Section 482 CrPC vs Section 528 BNSS — Inherent Powers of High Court

In India, Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) replaces Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The words are the same except "Code" becomes "Sanhita" twice. The section saves the High Court's inherent powers to give effect to orders, prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

At a glance

What changed

• Heading — Identical. Both read "Saving of inherent powers of High Court". (The CrPC's arrangement of sections prints "Saving of inherent power of High Court"; the section itself reads "powers".)
• Opening words — Minor edit. "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect" becomes "Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect".
• First purpose — Minor edit. "to give effect to any order under this Code" becomes "…under this Sanhita".
• Second and third purposes — Identical. "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice".
• Court named — Identical. Only "the High Court".
• Neighbouring section, s.529 BNSS (s.483 CrPC) — Expanded. The duty of continuous superintendence now extends to "the Courts of Session and Courts of Judicial Magistrates", with expeditious disposal "by the Judges and Magistrates". Section 483 CrPC covered only the Courts of Judicial Magistrates. This is a separate section and does not alter s.528.

Statutory text (relevant extract)

Section 482 CrPC: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

Section 528 BNSS: "Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

The text says nothing about quashing, FIRs, settlements or interim stays. Everything on this page about those subjects comes from judgments, identified as such.

How it works — the steps

1. Who may act. Only the High Court. Section 528 names no other court, so a Sessions Court or Magistrate needs a specific provision of the BNSS for any power it exercises.
2. What kind of provision it is. A saving clause. On its words it preserves powers rather than creating them. Gian Singh (para 49), construing s.482, says the section "confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers".
3. The purpose must be identified. The order must be necessary for one of three ends: to give effect to an order under the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Gian Singh (para 50) treats the High Court's formation of opinion on one of the twin objectives (abuse of process, ends of justice) as a sine qua non.
4. Threshold limits from the case law. Madhu Limaye notes, as principles followed "ordinarily and generally, almost invariably", that the power is not to be used where the Code provides a specific remedy, and that it is to be exercised very sparingly. Gian Singh (para 49) adds that it should not be exercised against an express bar of law in another provision of the Code.
5. Relationship with revision. Section 438(2) BNSS repeats s.397(2) CrPC: revision "shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order". Under Madhu Limaye, that bar confines revision, not inherent power. But inherent power is not a route around the bar for purely interlocutory orders.
6. Grounds for quashing. The seven illustrative categories in Bhajan Lal (below) are the usual starting point.
7. Settlement cases. Gian Singh (para 57) governs when a settled but non-compoundable case may be quashed.
8. Interim orders. Neeharika (para 23) governs stays of investigation and "no coercive steps" orders while a petition is pending.

What this means in practice

For the accused. Plead the ground, not just the section. Tie the petition to a Bhajan Lal category and one of the three statutory purposes. Show why a specific remedy in the BNSS does not meet the grievance, since Madhu Limaye and Gian Singh treat the existence of such a remedy as a reason to decline. For example, an express bar to the institution of proceedings is Bhajan Lal category (6). A time-bar under s.514 BNSS is, on a reading, such a bar, subject to the court's power to extend time under s.519. If you want protection from arrest while the petition is heard, Neeharika expects exceptional facts and brief reasons from the court. It points to anticipatory bail, which s.482 BNSS now provides, as the ordinary route.

For complainants and victims. A settlement does not automatically end a non-compoundable case. Under Gian Singh (para 57) the High Court weighs the nature and gravity of the offence. Settlement-based quashing is for offences that are private in nature or have an overwhelmingly civil flavour. It does not extend to heinous offences or offences by public servants in that capacity.

For the investigating officer. Neeharika (para 23(i)-(ii)) affirms the police's statutory right and duty to investigate a cognizable offence and says courts "would not thwart" such investigation. The same paragraph disapproves blanket interim orders. Where an interim order uses the words "no coercive steps", the High Court must clarify what they mean (para 23(xviii)).

For advocates. Cite s.528 BNSS for proceedings governed by the BNSS. For an application pending on 1 July 2024, see "Which law applies" below. Because the words are the same, on a reading the choice of label does not change the test.

Judgments that still matter

Section 528 BNSS repeats the operative words of s.482 CrPC. On a reading of the text, judgments construing s.482 remain relevant to s.528.

