Sections 467-473 CrPC vs Sections 513-519 BNSS — Limitation for Taking Cognizance

In India, Sections 513 to 519 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) replace Sections 467 to 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) on limitation for taking cognizance. The six-month, one-year and three-year periods are unchanged. A new Explanation to Section 514 fixes the complaint-filing or Section 173 recording date as the relevant date.

At a glance

What changed

• s.513 (s.467), definition of "period of limitation" — Minor edit. "section 468" becomes "section 514"; nothing else changes.
• s.514 heading — Minor edit. "Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation" becomes "…after lapse of period of limitation".
• s.514(1) — Minor edit. "Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code" becomes "Except as otherwise provided in this Sanhita".
• s.514(2), the three periods — Identical. Clauses (a) to (c) repeat s.468(2) word for word.
• s.514(3), offences tried together — Identical. The most severe punishment among offences that may be tried together governs. (CrPC: inserted by Act 45 of 1978, s.33, w.e.f. 18.12.1978.)
• Explanation to s.514 — New. "For the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date shall be the date of filing complaint under section 223 or the date of recording of information under section 173."
• s.515 (s.469), commencement — Minor edit. The heading drops "the" ("Commencement of period of limitation"); the text is identical.
• s.516 (s.470), exclusion of time — Minor edit. A semicolon replaces the comma after "Central Government" in sub-section (4)(a); the text is otherwise identical.
• s.517 (s.471), court closed — Identical.
• s.518 (s.472), continuing offence — Identical.
• s.519 (s.473), extension — Identical.

One editorial point sits outside the enacted words. The CrPC text prints a footnote to Chapter XXXVI saying the Chapter does not apply to certain economic offences, citing the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 (12 of 1974), s.2 and Schedule. The BNSS Gazette text carries no such note (see "Which law applies" below).

Statutory text (relevant extract)

Section 468(1) CrPC (extract): "Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation."

Section 514(1) BNSS (extract): "Except as otherwise provided in this Sanhita, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation."

Explanation to Section 514 BNSS (full): "For the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date shall be the date of filing complaint under section 223 or the date of recording of information under section 173."

Section 519 BNSS (extract; same words as s.473 CrPC): "…any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."

How it works — the steps

1. Classify the offence by its maximum punishment (s.514(2)). Fine only: six months. Imprisonment up to one year: one year. Imprisonment over one and up to three years: three years. Anything more severe: no period. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), public nuisance under s.292 (fine up to one thousand rupees) is in the six-month class; voluntarily causing hurt under s.115(2) (up to one year, or fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both) is in the one-year class.
2. Offences tried together (s.514(3)). The most severe punishment among them fixes the period.
3. Find the start date (s.515). Ordinarily the date of the offence. If the offence was not known to the person aggrieved or any police officer, the first day it came to the knowledge of either, whichever is earlier. If the offender was unknown, the first day the offender's identity became known to the person aggrieved or the investigating officer, whichever is earlier. Exclude the starting day itself (s.515(2)).
4. Deduct excluded time (s.516). (1) Time spent with due diligence prosecuting the offender on the same facts, in good faith, in a court unable to entertain the case for defect of jurisdiction or like cause. (2) The period of a stay by injunction or order, plus the days it was made and withdrawn. (3) Any notice period, or the time taken to obtain a required consent or sanction, excluding both the application date and the date the order is received. (4) Time when the offender was absent from India or avoided arrest by absconding or concealment.
5. Court closed on the last day (s.517). If the period expires on a day the court is closed (during its normal working hours), it may take cognizance on the day it reopens.
6. Continuing offence (s.518). A fresh period begins "at every moment of the time during which the offence continues".
7. Measure against the relevant date (Explanation to s.514). The complaint-filing date under s.223, or the date information was recorded under s.173.
8. If late, invoke s.519. The court may still take cognizance if the delay has been properly explained or if it is necessary in the interests of justice.

What this means in practice

For a complainant before a Magistrate. Keep proof of the filing date. Section 223(1) BNSS now bars cognizance "without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard". On a reading of the Explanation, the time that hearing takes does not count against the complainant. If the complaint is late, set out the explanation and the justice grounds for s.519 in it; Sarah Mathew (para 26) describes this route under the CrPC, with notice to the accused before delay is condoned.

For an informant going to the police. For cognizable offences the Explanation points to the date of recording of information under s.173. Section 173(1)(ii) takes electronic information "on record" once it is signed within three days; which date then controls is not answered by the text. Nor does the Explanation mention s.174, under which information about a non-cognizable offence is entered.

