Quick Answer
Sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 have been replaced by Sections 100 and 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, effective 1 July 2024. These are the foundational definitional provisions that distinguish culpable homicide from murder — arguably the most important distinction in Indian criminal law. The core definitions are substantively retained: Section 100 BNS reproduces the three limbs of culpable homicide (intention to cause death, intention to cause likely-fatal bodily injury, knowledge of likely death), and Section 101 BNS preserves the four clauses that elevate culpable homicide to murder along with all five exceptions. The key structural change is that BNS 101 replaces the IPC's limb structure (a first limb in the opening words, followed by limbs labelled Secondly, Thirdly and Fourthly) with clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), and recasts the provisos to Exception 1 as a proviso with items (a)–(c), with minor language changes.
What changed
| Old law | New law | |
|---|---|---|
| Act | Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 |
| Culpable homicide | Section 299 | Section 100 |
| Murder | Section 300 | Section 101 |
| Clause structure | Unlabelled first limb, then Secondly, Thirdly, Fourthly ("2ndly", "3rdly", "4thly" in the text) | Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) |
| Exceptions | Five exceptions (illustrations to Exceptions 1, 2 and 5) | Five exceptions — retained with minor language updates |
| Change type | Modified — restructured clause numbering, substance preserved |
Relevant statutory text (extract)
Section 299 IPC (repealed w.e.f. 1 July 2024)
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Explanation 1 — A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2 — Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3 — The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
Section 100 BNS
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Explanation 1 — A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2 — Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3 — The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
Section 300 IPC (repealed w.e.f. 1 July 2024)
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Section 101 BNS
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,––
(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or
(b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or
(c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
(d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Both sections retain the same five exceptions: (1) grave and sudden provocation, (2) exceeding the right of private defence in good faith, (3) public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, (4) sudden fight in the heat of passion, and (5) consent of the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years. The provisos to Exception 1, set out in the IPC as "First", "Secondly" and "Thirdly", appear in BNS 101 as "Provided that the provocation is not,–– (a) … (b) … (c) …". Illustrations are omitted from this extract.
Key differences
Clause numbering reformatted: Section 300 IPC set out the first limb in its opening words and the remaining limbs as Secondly, Thirdly and Fourthly (rendered "2ndly", "3rdly", "4thly" in the text). Section 101 BNS replaces this with clauses (a), (b), (c), (d). The wording of each limb is carried over with drafting changes: each BNS clause restates "if the act by which the death is caused is done", and clause (d) reads "if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows".
Section 100 BNS is textually identical to Section 299 IPC: The definition of culpable homicide — including all three limbs and all three explanations — is reproduced without any change. On a reading of the text, judgments interpreting the words of Section 299 therefore remain relevant to Section 100.
Exception language preserved: All five exceptions to murder are retained in BNS 101, and their operative words are unchanged. Two drafting changes: the provisos to Exception 1 are recast from "First / Secondly / Thirdly" into a "Provided that" clause with items (a)–(c); and the illustration to Exception 5 refers to "a child" where the IPC said "a person under eighteen years of age" (Section 2(3) BNS defines "child" as any person below the age of eighteen years).
No new elements or defences added: Unlike BNS 103 (punishment for murder, which added a mob lynching sub-section), the definitional provisions in BNS 100-101 do not introduce any new concepts, offences, or defences.
Illustrations retained: The illustrations to both sections are carried over from the IPC. The only change of wording is in the illustration to Exception 5 ("a child" for "a person under eighteen years of age"); no new illustrations are added.
Structural reorganisation within the Code: Under the IPC, these provisions appeared in Chapter XVI (Offences Affecting the Human Body). Under the BNS, they appear in Chapter VI (Of Offences Affecting the Human Body), maintaining the same thematic grouping but with a different chapter number.
What this means for practitioners
For drafting and citations: All charge sheets, FIRs, and court filings relating to offences committed on or after 1 July 2024 must cite Sections 100-101 BNS instead of Sections 299-300 IPC. The clause references change from "Section 300 Thirdly" to "Section 101(c) BNS" — the change in citation format requires careful attention in drafting.
For pending cases: Offences committed before 1 July 2024 continue to be governed by Sections 299-300 IPC: Section 358(2) BNS provides that the repeal of the IPC does not affect penalties or punishments incurred for offences committed against it, and that proceedings may be instituted or continued "as if that Code had not been repealed". Since the definitions correspond (Section 100 verbatim; Section 101 with drafting changes), this creates no interpretive difficulty — only the citation format differs.
For new cases: The four-clause structure of BNS 101 is functionally identical to the four-limb structure of IPC 300. Prosecution strategy remains unchanged: clause (c) of BNS 101 (corresponding to IPC 300 "Thirdly") requires proving that the intended injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death — without requiring proof that the accused intended to cause death itself. Because clause (c) repeats the operative words of "Thirdly", the four elements that Virsa Singh identified for "Thirdly" (see below) map onto clause (c) on a reading of the text.