State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 259 (1990 INSC 363), 21 November 1990. S. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy JJ.; judgment by Pandian J. The reported text carries no paragraph numbers; the passage is at pp. 305-306 per the headnote. Covering both Article 226 and s.482, the Court gave seven categories "by way of illustration", expressly not exhaustive. The seven are: (1) allegations that, taken at face value, disclose no offence; (2) allegations that disclose no cognizable offence justifying police investigation; (3) uncontroverted allegations and evidence that disclose no offence; (4) a non-cognizable offence investigated without a Magistrate's order; (5) allegations so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could find sufficient ground; (6) an express legal bar to institution or continuance, or a specific efficacious remedy; (7) proceedings manifestly mala fide or instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance. It cautioned that the power "should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases". On the facts, it held that the allegations disclosed a cognizable offence and did not call for quashing the FIR itself (headnote 8.2).

Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 749 (1977 INSC 206), 31 October 1977. P.K. Goswami, N.L. Untwalia and D.A. Desai JJ.; judgment by Untwalia J. (no paragraph numbers). The question was whether the bar on revising interlocutory orders in s.397(2) also bars s.482. The Court's "harmonious" answer was that the bar operates only on revision. If an order brings about an abuse of process, or interference is absolutely necessary to secure the ends of justice, s.397(2) cannot limit the inherent power. The Court added that such cases would be "few and far between" (at 753-754). It also held that, even assuming an order taking cognizance is interlocutory, s.397(2) does not stop the High Court from using inherent power to end a proceeding early (at 754). Bearing on BNSS: s.438(2) BNSS repeats s.397(2) and s.528 repeats s.482, so on a reading the same harmonisation applies.

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, [2012] 8 S.C.R. 753 (2012 INSC 419), 24 September 2012. A three-judge bench (R.M. Lodha, Anil R. Dave and Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya JJ.); judgment by Lodha J. on a reference. Para 49 describes s.482 as an overriding provision that confers no new power. Para 57 holds the quashing power "distinct and different" from compounding under s.320 CrPC (now s.359 BNSS). It holds that "Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute". Cases with an overwhelmingly civil flavour, and private matrimonial or family disputes, stand on a different footing.

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, [2021] 4 S.C.R. 1044 (2021 INSC 253), 13 April 2021. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah and Sanjiv Khanna JJ.; judgment by Shah J. Para 23 sets out the Court's conclusions. Quashing is "an exception rather than an ordinary rule". The court cannot inquire into the reliability of the allegations. Stays of investigation and "no coercive steps" orders are for exceptional cases only. Even then, "the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted". Otherwise the accused is relegated to anticipatory bail under s.438 CrPC.

Surendra Khawse v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Supreme Court, 22 September 2025 (non-reportable). Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh JJ.; judgment by Karol J. The Madhya Pradesh High Court had "refused to exercise its powers under Section 528" to quash an FIR and chargesheet under s.376 IPC (para 2). The Court set out s.528 (para 11) and said s.482 CrPC "corresponds to Section 528, BNSS" (para 12). It applied Bhajan Lal category (7). The FIR was lodged four months after the alleged incident and after the complainant's employer had issued her a show-cause notice on the appellant's earlier complaints. That left "a gaping possibility" that the FIR was "a vehicle for vengeance" (para 13). The appeal was allowed and the FIR and chargesheet were quashed (para 15). This is the Supreme Court acting on appeal; s.528 saves only the High Court's powers.

Which law applies to your case

Section 531(2)(a) BNSS provides that any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending immediately before the BNSS came into force is disposed of under the CrPC "as if this Sanhita had not come into force". On a reading, a s.482 CrPC petition pending on 1 July 2024 continues under s.482, and petitions filed afterwards invoke s.528 BNSS. In Surendra Khawse the petition was filed under s.482 CrPC on 13 October 2023 (para 8), yet the Supreme Court described the High Court's January 2025 order as a refusal under s.528 (para 2). The judgment does not discuss s.531. Because the two sections use the same words, on a reading the test applied is the same either way. See which law applies to an offence before 1 July 2024.

