arbitration (NSDC v. Surya Wires), and a Latin maxim tailor-made for a two-mark viva question (actus curiae neminem gravabit in Mamta Binani). A fourth — the Stamp Act reference in Bharat Petroleum — is a clean worked example of judicial propriety: a smaller Bench that disagrees with a larger Bench must refer the question upward, not simply rule the other way. The Section 147A ruling is this week's best constitutional-law answer material, because it applies the settled but underused principle that a retrospective validating law must cure the defect a court identified, not merely declare the court wrong. Fix the BNS Section 105 versus Section 106 distinction carefully — it is verified against the statute even though the specific FIR facts are not.
Developments — W37 2026
1. Supreme Court Lays Down a Three-Stage Test for Corporate Criminal Liability
Date: 7 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra | Citation: Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 INSC 957 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: Sanofi India was Accused No. 4 in a CBI chargesheet alleging that a Bhabha Atomic Research Centre scientist conspired with the company across 2011-16 to procure pharmaceutical products at inflated rates by misclassifying tender items, causing roughly Rs 3.53 lakh wrongful loss. No Sanofi employee was named as a co-accused. Sanofi's Section 482 CrPC petition — arguing a company cannot be prosecuted for a mens rea offence unless its "directing mind and will" is separately identified and arraigned — failed before the Karnataka High Court, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
The legal principle: The Court adopted a hierarchical three-stage attribution framework drawn from English authorities — Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 705, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153, and Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission [1995] 2 A.C. 500. Stage 1 examines the company's constitutional documents and company-law rules to identify where a power is vested; Stage 2 asks whether that power was delegated with sufficient discretion and independence; Stage 3 considers whether a special rule of attribution should be fashioned to serve the statute's purpose. Applying this, the Court held a chargesheet must disclose the corporation's own commission of the offence, not necessarily the identity of the individual who acted for it — identification and arraignment of a specific employee is not a threshold requirement. It distinguished Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 754, as confined to statutory vicarious-liability provisions, not cases of direct attribution like this one.
For your exam: Memorise the three stages in order, and their English-law sources. Keep two settled-law anchors alongside this new framework: Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 (companies can be prosecuted even for offences carrying mandatory imprisonment) and Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 (companies can possess mens rea).
2. Punjab and Haryana High Court Declares Section 147A of the Income-tax Act Unconstitutional
Date: 10 September 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Justice Deepak Sibal and Justice Rupinderjit Chahal | Citation: Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India and others, CWP-15791-2024 with connected cases | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: Nine constitutional courts, including this one, had held that only a faceless Assessing Officer — not a jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) — could issue a Section 148 reassessment notice, under Section 151A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the e-Assessment Scheme, 2022. Parliament inserted Section 147A by the Finance Act, 2026, retrospective from 1 April 2021, deeming a JAO always to have been a valid issuer. The Supreme Court, on 10 April 2026, remitted the question to each jurisdictional High Court without opinion. On remit, the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared Section 147A unconstitutional and set aside the Section 148 notices before it.
The legal principle: Drawing on Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 509, the Court held that Parliament may amend a statute retrospectively but cannot simply overrule a constitutional court's finding by deeming fiat without removing the statutory foundation the finding rested on. Because Section 151A and the 2022 scheme remained unamended and on the statute book, Section 147A's "clarification" was "in defiance of and in conflict with" the earlier rulings rather than a genuine cure, and — contrary to its own stated purpose of avoiding litigation — left the two provisions in unresolved conflict.
For your exam: The transferable principle is that a retrospective validating law must cure the defect a court identified in the pre-existing law, not merely assert the court's reading was wrong. Note this is a High Court ruling confined to Punjab and Haryana; at least eight other High Courts have parallel batches pending, so expect a Supreme Court resolution eventually.
3. SEBI and RBI Launch "Demat 2.0" — Tokenised Corporate Bonds Settled in the Digital Rupee
Date: 10 September 2026 | Authority: Securities and Exchange Board of India and Reserve Bank of India, Global Fintech Fest, Mumbai | Citation: SEBI Press Release No. 56/2026 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium-High
What happened: SEBI and RBI jointly launched a pilot testing the issuance, holding and settlement of corporate bonds as native digital tokens on a private, permissioned distributed-ledger network owned by the depositories, with funds moving through RBI's wholesale central bank digital currency (e-rupee) using atomic delivery-versus-payment.
The legal principle: SEBI's own 24-question FAQ confirms a tokenised bond remains a "security" under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, retaining its ISIN, coupon, maturity, rating and investor rights — tokenisation changes only the record-keeping technology. The depository, not the distributed ledger, remains the statutory record of beneficial ownership under the Depositories Act, 1996, and any freeze, attachment or direction on a demat holding carries over to the linked tokenised holding unchanged. The pilot runs under SEBI's Regulatory Sandbox, not a new statutory instrument; investors need no new demat account, no fresh KYC and manage no private keys — the depositories hold the keys on their behalf.
For your exam: A high-value current-affairs item for CLAT GK and company-law papers on fintech regulation. Fix three anchors: the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (what makes it a "security"), the Depositories Act, 1996 (who is the statutory record-keeper), and "Regulatory Sandbox" (the legal basis for the pilot — not a notified regulation).
4. Supreme Court: A Tribunal's Own E-Filing Failure Cannot Be Held Against a Litigant
Date: 10 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu | Citation: Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II v. Ms. Mamta Binani & Ors. | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: An IBC appeal under Section 61(2) was e-filed exactly one day beyond the 45-day outer limit — 30 days' limitation plus the 15-day condonable window — because the NCLAT's own e-filing portal suffered an OTP-delivery failure, a fact the NCLAT Registry's own report confirmed. The NCLAT held it had no statutory power to condone delay beyond 45 days and dismissed the appeal as time-barred; the Supreme Court set that order aside.
The legal principle: The Court left undisturbed the settled rule that Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 caps condonable delay at 45 days (National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Anil Kohli, (2022) 11 SCC 761; Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors., (2025) 9 SCC 483, remain good law for litigant-caused delay). But it held the NCLAT was "not precluded from invoking the actus curiae neminem gravabit principle" — an act of the court shall prejudice no one — even absent an express statutory remedy in Section 61, relying on the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602. It restored the appeal for the NCLAT to reconsider condonation on this footing, without itself ruling the appeal timely.
For your exam: The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is a favourite for a two-mark viva or MCQ — memorise the literal sense ("an act of the court shall prejudice no one") and this fact pattern as the illustration. The route is narrow: it required objective proof, from the tribunal's own Registry report, that the tribunal's infrastructure — not the litigant — caused the shortfall.
5. Supreme Court: A Personal Guarantor Can Be Bound by an Arbitration Clause It Never Signed
Date: 8 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe | Citation: National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires Private Limited & Ors., 2026 INSC 977 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: A guarantor who personally signed only a Personal Guarantee — not the Loan Agreement — sought exclusion from arbitration under Section 16, arguing he never agreed to arbitrate. The Loan Agreement defined "Facility Agreements" to include the Personal Guarantee and deemed all Facility Agreements "part of this Agreement as if the provisions thereof were set out herein in extension." The Sole Arbitrator and the Delhi High Court excluded him from the reference; the Supreme Court reversed.
The legal principle: Applying Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Constitution Bench in Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1, the Court reaffirmed that a general reference to another contract does not import its arbitration clause, but a specific, express incorporation does. It held the Loan Agreement's definition-and-deeming structure was "explicit, rather than a matter of inference," so the arbitration clause stood incorporated into the guarantee under Section 7(5), even though the guarantor never signed the Loan Agreement itself.
For your exam: Fix the citation chain — M.R. Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd., (2009) 7 SCC 726 → Inox Wind Ltd. v. Thermocables Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 519 → Cox and Kings, (2024) 4 SCC 1. The single most testable line is "general reference" (no incorporation) versus "specific reference" (incorporation).