For the accused. A limitation objection turns on offence class, start date, excluded time and the relevant date, not on when cognizance was taken. On condonation under the CrPC, Sarah Mathew (para 26) describes notice to and hearing of the accused, and expressly leaves open whether notice is needed when only the interests-of-justice ground is relied on.

For advocates checking the class. The class follows the punishment in the substantive law that applies to the offence. Some BNS punishments differ from the IPC: criminal breach of trust was punishable with up to three years under s.406 IPC (three-year class), but s.316(2) BNS allows up to five years. On a reading of s.514(2), an offence under s.316(2) BNS is therefore outside the Chapter altogether.

Judgments that still matter

Sections 514(1)-(3) and 515-519 BNSS repeat the operative words of ss.468-473 CrPC, so on a reading of the text judgments construing them remain relevant, subject to the new Explanation.

Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, [2013] 12 S.C.R. 674 (2013 INSC 784), 26 November 2013. A five-judge bench (P. Sathasivam CJI, B.S. Chauhan, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan Gogoi and S.A. Bobde JJ.) answered a reference on conflicting decisions; the judgment of the Court was delivered by Desai J. Para 41 holds that "the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance". Para 28 reasons that otherwise a diligent complainant would be "entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate". Para 27 reads s.473 as addressed to the complainant's delay in filing. Bearing on BNSS: the Explanation to s.514 now states the relevant date in the text. For police cases its words ("date of recording of information under section 173") differ from the Court's ("date of institution of prosecution"), and the statute now governs.

Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, [2007] 8 S.C.R. 582, 27 July 2007. C.K. Thakker and Tarun Chatterjee JJ.; judgment by Thakker J. The complaint was filed three days after the alleged offence; cognizance came after the one-year period. Para 52 holds that a complainant who acts within time "is not responsible for any delay on the part of the Court or Magistrate". Para 53 holds the relevant date to be the date of filing the complaint or initiating proceedings, and overrules contrary decisions. Sarah Mathew (para 41) held that this line of authority "lays down the correct law".

Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 287 (1993 INSC 158), 20 April 1993. Kuldip Singh and N.P. Singh JJ.; judgment by N.P. Singh J. A wife's cruelty complaint had been quashed by the High Court as time-barred. Para 5 holds that s.473 has a non obstante clause with overriding effect on s.468. Cognizance may be taken where the delay is properly explained and, even without a proper explanation, where the interests of justice require it. Para 6 contrasts s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the applicant must show "sufficient cause". Section 473, by contrast, "enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay". The appeal was allowed (para 10). Bearing on BNSS: s.519 repeats s.473, and "sufficient cause" still does not appear in it.

Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 719 (1999 INSC 260), 14 May 1999. K. Venkataswami and S.S.M. Quadri JJ.; judgment by Quadri J. (the reported text has no paragraph numbers). Cruelty under s.498A IPC was treated as a continuing offence, each act giving a new starting point, but the complaint, filed about seven years after the last alleged act, was time-barred. The discharge on the unexplained s.406 IPC charge was upheld; on s.498A the Magistrate had not considered s.473. The Court held that "interest of justice" cannot be read to mean "in the interest of prosecution". It added that a finding of time-bar "without considering the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C. will be a deficient and defective finding", and remitted the s.498A question.

State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 S.C.R. 349, 2 April 1981. S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and A. Varadarajan JJ.; judgment by Fazal Ali J. An embezzlement of 22 August 1972, detected by an audit report of 5 January 1973, was charged under s.406 IPC on 13 October 1976. Taking either date, the prosecution was barred under s.468(2)(c) read with s.469, and the acquittal was upheld. The Court tied the bar to fair trial under Article 21: any prosecution "must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation" (at 351).

Which law applies to your case

Section 531(2)(a) BNSS provides that any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending immediately before the BNSS came into force is disposed of under the CrPC "as if this Sanhita had not come into force". Section 531(3) adds that where a CrPC period had already expired, nothing in the BNSS enables a proceeding to be commenced merely because the BNSS gives a longer period or allows extension. On a reading, a complaint filed on or after 1 July 2024 about an offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) committed earlier is tested under ss.513-519 BNSS. On the same reading, the class follows the IPC punishment, because s.358(2) BNS preserves penalties incurred for offences against the IPC and lets proceedings be instituted and penalties imposed "as if that Code had not been repealed". Article 20(1) of the Constitution bars a penalty greater than the law in force at the time of the offence. Separately, s.2 of the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 disapplies "Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973" to scheduled offences. Whether that reference now reaches BNSS Chapter XXXVIII turns on s.8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 ("unless a different intention appears"); no amendment to the 1974 Act was verified for this page. See which law applies to an offence before 1 July 2024.