The critical distinction remains: The second limb of culpable homicide (Section 100/299) turns on bodily injury "likely to cause death." Murder under clause (c) of Section 101/300 requires that the bodily injury intended is "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." This elevated threshold — from likelihood to sufficiency in the ordinary course of nature — is the razor-thin but legally decisive line that separates punishment under Section 105 BNS (culpable homicide not amounting to murder: imprisonment for life, or for a term of not less than five and up to ten years, with fine, where death is caused with intention; up to ten years and fine where it is caused with knowledge only) from punishment under Section 103 BNS (murder: death or imprisonment for life, and fine).
Does old case law still apply?
Section 100 BNS reproduces Section 299 IPC verbatim, and Section 101 BNS carries over the operative words of Section 300 IPC with drafting changes only (see Key differences). On a reading of the text, judgments construing those words therefore remain relevant to Sections 100–101 BNS. None of the Supreme Court judgments summarised below turns on a word that the BNS has changed.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya ([1977] 1 S.C.R. 601; 1976 INSC 221) — A two-judge bench (R.S. Sarkaria and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali JJ; judgment by Sarkaria J, 15 September 1976) explained that in the scheme of the Penal Code "culpable homicide" is the genus and "murder" its species: all murder is culpable homicide, but not vice versa. For the purpose of fixing punishment, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide — murder (Section 300), culpable homicide punishable under the first part of Section 304, and the lowest degree punishable under its second part. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 ("likely to cause death") and clause (3) of Section 300 ("sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death") is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury; the Court described the distinction as "fine but real". Those clauses now correspond to Section 100 and Section 101(c) BNS.
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab ([1958] 1 S.C.R. 1495; 1958 INSC 18) — A three-judge bench (Jafer Imam, P.B. Gajendragadkar and Vivian Bose JJ; judgment by Bose J, 11 March 1958) held that, to bring a case under "Thirdly" of Section 300, the prosecution must prove: (1) that a bodily injury is present; (2) the nature of the injury; (3) that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury — that is, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended; and (4) that the injury so described is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, an enquiry the Court described as purely objective and inferential, with nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these elements are proved, it does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. "Thirdly" is now clause (c) of Section 101 BNS.
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra ([1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 567) — A three-judge bench (K. Subba Rao, S.K. Das and Raghubar Dayal JJ; judgment by Subba Rao J, 24 November 1961) stated the Indian law on grave and sudden provocation (Exception 1 to Section 300, now Exception 1 to Section 101 BNS): (1) the test is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control; (2) words and gestures may also, in certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation; (3) the mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration; and (4) the fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation, and not given after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time or otherwise giving room for premeditation and calculation. On the facts — about three hours had passed between the accused leaving his house and the shooting — the Court held that Exception 1 was not attracted.
Frequently asked questions
What is the BNS equivalent of Sections 299 and 300 IPC? Section 100 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 replaces Section 299 IPC (culpable homicide definition). Section 101 BNS replaces Section 300 IPC (murder definition). Section 100 is textually identical to Section 299; Section 101 carries over the four limbs and five exceptions of Section 300 with drafting changes — the limbs (an unlabelled first limb, then "Secondly", "Thirdly" and "Fourthly") become clauses (a)-(d).
Does old case law on the murder vs. culpable homicide distinction still apply? On a reading of the text, yes. Section 100 BNS reproduces Section 299 IPC verbatim and Section 101 BNS carries over the wording of Section 300 IPC with drafting changes only, so Supreme Court judgments construing those words — including Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) on the degrees of culpable homicide, Virsa Singh (1958) on the four elements of "Thirdly", and K.M. Nanavati (1961) on grave and sudden provocation — remain relevant to the corresponding words of the BNS. This guide does not survey post-July 2024 judgments applying them to the BNS.
Which section applies to cases before 1 July 2024? Section 358(2) BNS provides that the repeal of the IPC does not affect any penalty or punishment incurred in respect of offences committed against it, and that proceedings may be instituted or continued and penalties imposed "as if that Code had not been repealed". On a reading of that provision with Article 20(1) of the Constitution, Sections 299-300 IPC govern offences committed before 1 July 2024 whenever the trial takes place, and Sections 100-101 BNS govern offences committed on or after 1 July 2024. Section 531(2)(a) BNSS separately keeps investigations, inquiries and trials pending on that date under the CrPC.
How do I cite Section 300 "Thirdly" under the new law? The citation changes to "Section 101(c) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023." The limbs map as follows: the unlabelled first limb = (a), Secondly = (b), Thirdly = (c), Fourthly = (d) (the IPC text renders these "2ndly", "3rdly" and "4thly"). The wording of each limb is carried over with drafting changes: each BNS clause restates "if the act by which the death is caused is done", and clause (d) reads "if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows".