Article 142 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing "complete justice" in any cause or matter pending before it, with such orders being enforceable throughout India. Under Indian law, this is the Court's broadest residuary power — a constitutional equity jurisdiction that allows the Supreme Court to fashion remedies, fill legislative gaps, and do justice even where existing statutory provisions are inadequate or absent.
Legal definition
The Constitution provides the full text of Article 142:
Article 142(1): "The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe."
Article 142(2): "Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself."
Article 142(1) is the provision of greater constitutional significance. Several features distinguish it from ordinary judicial powers. First, it is available only to the Supreme Court — no High Court or subordinate court possesses an equivalent power. Second, it operates across all jurisdictions of the Court — original, appellate, and advisory. Third, the orders passed under Article 142 are enforceable throughout India, unlike ordinary decrees that may require separate execution proceedings. Fourth, the power is residuary and supplementary — it is designed to fill gaps left by substantive and procedural law, not to replace them.
How courts have interpreted this term
The scope of Article 142 has been the subject of a tension between two judicial approaches: an expansive view (Article 142 can override substantive law where complete justice demands it) and a restrictive view (Article 142 supplements but cannot supplant substantive law).
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner [AIR 1963 SC 996]
A five-judge Constitution Bench adopted the restrictive view, holding that an order under Article 142 "must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws." This decision established the early baseline that Article 142 powers are not unlimited and must operate within the framework of existing law.
Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India [(1989) 1 SCC 674]
In the Bhopal Gas Tragedy case, the Supreme Court adopted the expansive view, settling the mass tort claims for US $470 million and holding that "prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142." The Court reasoned that Article 142 operates at a different constitutional plane from ordinary statutory provisions and enables the Court to do complete justice even if that requires departing from the strict letter of the law.
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India [(1998) 4 SCC 409]
A three-judge Bench attempted to reconcile the tension between Prem Chand Garg and Union Carbide. The case arose from the contempt conviction of an advocate and the question of whether the Court could, in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, also suspend the advocate's licence to practise under Article 142. The Court held that while Article 142 confers plenary powers that are "complementary to those powers specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes," these powers cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law — only to "supplement" it. The Court specifically held that the power to suspend or revoke an advocate's licence is vested exclusively in the Bar Council under the Advocates Act, 1961, and cannot be exercised by the Supreme Court through Article 142 in contempt proceedings without following the statutory procedure. This decision established the "supplement but not supplant" test as the governing standard.
Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan [(2023) 10 SCC 461]
A five-judge Constitution Bench expanded the scope of Article 142 in the context of matrimonial law, holding that the Supreme Court can grant divorce directly under Article 142 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, even though this ground is not recognised in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Court also held that the mandatory six-month waiting period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act can be waived under Article 142. This decision marks the most significant recent expansion of Article 142 powers.
Why this matters
Article 142 is the Supreme Court's most powerful and most controversial provision. It enables the Court to do justice in situations where rigid application of statutory law would produce unjust outcomes — acting as a constitutional safety valve that prevents the legal system from failing individual litigants or the nation at large.
For practitioners, Article 142 is both an opportunity and a limitation. It is an opportunity because it provides a residuary source of relief when no statutory provision covers the litigant's situation. It is a limitation because its boundaries are inherently uncertain — the "supplement but not supplant" test from Supreme Court Bar Association leaves room for judicial discretion in determining where supplementation ends and supplantation begins. The Shilpa Shailesh decision (2023) demonstrates that the Court is willing to use Article 142 to fill what it perceives as legislative gaps, even in areas where Parliament has enacted a comprehensive statutory framework.
A common misconception is that Article 142 gives the Supreme Court unlimited power to override any law. This is incorrect. The Court has consistently held that Article 142 cannot be used to violate fundamental rights, cannot override express constitutional provisions, and should be exercised with restraint and judicial responsibility. The power is extraordinary and must be invoked only when ordinary legal remedies are demonstrably inadequate to achieve complete justice.
Related terms
Broader concepts:
Related Supreme Court powers:
- Article 141 (Law Declared by SC)
- Article 136 (Special Leave to Appeal)
- Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies)
Related concepts:
Frequently asked questions
Can the Supreme Court use Article 142 to override a statute?
The position is nuanced. The Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) established the "supplement but not supplant" test — Article 142 can supplement statutory law to fill gaps and do justice, but cannot supplant (i.e., replace or override) substantive statutory provisions. However, in Union Carbide (1989) and Shilpa Shailesh (2023), the Court exercised Article 142 powers in ways that departed from statutory provisions. The current position is that Article 142 can override procedural requirements and fill legislative gaps, but cannot override express substantive prohibitions or fundamental rights.
Can High Courts exercise powers similar to Article 142?
No. Article 142 is a power vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. High Courts do not possess any equivalent constitutional provision. However, High Courts have inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Article 226, which provide some equitable jurisdiction — though far narrower than Article 142. The absence of an Article 142 equivalent for High Courts is a deliberate constitutional design reflecting the Supreme Court's unique position as the apex court.
Has Article 142 been used to grant divorce in India?
Yes. In Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023), a five-judge Constitution Bench held that the Supreme Court can grant divorce directly under Article 142 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, even though this ground is not statutorily recognised under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or other personal laws. The Court also held that the mandatory waiting period under Section 13B(2) can be waived under Article 142. Prior to this, the Supreme Court had used Article 142 to grant divorce in individual cases on a case-by-case basis.
What are the limitations on Article 142 powers?
The Supreme Court has identified several limitations: Article 142 cannot override fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution; it cannot be used to override express constitutional provisions; it should not be used as a substitute for legislative action on matters of policy; and it must be exercised with judicial restraint and only when necessary to achieve complete justice. The "supplement but not supplant" test from Supreme Court Bar Association (1998) remains the governing standard, though its application varies across cases.
This entry is part of the Veritect Indian Legal Glossary, a comprehensive reference of Indian legal terminology grounded in statutory text and judicial interpretation.
Last updated: 2026-03-27. Veritect provides this content for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.