6. Supreme Court: A Released Buyback Escrow Does Not Bar a Separate Fraud Inquiry
Date: 9 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan | Citation: Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Limited & Ors., 2026 INSC 978 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium-High
What happened: Vedanta Limited (then Cairn India) announced a buyback of up to 17.09 crore shares, worth up to Rs 5,725 crore, in January 2014, but purchased only about 21.48% of the targeted quantity. SEBI's Adjudicating Officer fined Vedanta Rs 5.25 crore and three directors Rs 15 lakh each for fraud under the PFUTP Regulations. The Securities Appellate Tribunal set the penalty aside, partly because the buyback escrow amount had already been released. The Supreme Court partly allowed SEBI's appeal and remanded the matter.
The legal principle: The Court held that satisfaction of Regulation 15B(8) of the SEBI (Buyback of Securities) Regulations, 1998 — a narrow, mechanical question of whether escrow is liable to forfeiture — does not automatically negate a separate fraud allegation under the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003; the two inquiries are legally distinct. It reaffirmed, per SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368, that fraud can be inferred from the totality of trading conduct, but found unresolved discrepancies in the underlying trading data and remanded the fraud question to SAT for fresh findings within six months.
For your exam: Fix the core proposition — a completed buyback and a released escrow do not insulate a company from a later PFUTP inquiry into the same transaction, a point frequently tested in company-law and securities-regulation papers.
7. Supreme Court Doubts the "Fraudulent Intent" Test for Stamp-Duty Undervaluation Notices
Date: 7 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu | Citation: Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. The District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 INSC 963 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium
What happened: BPCL had paid stamp duty on the full deed consideration, but the registering authority issued a Section 47-A show cause notice alleging undervaluation. A Single Judge, relying on the three-Judge Bench in V.N. Devadoss v. Chief Revenue Control Officer, (2009) 7 SCC 438 — which requires proof of "fraudulent intent" before a Section 47-A notice can issue — quashed the notice; a Division Bench restored it. The two-Judge Supreme Court Bench doubted V.N. Devadoss but, bound by it as a larger-Bench decision, referred the question to the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench.
The legal principle: The Court held Section 47-A's text requires only "reason to believe" that the market value was not truly set forth — no fraudulent-intent requirement appears in the text — and that reading one in "would be tantamount to judicial legislation." It illustrated the difficulty with two hypotheticals — an "honest" undervaluation and a genuinely "fraudulent" one — to show V.N. Devadoss "fails to do justice in either situation." Judicial discipline required a reference, not an override.
For your exam: A clean illustration of judicial propriety: a two-Judge Bench that disagrees with a three-Judge Bench precedent must refer the question, not decide the other way.
8. Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 2026 to Replace the 1891 Act from 1 October
Date: notified 10 September 2026, commencing 1 October 2026 | Authority: Ministry of Finance, Gazette notification under Section 1(2) of the Act | Citation: Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 2026 (Act 15 of 2026) | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium-High
What happened: A gazette notification dated 10 September 2026 appointed 1 October 2026 as the date on which the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 2026 comes into force. The Act, which received Presidential assent on 13 August 2026, repeals the 130-year-old Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891.
The legal principle: The 2026 Act adopts a technology-neutral definition of "bankers' books," covering records maintained in physical, electronic, digital, virtual and cloud-based forms, and expressly bars courts from denying admissibility to an electronic banking record solely because it is not physical. It introduces a "special cause" — to be recorded in writing by the court — as a precondition before a bank official can be summoned to give evidence where the bank is not itself a party, a defined threshold absent from the 1891 Act.
For your exam: Add this to your list of 2023-2026 evidence-law reforms alongside the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — a specialised banking-evidence statute sharing the same technology-neutral drafting approach. Fix the two dates: assent 13 August 2026, commencement 1 October 2026.
9. Supreme Court Collegium Recommends 15 Judicial Officers to Four High Courts
Date: 10 September 2026 | Authority: Supreme Court Collegium | Citation: Collegium Statements dated 10 September 2026 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium
What happened: In four separate statements issued the same day, the Collegium approved proposals to appoint 15 judicial officers as High Court judges: eight to the Delhi High Court, three each to the Karnataka and Jharkhand High Courts, and one to the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. All 15 were drawn from the subordinate-judiciary pool, none from the Bar.
