This is Veritect's legal current affairs digest for 31 August to 6 September 2026 in India. Two Supreme Court judgments define the week: Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026 INSC 928) fixes who may authorise a settlement supporting quashing, and Prakash Narain Sharma (D) thr. LR v. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (2026 INSC 927) restates when certiorari reaches a finding of fact. Both were decided on 31 August 2026.
Why This Week Matters for Exam Aspirants
W36 divides at the calendar. Every judgment in this digest was delivered on 31 August or 1 September 2026; every item from 2 September onwards is a Reserve Bank of India or Securities and Exchange Board of India instrument. The week was, on the record we hold, regulator-dominated in its back half — six RBI items and two SEBI items against seven judgments, and no judgment at all after 1 September. That is a statement about our archive for the week, not a finding that the courts delivered nothing; treat the second half as a source of dated, figure-bearing legal GK rather than of doctrine.
What the judgments give you is unusually concentrated. Three of the ten items below turn on the distinction between an error of fact and an error of law — the single most reusable idea in administrative law and in any Section 34 arbitration question. Two more supply clean old-law-to-new-law bridges: Section 320 CrPC to Section 359 BNSS, and Section 482 CrPC to Section 528 BNSS. Judiciary Mains candidates should mine items 1, 2 and 5 hardest; CLAT and AIBE candidates should mine items 3, 8 and 10 for figures.
Developments — W36 2026
1. Only the Victim, Not the Informant, Can Settle a Case for Quashing
Date: 31 August 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli | Citation: Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 INSC 928 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: A 2011 complaint alleged that a General Power of Attorney of 31 March 1997 over 54.48 acres in District Bhopal carried a forged signature and that a partnership deed of 16 March 2000 was built on that forgery. The man whose signature was said to have been forged was never made an accused, and in 2019 he swore an affidavit that he had himself contributed the land and had no grievance. The High Court refused to quash because the complainant had not joined the compromise. The Supreme Court set that aside and quashed the sessions trial against all accused.
The legal principle: The Court held that "'compounding of offence' and 'Quashing of offence due to a settlement' are two different concepts". Compounding is confined by Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — the successor to Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — to the offences in its table and the persons named in its third column, who are invariably those to whom the hurt, loss or damage was caused. Quashing on settlement is inherent power under Section 528 BNSS, and turns on whether any likelihood of conviction survives the settlement and whether continuing would abuse the process. On who may settle, the Court was categorical: "It will only be the victim who can authorize a settlement." Section 2(y) BNSS defines a victim as a person who has suffered loss or injury caused by the accused's act or omission, including a guardian or legal heir; Section 33 BNSS obliges any person aware of certain offences to inform the authorities, so the informant need not be the victim at all. The Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 carve-out survives intact.
For your exam: Learn the four-provision map — Section 2(y) for who the victim is, Section 33 for who the informant is, Section 359 for compounding, Section 528 for quashing — and their CrPC predecessors Sections 2(wa), 39, 320 and 482. The trap option in an MCQ will be "the first informant must consent". The correct answer is that consent is required from the person who suffered the loss.
2. Certiorari Reaches a Finding Made on No Evidence
Date: 31 August 2026 | Court/Authority: Supreme Court of India, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar | Citation: Prakash Narain Sharma (D) thr. LR v. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society, 2026 INSC 927; Civil Appeal Nos. 10693-10694 of 2026 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: A Registrar acting as arbitrator under Section 61 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 held in an award of 7 October 2003 that a claimant had remained a member of a housing society, and the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal affirmed that in a six-paragraph order under Section 76. The Delhi High Court set both aside in 2010. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against that.
The legal principle: The operative sentence in the award was "It has to be presumed that he continued to be a member of the society till the end of his life." Against that presumption stood four documents the arbitrator did not consider — a resignation accepted in 1951, a share transfer in 1951, a rejected fresh membership application in 1952, and a refusal in 1979. The Court held that a jurisdiction to issue certiorari "is supervisory and not appellate", that the writ court "will not reappreciate evidence", but that "[a] finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere." A body with jurisdiction to decide has the jurisdiction to decide correctly or wrongly; only a patent error is correctable, not merely a wrong decision.
