Judicial Review is the power of the Supreme Court and High Courts to examine the constitutional validity of legislative enactments and executive actions, and to declare them void if they are found to violate the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution or transgress the limits of legislative competence. Under the Indian Constitution, judicial review derives from Articles 13, 32, 226, and 227, and has been declared a part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution.
Legal definition
Unlike in some other jurisdictions, judicial review in India has an explicit textual basis in the Constitution:
Article 13(1): All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
Article 13(2): The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
Article 13 provides the substantive basis — laws violating Fundamental Rights are void. Article 32 and Article 226 provide the procedural mechanisms through which the Supreme Court and High Courts exercise this power by issuing writs. Article 227 additionally vests High Courts with supervisory jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction.
Indian judicial review encompasses three distinct dimensions: (a) review of legislative action for constitutionality; (b) review of executive and administrative action for legality, rationality, and procedural propriety; and (c) review of constitutional amendments for compliance with the basic structure doctrine.
How courts have interpreted this term
Minerva Mills v. Union of India [(1980) 3 SCC 625]
The Supreme Court held that the power of judicial review is an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment. The Court struck down clauses 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment (enacted during the Emergency) which had attempted to bar judicial review of constitutional amendments and give primacy to Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights. Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud observed: "If the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited, as it must be, the power of judicial review is an essential feature of the Constitution for it is through this power that the limitation is enforced."
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261]
A seven-judge Bench held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be ousted or excluded by any legislative or constitutional provision. The Court struck down provisions of Articles 323A and 323B that sought to exclude the High Courts' writ jurisdiction over administrative tribunals. This decision established that no tribunal or statutory body can be insulated from judicial review by the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4 SCC 225]
While this thirteen-judge Bench decision is primarily associated with the basic structure doctrine, it is foundational to judicial review because it established that the Supreme Court has the power to review constitutional amendments — not merely ordinary legislation — for compliance with the basic structure. Before this decision, the prevailing view (in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh) was that Parliament's amending power under Article 368 was unlimited. Kesavananda Bharati placed the ultimate check on parliamentary sovereignty in the hands of the judiciary.
Types of judicial review
Indian constitutional law recognises three grounds of judicial review, broadly following the framework developed in administrative law:
Illegality: The decision-maker did not have the legal power to take the action, acted beyond the scope of the enabling statute, or misinterpreted the law.
Irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness): The decision is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who applied their mind to the question could have arrived at it. Indian courts adopted this test from English law and have applied it consistently.
Procedural impropriety: The decision-maker failed to observe the rules of natural justice — specifically, the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem) and the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) — or did not follow mandatory procedural requirements prescribed by the governing statute.
In addition, the Indian doctrine of proportionality — applied with increasing frequency since Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2016) 7 SCC 353] — examines whether the means adopted by the State are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Why this matters
Judicial review is the cornerstone of Indian constitutionalism. It ensures that no organ of the State — whether legislature, executive, or even a constitutional amendment body — can act outside the bounds of the Constitution. Without judicial review, the guarantees of Fundamental Rights would be unenforceable, and the constitutional distribution of powers between the Union and the States would be unpoliced.
For practitioners, understanding judicial review is essential because it determines the range of remedies available to challenge government action. Tax professionals challenging an arbitrary assessment, businesses contesting regulatory orders, citizens challenging detention, environmental groups seeking enforcement of pollution norms, and employees challenging dismissal — all ultimately rely on the courts' power of judicial review. The choice of forum (Supreme Court under Article 32, High Court under Article 226, or a specialised tribunal with High Court review) is a critical strategic decision in every constitutional challenge.
A common misconception is that judicial review allows courts to substitute their judgment for that of the government on policy matters. Indian courts have consistently held that judicial review is concerned with the "decision-making process" and not with the "decision" itself. Courts do not sit as appellate authorities over policy choices. However, where a policy decision violates Fundamental Rights, is manifestly arbitrary, or falls outside the decision-maker's legal authority, judicial review provides the constitutional corrective.
Related terms
Broader concepts:
Enforcement mechanisms:
Related concepts:
Frequently asked questions
Is judicial review explicitly mentioned in the Indian Constitution?
Unlike in the United States, where judicial review was established by judicial interpretation in Marbury v. Madison (1803), India's Constitution provides an explicit textual basis through Article 13 (which declares laws violating Fundamental Rights to be void) and Articles 32 and 226 (which empower the Supreme Court and High Courts to issue writs enforcing those rights). The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) declared this power to be part of the basic structure.
Can judicial review be excluded by Parliament?
No. The Supreme Court has held that judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be excluded even by a constitutional amendment. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), the Court struck down provisions that attempted to exclude High Court writ jurisdiction over tribunals. Parliament can establish alternative forums like tribunals, but their decisions must remain subject to judicial review by High Courts.
What is the difference between judicial review and appeal?
In an appeal, the appellate court can re-examine both facts and law, and can substitute its own findings for those of the lower court. Judicial review is narrower — it examines only whether the decision-maker acted within its legal authority, followed proper procedure, and reached a decision that is not irrational or disproportionate. Courts exercising judicial review do not re-weigh evidence or substitute their judgment on merits.
Can the Supreme Court review its own judgments?
Yes, but only in limited circumstances. Under Article 137, the Supreme Court has the power to review its own judgments or orders, subject to the provisions of any law or rules made under Article 145. Review is typically granted only on grounds of an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new evidence, or other sufficient reason. Additionally, the Supreme Court can revisit and overrule its prior decisions through a larger bench — as it did when the nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy (2017) overruled the five-judge bench in ADM Jabalpur (1976).
Does judicial review apply to constitutional amendments?
Yes, since the Kesavananda Bharati decision (1973). The Supreme Court can examine whether a constitutional amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution. If it does, the amendment can be struck down. This was applied in Minerva Mills (1980), where the Court struck down parts of the 42nd Amendment, and in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), where the Court held that even laws placed in the Ninth Schedule can be reviewed for basic structure violations.
This entry is part of the Veritect Indian Legal Glossary, a comprehensive reference of Indian legal terminology grounded in statutory text and judicial interpretation.
Last updated: 2026-03-27. Veritect provides this content for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.