The legal principle: A Collegium recommendation is a proposal forwarded to the Union Government under the consultative process built around Article 217 of the Constitution of India, following the Second and Third Judges Cases; it is not itself an appointment. Legal effect follows only once the President issues the formal warrant of appointment, followed by a Department of Justice notification in the Gazette of India.
For your exam: A reliable current-affairs GK item — fix the process chain: Collegium recommendation → Union Government processing → President's warrant under Article 217 → Gazette notification → swearing-in. Never describe a recommended judicial officer as already holding the office of Judge.
10. Madras High Court Denies UAPA Bail to a PFI Leader, Applying the Three-Pronged Test
Date: 7 September 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Judicature at Madras, Dr Justice Anita Sumanth and Justice Sunder Mohan | Citation: M. Mohammed Ali Jinnah v. Union of India, Crl. A. No. 865 of 2025 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium-High
What happened: The Court dismissed a bail appeal by a man alleged to be the Town Secretary of the Popular Front of India, accused of harbouring three proclaimed offenders wanted for a 2019 murder, finding a strong prima facie case under Section 19 of the UAPA and an incarceration period — 1 year, 9 months — well short of the roughly 5-year threshold in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb.
The legal principle: The Court applied a three-pronged test for UAPA bail — (i) the accused's role in the prima facie case, (ii) period of incarceration, and (iii) tempo of trial — tracing its development through Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Watali, K.A. Najeeb, Gurwinder Singh and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi. It rejected a bail-parity claim with a co-accused whose overt act — a single, incidental accommodation arrangement — was materially different from this appellant's sustained provision of shelter, false identities and phone connectivity to three proclaimed offenders.
For your exam: Fix the three-pronged test verbatim; it is the standard framework for any UAPA bail question. The same week's Delhi High Court UAPA bail grant, on comparable statutory provisions but after roughly eight years' custody, shows how outcome-determinative the "period of incarceration" prong has become.
11. A Reported FIR Shows Why BNS Section 105 Is Not the Same as Section 106
Date: statutory text verified this week; reported FIR dated on or about 31 August-1 September 2026 | Authority: reporting on a Uttar Pradesh Police FIR, statute text independently verified | Citation: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 105, 106 and 288 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High (statutory distinction); underlying facts unverified
What happened: Reporting on the FIR registered at Pipri police station over a 31 August 2026 firecracker-unit blast in Kaushambi, Uttar Pradesh specifies Sections 105 and 288 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — not the more commonly assumed Section 106. Veritect's OSH/WHS tracker read all three provisions directly from the statute, not from the FIR, which it has not seen, and flags the section-number attribution to this specific case as reported, not verified.
The legal principle: Section 106(1) (causing death by a rash or negligent act, not amounting to culpable homicide) caps punishment at 5 years. Section 105 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) carries a floor of 5 years rising to life imprisonment where the act was done with knowledge that death was likely, or 5 to 10 years where done with intent to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Section 288 (negligent conduct with an explosive substance) caps punishment at 6 months or a fine up to Rs 5,000. The line between "negligence" (Section 106) and "knowledge that death was likely" (Section 105) is the same line the Indian Penal Code, and now the BNS, has always drawn.
For your exam: A clean, statute-verified comparative question testing whether you can distinguish Section 105 from Section 106 by mental-element threshold and punishment range. Do not treat the specific Kaushambi FIR facts as confirmed — only the statutory text has been independently verified.
Key Facts to Remember
| Date | Item | One-line fact | Subject |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7 Sep 2026 | Sanofi India v. CBI, 2026 INSC 957 | Three-stage test to attribute mens rea to a company; no need to name an individual accused | Criminal Law / Company Law |
| 10 Sep 2026 | Jyoti Sareen v. UOI | Section 147A Income-tax Act declared unconstitutional; validating law must cure, not just override | Constitutional Law / Taxation |
| 10 Sep 2026 | Demat 2.0 (SEBI PR 56/2026) | Tokenised bonds remain securities under SCRA 1956; settled via wholesale digital rupee | Company Law / Securities Law |
| 10 Sep 2026 | RPFC-II v. Mamta Binani | Actus curiae neminem gravabit restores IBC appeal lost to NCLAT's own portal glitch | Insolvency Law |
| 8 Sep 2026 | NSDC v. Surya Wires, 2026 INSC 977 | Specific (not general) incorporation binds a non-signatory guarantor to arbitration, s. 7(5) | Arbitration Law |
| 9 Sep 2026 | SEBI v. Vedanta, 2026 INSC 978 | Escrow release under Buyback Regs does not bar a separate PFUTP fraud inquiry | Securities Law |
| 7 Sep 2026 | BPCL v. DRO (Stamps), 2026 INSC 963 | "Fraudulent intent" test for s. 47-A Stamp Act notices referred to larger bench | Taxation / Judicial Propriety |
| 1 Oct 2026 | Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 2026 | Commences 1 Oct 2026; replaces the 1891 Act with a technology-neutral framework | Evidence Law |
| 10 Sep 2026 | SC Collegium statements | 15 judicial officers recommended: 8 Delhi, 3 Karnataka, 3 Jharkhand, 1 J&K and Ladakh | Constitutional Law |
| 7 Sep 2026 | M. Mohammed Ali Jinnah v. UOI | Three-pronged UAPA bail test: role, incarceration period, trial tempo | Criminal Procedure |
| verified this week | BNS ss. 105/106/288 | s. 105 (knowledge, up to life) is far graver than s. 106 (negligence, capped at 5 years) | Criminal Law |
Practice MCQs
Q1: In Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2026 INSC 957), the Supreme Court's three-stage framework for attributing an individual's guilty mind to a company begins with which enquiry?
(a) Whether the individual was formally designated a director (b) Where a power is vested, examined against the company's constitutional documents and company-law rules (c) Whether the company recorded a board resolution authorising the conduct (d) Whether the individual has since resigned from the company
Answer: (b) — Stage 1 of the framework laid down on 7 September 2026 looks to the company's constitutional documents and company-law rules to identify in whom the relevant power is vested. Stage 2 then asks whether that power was delegated with sufficient discretion and independence, and Stage 3 considers whether a special rule of attribution should be fashioned to serve the purpose of the statute in question.
Q2: The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, applied by the Supreme Court in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II v. Ms. Mamta Binani & Ors. (10 September 2026) to restore an IBC appeal filed one day beyond the Section 61(2) outer limit, translates as:
(a) The court shall never condone delay (b) An act of the court shall prejudice no one (c) Ignorance of the law is no excuse (d) He who seeks equity must do equity
Answer: (b) — The Supreme Court invoked this maxim, drawing on the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, because the one-day delay in e-filing was caused entirely by a technical failure in the NCLAT's own e-filing portal, established by the NCLAT Registry's own report, not by any fault of the appellant.
Q3: Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, an act causing death, done with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death, falls most precisely under:
(a) Section 106(1) — causing death by a rash or negligent act, capped at 5 years (b) Section 105 — culpable homicide not amounting to murder, up to 10 years and fine where done with such knowledge (c) Section 288 — negligent conduct with an explosive substance, capped at 6 months (d) None of the above; the BNS has no provision for this specific state of mind
Answer: (b) — Section 105 fixes a floor of 5 years rising to life imprisonment where the act is done with intent to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and separately a term of 5 to 10 years with fine where the act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without such intent. This is a materially graver charge than Section 106's 5-year ceiling for a merely rash or negligent act.