Frequently asked questions

What is the limitation period for a criminal complaint under the BNSS? Section 514(2) BNSS sets three periods: six months if the offence is punishable with fine only, one year if it is punishable with imprisonment up to one year, and three years if it is punishable with imprisonment over one year but not over three years. These are the same periods as Section 468(2) CrPC. Section 514 sets no period for an offence punishable more severely, so its bar does not apply to such offences.

Which date counts — the date I file, or the date the Magistrate takes cognizance? The Explanation to Section 514 BNSS says the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing the complaint under Section 223 or the date of recording of information under Section 173. Under the CrPC, which had no such Explanation, the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew ([2013] 12 S.C.R. 674, para 41) had held the relevant date to be the date of filing the complaint or instituting the prosecution, not the date of cognizance.

When does the limitation period start running? Under Section 515 BNSS (Section 469 CrPC), the period starts on the date of the offence. If the offence was unknown to the person aggrieved and the police, it starts when either first learns of it; if the offender was unknown, when the offender's identity first becomes known. The starting day itself is excluded.

Can a court take cognizance after the limitation period has expired? Yes. Section 519 BNSS, worded exactly like Section 473 CrPC, lets any court take cognizance after the period expires if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice. In Vanka Radhamanohari ([1993] 3 S.C.R. 287, para 5) the Supreme Court read the two grounds as alternatives, so the second can apply even without a proper explanation.

What time is excluded when computing limitation? Section 516 BNSS (Section 470 CrPC) excludes a good-faith prosecution in a court lacking jurisdiction, a stay by injunction or order, a notice period or the time taken to obtain a required sanction, and time the offender was absent from India or absconding. Under Section 517, if the period ends on a day the court is closed, cognizance may be taken when it reopens.

Does limitation apply to a continuing offence such as cruelty? Section 518 BNSS (Section 472 CrPC) starts a fresh period at every moment the offence continues. In Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas ([1999] 3 S.C.R. 719) the Supreme Court treated cruelty under Section 498A IPC as a continuing offence with a new starting point for each act of cruelty, and held that a Magistrate must consider Section 473 before declaring such a complaint time-barred.

Does the limitation bar apply to serious offences like murder or criminal breach of trust? No period is prescribed by Section 514 BNSS for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding three years, imprisonment for life or death, so the Chapter's bar does not reach them. The category depends on the punishment in the substantive law: criminal breach of trust carried up to three years under Section 406 IPC but up to five years under Section 316(2) BNS.

If limitation expired under the CrPC, can a complaint be revived under the BNSS? Not by relying on the BNSS alone, on a reading of Section 531(3) BNSS. Where the period for an application or other proceeding under the CrPC had expired on or before the BNSS came into force, nothing in the BNSS enables it to be made or commenced merely because the BNSS specifies a longer period or provides for extension of time.

Related

• Section 200 CrPC vs Section 223 BNSS — private complaint
• Section 154 CrPC vs Section 173 BNSS — FIR
• Section 406 IPC — criminal breach of trust
• Section 482 CrPC vs Section 528 BNSS — inherent powers of the High Court
• Offence before 1 July 2024 — which law applies

Sources

• Acts and sections read: BNSS 2023 ss.173, 174, 223, 513-519, 531 (Gazette CG-DL-E-25122023-250884); BNS 2023 ss.115(2), 292, 316(2) (Gazette CG-DL-E-25122023-250883); CrPC 1973 ss.154, 200, 467-473 with the Chapter XXXVI footnote (original India Code text); IPC 1860 s.406; Limitation Act 1963 s.5; General Clauses Act 1897 s.8; Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act 1974 ss.1-2.
• Judgments read (Veritect judgment corpus, full text): Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2013_12_674_734_EN.md); Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007_8_582_604_EN.md); Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy (1993_3_287_295_EN.md); Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas (1999_3_719_728_EN.md); State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh (1981_3_349_351_EN.md).

This page explains the statutory text and the judgments cited as they stand. It is not legal advice; for a specific case, consult an advocate.