For your exam: This is the cleanest current authority for the error-of-fact versus error-of-law line, and it pairs directly with the Section 34 arbitration standard at item 5 — the reasoning is the same reasoning in two statutory settings. Note also the drafting point the Court made: Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, which separates the fields of Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, did not bite because the petition invoked both. Write petitions against statutory tribunals under both Articles.
3. Post-Maternity Demotion Breaches Section 12 Even Without a Pay Cut
Date: 31 August 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Delhi, Justice Sachin Datta | Citation: Rakhi Bisht v. Union of India & Anr., W.P.(C) 14785/2024 (CNR No. DLHC010727702024) | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: A Chartered Accountant appointed Manager, Accounting at Rs 2,60,000 a month disclosed her pregnancy in May 2023, took maternity leave in December 2023, and on resuming in July 2024 was placed in a treasury role with no reporting employees. Her salary and designation were unchanged and an increment had been paid. She resigned in October 2024. The Court awarded Rs 10,00,000 compensation — described as approximately four months' salary — and Rs 1,50,000 costs, payable in eight weeks failing which interest runs at 9% per annum.
The legal principle: Three holdings matter. First, maintainability: although the employer was not "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, Section 27 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 makes the statutory obligation operate in supersession of the contract, so a writ under Article 226 lies against a private body discharging a positive obligation of a public nature — the Court applied Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733. Second, scope: the bar in Section 12(1) of the 1961 Act and Section 68(1) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 is "not confined to measures amounting to, or directly associated with, termination of employment nor is it exhausted by merely maintaining her salary and designation", and reaches duties, grade, functional status, reporting hierarchy, supervisory responsibilities and appraisal and promotion eligibility. Third, compensation: public-law compensation is not confined to State action, following Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 42 and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746.
For your exam: The transition point is worth stating expressly in a Mains answer — the Court read Section 12 of the 1961 Act together with Section 68 of the 2020 Code, and recorded that the rules and schemes contemplated by Sections 150 and 154 of the Code have not been framed, directing the Union to complete that exercise within six months of 31 August 2026. Attach the judgment to Articles 14, 15, 21 and 42, and remember Section 11A of the 1961 Act for the creche facility.
4. A Section 163 BNSS Order Cannot Reach Backwards
Date: 31 August 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Delhi, Justice Saurabh Banerjee | Citation: Alok Prakash Srivastava v. State (NCT of Delhi), CRL.M.C. 4388/2026 (CNR No. DLHC010256942026) | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium-High
What happened: An Assistant Commissioner of Police passed an order on 8 November 2025 under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 read with Section 70 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, requiring tenant and servant particulars to be furnished; it came into force on 9 November 2025 for 60 days. On 13 November 2025 a guard was found at premises during a verification drive who had worked there for about five years. An FIR under Section 223(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 followed. The Court quashed it.
The legal principle: Section 163(4) BNSS provides that no order under that section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, subject to a State Government extension power — which is why such orders issue in a rolling series. The Court held that an order so limited is prospective and "cannot be given an expansive meaning" to govern engagements already subsisting when it commenced. Because the order was the sole basis of the alleged offence, nothing survived to go to trial. The test applied was State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, through the inherent power in Section 528 BNSS.
For your exam: Section 223 BNS is titled "Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant" and opens with the word "knowing" — knowledge of the order is an ingredient, and clause (a) carries simple imprisonment up to six months, or fine up to Rs 2,500, or both. The examinable structure is the three-date test: when the order commenced, when the engagement began, when the inspection happened. Note the mixed statutory landscape — order under BNSS, offence under BNS, quashing power under BNSS, governing test from a 1992 CrPC authority.
5. NIL Arbitral Award Restored — Section 34 Is Not an Appeal
Date: 1 September 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Delhi, Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Madhu Jain | Citation: Otsuka Chemical (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Trans Engineers India Pvt. Ltd., FAO (OS) (COMM) 234/2024 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐⭐ High
What happened: On a Rs 71 crore turnkey contract for a chemical plant at Kotputli, Rajasthan, the contractor claimed Rs 28,37,09,384 for additional work after completion and full payment. A Sole Arbitrator dismissed all claims by a NIL award of 7 March 2022. A Single Judge set that aside on 22 July 2024. The Division Bench restored the award.
The legal principle: "Though the learned Single Judge may have had a view that the above interpretation of the Agreement by the learned Arbitrator was not correct, this is not the test to be applied under Section 34 of the A&C Act. Interference with the Award is warranted only where such interpretation is perverse and not possible at all." Two subsidiary holdings are examinable in their own right: a party's failure to specifically deny extra work, and a "without prejudice" offer of Rs 3 crore, do not discharge the claimant's burden of proof and are in any event matters of appreciation of evidence within the arbitrator's exclusive domain. The Bench applied Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 INSC 34, for the proposition that Section 37 jurisdiction is akin to Section 34 jurisdiction.
For your exam: Fix the ladder — Section 34(2)(b)(ii) public policy, Section 34(2A) patent illegality for domestic awards, Section 37 appeal. The transferable sentence for a Mains answer is that correctness is not the standard; possibility is. This is the same error-of-fact / error-of-law line as item 2, in arbitration clothing.
6. Regularisation of Long-Serving Contractual Staff in a Public Sector Undertaking
Date: 1 September 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Delhi, Justice Sanjeev Narula | Citation: Piyush Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 3843/2026 and connected petitions | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium-High
What happened: WAPCOS Limited, a Government of India undertaking, decided on 10 November 2025 to stop extending contractual engagements in non-technical categories, and on 30 January 2026 issued notices terminating subsisting contracts on one month's notice. Nine writ petitions were partly allowed. The policy was upheld prospectively; the termination notices were set aside.
The legal principle: Starting from Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, the Court held that the enquiry cannot begin from an assumption that a contractual appointment is illegal merely because it is contractual, and that mere non-availability of the original recruitment file does not by itself establish illegal entry. The employer's own Recruitment and Promotion Rules contained Guideline (j), a preferential route to regular appointment for contractual employees of at least five years' standing; having used that mechanism before, the employer could not leave it unaddressed while continuing to extend engagements. A three-category scheme followed: ten years or more, regularisation within six weeks; five years or more, consideration by the Guideline (j) Selection Committee within three months; below five years, no entitlement. Where no vacancy exists, a personal supernumerary post coterminous with service is to be created, outside the regular vacancy pool and without disturbing the reservation roster. Benefits are prospective only, with no arrears.
For your exam: Service law questions almost always route through Umadevi, and this judgment is a clean illustration of the limits of that authority — it bars regularisation of illegal entrants, not of employees recruited through the employer's own recognised route. Note the two anti-parity holdings: Article 14 does not require an employer to repeat an irregular exercise, and a restructuring proposal generated after a decision cannot retrospectively justify it.
7. Nomination Procurement Upheld Under Rule 204 GFR, With a Course Correction
Date: 31 August 2026 | Court/Authority: High Court of Delhi, Justice Sachin Datta | Citation: Utimaco Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 15291/2024 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium
What happened: A private supplier challenged the Union Government's designation of the Centre for Development of Telematics as sole implementing agency for the cell broadcasting component of Sachet, India's Common Alerting Protocol-based emergency alert system connected with the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The petition was dismissed. The project stands sanctioned at Rs 99.82 crore and the solution was launched on 2 May 2026.
The legal principle: The engagement was procurement of a non-consulting service governed by Rule 204 of the General Financial Rules, 2017 — not Rule 194 — whose substantive requirements of an exceptional situation, consultation with the Financial Adviser and recorded justification were satisfied on the record. An erroneous or absent reference to the source of power does not invalidate its exercise where the substantive conditions are met. On Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, the Court distinguished impermissible supplementation by extraneous material from permissible substantiation on grounds implicit in contemporaneous records. Applying Tata Cellular v. Union of India, it held it does not possess the technical expertise to sit in appeal over evaluations by domain experts. The Court nonetheless directed that in future nomination procurements the specific enabling GFR provision be expressly invoked and the justification contemporaneously recorded.
For your exam: The three grounds of judicial review of administrative action — illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety — are the frame, and Tata Cellular plus Mohinder Singh Gill are the two names to carry. The portable proposition is that a made-out procedural infraction may still not yield relief where the project is operational and public safety is engaged; remedy is discretionary.