Q4: The Punjab and Haryana High Court's ruling in Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India (10 September 2026), declaring Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 unconstitutional, rests on the principle that a retrospective validating law is invalid where it:
(a) Applies only to pending, and not already decided, assessments (b) Fails to remove or amend the very statutory basis — here, Section 151A and the 2022 e-Assessment Scheme — that the earlier judicial findings rested on (c) Was passed through a Finance Act rather than a standalone statute (d) Increases the limitation period available to the Revenue
Answer: (b) — Applying Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 509, the Court held Parliament could retrospectively amend the law but could not simply declare nine High Courts' rulings wrong without amending Section 151A or the 2022 scheme those rulings were founded on — a validating law must cure the underlying defect, not just override the finding.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the single most examinable holding from W37 2026?
Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 INSC 957, decided 7 September 2026 by Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra. The Supreme Court held that a company can be prosecuted for an offence requiring mens rea even where no individual employee or director is named as a co-accused, and laid down a three-stage framework for attributing a person's guilty mind to the corporation, drawing on Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 705, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153, and Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission [1995] 2 A.C. 500.
Does Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 now validly protect reassessment notices issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers?
Not in Punjab and Haryana, as things stand after 10 September 2026. In Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India, a Division Bench held Section 147A unconstitutional because Parliament's retrospective "clarification" never amended Section 151A of the Act or the 2022 e-Assessment Scheme those earlier rulings rested on. The ruling is confined to Punjab and Haryana for now; at least eight other High Courts have parallel litigation pending, and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the provision's validity.
Is a tokenised corporate bond under SEBI and RBI's "Demat 2.0" pilot a new kind of financial instrument?
No. SEBI's own 24-question FAQ, published alongside the 10 September 2026 launch, states a tokenised bond remains a security under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, keeping the same ISIN, coupon, maturity, rating and investor rights as a conventional dematerialised bond. Only the record-keeping technology changes; the depository, not the ledger, remains the statutory record of beneficial ownership under the Depositories Act, 1996, and the pilot runs under SEBI's Regulatory Sandbox rather than a new statutory framework.
What must a litigant prove to invoke actus curiae neminem gravabit against a tribunal's own e-filing failure?
Objective proof that the tribunal's own infrastructure, not the litigant's diligence, caused the shortfall. In Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II v. Ms. Mamta Binani & Ors., decided 10 September 2026, the Supreme Court restored an IBC appeal filed one day beyond the 45-day outer limit under Section 61(2) because the NCLAT Registry's own report confirmed the appellant's e-filing attempts had failed only due to an OTP-delivery defect in the NCLAT's own portal. The Court left the settled 45-day outer limit undisturbed; it held only that the tribunal was not precluded from applying the maxim in this narrow circumstance.
How does Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 differ from Section 106, and why does it matter this week?
Section 106(1) punishes causing death by a rash or negligent act, capped at five years. Section 105 punishes culpable homicide not amounting to murder, with a floor of five years rising to life imprisonment where the act was done with knowledge that death was likely, or five to ten years where done with intent. Reporting on the FIR registered over a 31 August 2026 firecracker-unit blast in Kaushambi, Uttar Pradesh specifies Sections 105 and 288 — not Section 106 — meaning investigators are reportedly treating the facts as closer to a knowing act than to simple negligence. Veritect has verified the statutory text directly against the Bare Acts mirror; it has not seen the FIR itself, so the section-number attribution to this specific case remains reported, not confirmed.
Sources: Supreme Court of India — Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 INSC 957 | Supreme Court of India — Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 INSC 963 | Supreme Court of India — National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2026 INSC 977 | Supreme Court of India — SEBI v. Vedanta Limited & Ors., 2026 INSC 978 | Supreme Court of India — Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II v. Ms. Mamta Binani & Ors. | High Court of Punjab and Haryana — Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India and others, CWP-15791-2024 | High Court of Judicature at Madras — M. Mohammed Ali Jinnah v. Union of India, Crl. A. No. 865 of 2025 | SEBI — Press Release No. 56/2026, "Demat 2.0" Pilot | Press Information Bureau — Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 2026 commencement | Supreme Court of India — Collegium Resolutions | India Code — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 | India Code — Bare Acts and Central legislation
Content by Veritect Legal Intelligence. For examination preparation purposes only. Verify current legal position from official sources — sci.gov.in, indiacode.nic.in, egazette.gov.in — before any practical application.