Frequently asked questions

Is Section 528 BNSS different from Section 482 CrPC? Only in two words. Section 528 BNSS repeats Section 482 CrPC word for word except that "Code" becomes "Sanhita" in both places, and the heading "Saving of inherent powers of High Court" is the same. The three purposes, the court named and the saving form are unchanged.

Can a Sessions Court or Magistrate use Section 528 BNSS? No. Section 528 BNSS saves only "the inherent powers of the High Court" and names no other court. A Sessions Court or Magistrate must find its power in a specific provision of the BNSS, such as discharge, revision under Section 438 or compounding under Section 359.

Can the High Court quash an FIR under Section 528 BNSS? The words of Section 528 BNSS do not mention quashing; they save powers to give effect to orders, prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. The quashing jurisdiction comes from judgments under Section 482 CrPC, notably State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ([1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 259). In Surendra Khawse (22 September 2025) the Supreme Court quashed an FIR and chargesheet on appeal from a High Court order under Section 528.

What are the Bhajan Lal categories? Bhajan Lal listed seven illustrative categories for Article 226 or Section 482: allegations that disclose no offence, no cognizable offence, or no offence even with the evidence collected; a non-cognizable offence investigated without a Magistrate's order; absurd allegations; an express legal bar or specific remedy; and mala fide proceedings. The Court said the list was not exhaustive and the power is to be used sparingly.

Can a non-compoundable case be quashed after the parties settle? Gian Singh v. State of Punjab ([2012] 8 S.C.R. 753, para 57) held that quashing under Section 482 CrPC differs from compounding under Section 320 CrPC (now Section 359 BNSS). Quashing on settlement may be justified in cases with a predominantly civil flavour or private family and matrimonial disputes. Heinous offences such as murder, rape and dacoity, and offences by public servants while working in that capacity, are not fit for it.

Can the High Court stop the police from arresting me while my quashing petition is pending? Neeharika Infrastructure ([2021] 4 S.C.R. 1044, para 23) held that High Courts should not pass blanket orders of "no coercive steps" or stays of investigation as a matter of course. Such orders are for exceptional cases, with brief reasons, and the accused may otherwise be relegated to anticipatory bail, now Section 482 BNSS.

Does the bar on revising interlocutory orders also limit Section 528 BNSS? Section 438(2) BNSS repeats the Section 397(2) CrPC bar on revision of interlocutory orders. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ([1978] 1 S.C.R. 749) the Supreme Court held that the bar applies to revision, but inherent power may still be used, sparingly, where an order amounts to an abuse of process or interference is absolutely necessary to secure the ends of justice.

How does Section 528 BNSS differ from Article 226 of the Constitution? Section 528 BNSS is a statutory saving clause: nothing in the Sanhita limits the High Court's inherent powers. Article 226 is a separate constitutional power to issue directions, orders or writs for enforcing Part III rights and for any other purpose, and Article 227 gives superintendence over courts. Bhajan Lal framed its quashing categories for both Article 226 and Section 482.

Related

• Section 438 CrPC vs Section 482 BNSS — anticipatory bail
• Compromise in a criminal case — compounding under BNSS 359
• Police refuse to register an FIR — remedies
• Limitation for taking cognizance — BNSS 513-519
• Section 154 CrPC vs Section 173 BNSS — FIR
• Offence before 1 July 2024 — which law applies
• Section 397 CrPC vs Section 438 BNSS — Criminal Revision (CrPC 397-401)
• Section 483 CrPC vs Section 529 BNSS — Duty of the High Court to Exercise Continuous Superintendence over Courts
• Sections 406–412 CrPC vs Sections 446–452 BNSS — Transfer of Criminal Cases

Sources

• Acts and sections read: BNSS 2023 ss.359(1), 438, 442, 482, 528, 529, 531 (Gazette CG-DL-E-25122023-250884); CrPC 1973 ss.397, 401, 438, 482, 483 (original India Code text); Constitution of India, Arts. 226 and 227.
• Judgments read (Veritect judgment corpus, full text): State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (S_1990_3_259_319_EN.md); Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1978_1_749_760_EN.md); Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012_8_753_812_EN.md); Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021_4_1044_1099_EN.md); Surendra Khawse v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Diary_8809-2025_Judgment.md).

This page explains the statutory text and the judgments cited as they stand. It is not legal advice; for a specific case, consult an advocate.