8. RBI Fines Three Credit Bureaus Over Late Compensation Payouts
Date: Announced 4 September 2026; orders dated 31 August 2026 | Court/Authority: Reserve Bank of India | Citation: RBI Press Releases 2026-2027/1042, 1043 and 1045 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium
What happened: RBI penalised TransUnion CIBIL Limited Rs 26,82,800, CRIF High Mark Credit Information Services Private Limited Rs 6,89,600 and Equifax Credit Information Services Private Limited Rs 1,19,400 — Rs 34,91,800 in aggregate — for failing to credit compensation to eligible complainants' bank accounts within the prescribed period. All three inspections were referenced to financial positions as on 31 March 2025.
The legal principle: The penalty power is Section 25(1)(iii) read with Section 23(4) of the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005. The substantive framework sits in paragraph 17 of the Master Direction — Reserve Bank of India (Credit Information Reporting) Directions, 2025. It converts two statutory timelines into a paid entitlement: Section 21(3) of the 2005 Act gives thirty days to act on a correction request, and Rule 20(3)(c) of the Credit Information Companies Rules, 2006 gives the credit institution twenty-one days to forward corrected particulars — twenty-one days for the lender, nine for the bureau. Miss the thirty days and the complainant is entitled to Rs 100 for every calendar day of delay, credited to the bank account within five working days of resolution. The charge sustained concerned that payout step, not the correction itself.
For your exam: Memorise the numeric chain — 21 days, 9 days, 30 days, Rs 100 per calendar day, 5 working days. This is exactly the shape of a CLAT legal GK or AIBE banking question. The consumer remedy is the RBI Ombudsman under the Reserve Bank — Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021.
9. Three RBI Instruments in One Day, and One Body With No Public Record
Date: 2 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Reserve Bank of India | Citation: A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20 (RBI/2026-27/251); RBI/2026-27/249; RBI/2026-27/250 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium
What happened: Three instruments issued the same day. First, two 2003-vintage reporting duties on Authorised Dealer Category-I banks concerning Rupee accounts of non-resident banks were dispensed with "with immediate effect", under Sections 10(4) and 11(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Second, reporting on relief measures in areas affected by natural calamities moved from a monthly return to a half-yearly return through the Centralised Information Management System portal, due within 30 days of each half-year — by 30 October and 30 April — with the old monthly return discontinued from 1 July 2026 and a materially wider set of filers now covered. Third, the urban co-operative bank investment-portfolio Directions were amended under Section 35A read with Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to permit UCBs to hold equity of the Indian Digital Payment Intelligence Corporation for acquiring its membership.
The legal principle: Two mapping points are examinable. Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is the provision that applies the Act to co-operative societies carrying on banking business, and Section 35A is the general power to issue directions in the public interest — that pair recurs in every RBI action against a co-operative bank. Under FEMA, Section 10(4) governs the duty of an authorised person to comply with RBI directions and Section 11(1) empowers RBI to give those directions.
For your exam: A research-honesty point worth carrying into your own answer-writing. As at 5 September 2026, no RBI notification or press release describing the establishment, ownership or mandate of the Indian Digital Payment Intelligence Corporation could be traced on rbi.org.in — the only primary description available is the single phrase in the amendment's own recital, "the nation's central digital payment fraud intelligence platform". That is a gap in the traceable record, not evidence that no such record exists, and it should be written as a gap rather than filled by inference.
10. SEBI Signals a Review of Derivative Settlement Prices, and Replaces a 2017 MoU
Date: 3 and 4 September 2026 | Court/Authority: Securities and Exchange Board of India | Citation: SEBI Press Release No. 53/2026 and No. 54/2026 | Exam Relevance: ⭐⭐ Medium
What happened: On 3 September 2026 SEBI said that after monitoring the first month of the Closing Auction Session it "may be proposing certain changes" to how settlement prices of derivative contracts are determined on expiry, with a consultation paper due in about a week. CAS was introduced by SEBI's circular of 16 January 2026 and took effect on 3 August 2026: a separate 20-minute session from 3:15 pm to 3:35 pm, applying in its initial phase only to stocks on which derivative contracts are available, with other securities keeping the volume weighted average price of the last 30 minutes. On 4 September 2026 SEBI signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the European Securities and Markets Authority on cooperation and exchange of information relating to central counterparties regulated by SEBI, replacing an MoU of 21 June 2017.
The legal principle: The instructive point is the difference between a signal and a decision. No amendment has been made; the methodology under the January 2026 circular continues until any change is separately notified. Clearing corporations in the Indian securities market are regulated under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations) Regulations, 2018, and the MoU's stated object is to establish a framework for ESMA "to place reliance on SEBI's regulatory and supervisory activities, while safeguarding the European Union's financial stability" — deference conditioned on an outcome, not deference at large.
For your exam: Fix three dates — circular 16 January 2026, CAS live 3 August 2026, review announced 3 September 2026 — and the 3:15 pm to 3:35 pm window. Note also that the text of the SEBI-ESMA MoU had not been published on sebi.gov.in as at 5 September 2026, so no claim about its contents beyond SEBI's own one-page release can be made.
Key Facts to Remember
| Date | Item | One-line fact | Subject |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31 Aug 2026 | 2026 INSC 928 | Only the victim under s. 2(y) BNSS may authorise a settlement | Criminal Procedure |
| 31 Aug 2026 | 2026 INSC 927 | A finding on no evidence is an error of law, correctable by certiorari | Administrative Law |
| 31 Aug 2026 | Rakhi Bisht | Rs 10,00,000 compensation; salary parity alone does not satisfy s. 12 | Labour Law |
| 31 Aug 2026 | Alok Prakash Srivastava | s. 163 BNSS order is prospective; s. 163(4) caps it at two months | Criminal Law |
| 31 Aug 2026 | Utimaco | Rule 204 GFR 2017 governs non-consulting service by nomination | Administrative Law |
| 1 Sep 2026 | Otsuka Chemical | Correctness is not the s. 34 test; perversity is | Arbitration |
| 1 Sep 2026 | Piyush Kumar Singh | Ten years, six weeks; five years, three months; supernumerary posts | Service Law |
| 2 Sep 2026 | RBI/2026-27/250 | Calamity-relief return now half-yearly, due 30 Oct and 30 Apr | Banking Law |
| 3 Sep 2026 | SEBI PR 53/2026 | CAS runs 3:15 pm to 3:35 pm; live since 3 August 2026 | Securities Law |
| 4 Sep 2026 | RBI PR 1042/1043/1045 | Rs 34,91,800 total; Rs 100 per calendar day compensation rule | Banking Law |
Practice MCQs
Q1: Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a settlement offered in support of quashing must be authorised by:
(a) The first informant who set the criminal law in motion (b) The victim, being a person who suffered loss or injury (c) The Public Prosecutor, in every case (d) The Magistrate who took cognizance
Answer: (b) — Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 INSC 928, decided 31 August 2026. Section 2(y) BNSS defines a victim as a person who has suffered loss or injury caused by the accused's act or omission, including a guardian or legal heir. Section 33 BNSS obliges any person aware of certain offences to inform the authorities, so an informant need not be a victim at all, and his refusal to join cannot block quashing under Section 528 BNSS.
Q2: An order made under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 shall not remain in force for more than:
(a) Fifteen days (b) One month (c) Two months (d) Six months
Answer: (c) — Section 163(4) BNSS provides that no order under that section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, subject to the State Government's power to extend. That ceiling is why such orders issue in a rolling series, and it underpinned the Delhi High Court's holding on 31 August 2026 in CRL.M.C. 4388/2026 that a Section 163 order is prospective and cannot govern an engagement predating it.
Q3: Under the Master Direction — Reserve Bank of India (Credit Information Reporting) Directions, 2025, a complainant whose credit-information complaint is not resolved within thirty calendar days is entitled to compensation of:
(a) Rs 50 per calendar day (b) Rs 100 per calendar day (c) Rs 500 per week (d) Rs 1,000 as a one-time payment
Answer: (b) — Rs 100 for every calendar day of delay, and the amount must be credited to the complainant's bank account within five working days of resolution. Within the overall thirty days, the credit institution has twenty-one days under Rule 20(3)(c) of the Credit Information Companies Rules, 2006 and the credit information company the remaining nine. RBI's orders of 31 August 2026, announced 4 September 2026, penalised three bureaus a combined Rs 34,91,800 for missing the five-working-day payout step.
Q4: A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was held maintainable against a private employer in Rakhi Bisht v. Union of India principally because:
(a) The employer was an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 (b) The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 provides its own writ remedy (c) Section 27 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 makes the statutory obligation operate in supersession of the contract (d) The petitioner had exhausted all alternative remedies
Answer: (c) — The Delhi High Court held on 31 August 2026 that although the employer was not "State" within Article 12, the obligation sought to be enforced is statutory and by force of Section 27 of the 1961 Act operates in supersession of the contract of employment, so a writ lies against a private body discharging a positive obligation of a public nature, following Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733. On alternative remedy the Court held the rule is one of prudence, noting that the rules and schemes contemplated by Sections 150 and 154 of the Code on Social Security, 2020 remain unframed.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the single most examinable holding from W36 2026?
Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 INSC 928, decided on 31 August 2026 by Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli. The proposition is that where quashing is sought on the strength of a settlement, only the victim can authorise that settlement — the victim being a person who has suffered loss or injury within Section 2(y) BNSS and Section 2(wa) CrPC. The Court also separated two ideas examiners routinely conflate: compounding under Section 359 BNSS operates only within the statutory table and the persons in its third column, while quashing on settlement is inherent power under Section 528 BNSS.
Does the ruling mean any case can be quashed once the victim agrees?
No, and stating it that way would lose marks. The Court reaffirmed Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: murder, rape, dacoity, offences of mental depravity and corruption by public servants cannot be quashed on settlement because they harm society at large. The exception operates for offences bearing a predominantly civil flavour — those arising from civil, mercantile, commercial, financial or partnership transactions. On the facts the Court found a civil flavour with commercial overtones and no repercussions on society generally.
When can a High Court interfere with a tribunal's findings of fact under Article 226?
Only where the finding amounts to an error of law. In 2026 INSC 927 the Supreme Court restated that certiorari is supervisory and not appellate and that the writ court will not reappreciate evidence — but that a finding unsupported by any evidence is perverse, and perversity is an error of law. A body with jurisdiction to decide has jurisdiction to decide correctly or wrongly, so a wrong decision on evidence is an error of fact; a decision on no evidence at all is an error of law.
Is keeping a returning mother's salary and designation unchanged enough under Section 12 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961?
No. The Delhi High Court held on 31 August 2026 that retention of the same designation and remuneration is necessary but not by itself sufficient. The bar in Section 12(1) of the 1961 Act and Section 68(1) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 is not confined to termination and reaches duties, grade and functional status, reporting hierarchy, supervisory responsibilities and appraisal and promotion eligibility. The Court awarded Rs 10,00,000 compensation and Rs 1,50,000 costs and gave the Union six months to frame implementation rules.
Why does a Section 163 BNSS order operate only prospectively?
Because it is a short-lived preventive order, not a continuing rule of conduct. Section 163(4) BNSS caps it at two months from the making thereof, subject to a State Government extension power. The Delhi High Court held on 31 August 2026 that an order operative for 60 days from 9 November 2025 could not govern a guard's engagement that had subsisted for about five years before it commenced, and quashed the FIR under Section 223(a) BNS. Section 223 itself opens with "knowing", so knowledge of the order is an ingredient of the offence.
How much of W36 2026 was regulatory rather than judicial?
Materially more than half, and the split is unusually clean by date. In our archive for the week, every item dated 2 September 2026 or later is a regulator instrument or enforcement action — six from RBI and two from SEBI — while the judgments all fall on 31 August and 1 September 2026. Treat the back half of the week as dated legal GK: Rs 100 per calendar day for delayed credit-report correction, Rs 34,91,800 in aggregate penalties on three bureaus, and calamity-relief reporting moving to a half-yearly cycle due 30 October and 30 April.
Sources: Supreme Court of India — Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 INSC 928 | Supreme Court of India — Prakash Narain Sharma (D) thr. LR v. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society, 2026 INSC 927 | High Court of Delhi — judgment search (all five Delhi High Court judgments, retrievable by case number or CNR) | Reserve Bank of India — Press Release 2026-2027/1042, TransUnion CIBIL Limited | Reserve Bank of India — A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20, RBI/2026-27/251 | Reserve Bank of India — Circular RBI/2026-27/250, half-yearly calamity-relief return | Reserve Bank of India — Second Amendment Directions, RBI/2026-27/249 | SEBI — Press Release No. 53/2026 | SEBI — Press Release No. 54/2026 | India Code — Bare Acts and Central legislation
Content by Veritect Legal Intelligence. For examination preparation purposes only. Verify current legal position from official sources — sci.gov.in, indiacode.nic.in, egazette.gov.in — before any practical application.