Quick Answer
Sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 have been replaced by Sections 100 and 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, effective 1 July 2024. These are the foundational definitional provisions that distinguish culpable homicide from murder — arguably the most important distinction in Indian criminal law. The core definitions are substantively retained: Section 100 BNS reproduces the three limbs of culpable homicide (intention to cause death, intention to cause likely-fatal bodily injury, knowledge of likely death), and Section 101 BNS preserves the four clauses that elevate culpable homicide to murder along with all five exceptions. The key structural change is that BNS 101 replaces the "Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly, Fourthly" numbering with clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and reorganises the exceptions with minor language modernisation.
What changed
| Old law | New law | |
|---|---|---|
| Act | Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 |
| Culpable homicide | Section 299 | Section 100 |
| Murder | Section 300 | Section 101 |
| Clause structure | Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly, Fourthly | Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) |
| Exceptions | Five exceptions with illustrations | Five exceptions — retained with minor language updates |
| Change type | Modified — restructured clause numbering, substance preserved |
Full statutory text
Section 299 IPC (repealed w.e.f. 1 July 2024)
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Explanation 1 — A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2 — Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3 — The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
Section 100 BNS
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Explanation 1 — A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2 — Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3 — The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
Section 300 IPC (repealed w.e.f. 1 July 2024)
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or —
Secondly — If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or —
Thirdly — If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or —
Fourthly — If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Section 101 BNS
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done—
(a) with the intention of causing death; or
(b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or
(c) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
(d) if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Both sections retain the same five exceptions: (1) grave and sudden provocation, (2) exceeding the right of private defence in good faith, (3) public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, (4) sudden fight in the heat of passion, and (5) consent of the person over eighteen years of age.
Key differences
Clause numbering reformatted: Section 300 IPC used "Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly, Fourthly" — an archaic Victorian drafting convention. Section 101 BNS replaces this with clauses (a), (b), (c), (d). The substance of each clause is word-for-word identical.
Section 100 BNS is textually identical to Section 299 IPC: The definition of culpable homicide — including all three limbs and all three explanations — is reproduced without any change. This means the entire body of case law interpreting Section 299 applies directly.
Exception language preserved: All five exceptions to murder are retained in BNS 101. The exception for grave and sudden provocation, the right of private defence, the public servant exception, the sudden fight exception, and the consent exception continue in the same form.
No new elements or defences added: Unlike BNS 103 (punishment for murder, which added a mob lynching sub-section), the definitional provisions in BNS 100-101 do not introduce any new concepts, offences, or defences.
Illustrations updated: The BNS provides updated illustrations with modern scenarios while retaining the classical examples. The core pedagogical function remains the same.
Structural reorganisation within the Code: Under the IPC, these provisions appeared in Chapter XVI (Offences Affecting the Human Body). Under the BNS, they appear in Chapter VI (Of Offences Affecting the Human Body), maintaining the same thematic grouping but with a different chapter number.
What this means for practitioners
For drafting and citations: All charge sheets, FIRs, and court filings relating to offences committed on or after 1 July 2024 must cite Sections 100-101 BNS instead of Sections 299-300 IPC. The clause references change from "Section 300 Thirdly" to "Section 101(c) BNS" — this is the most commonly invoked clause in murder prosecutions and the change in citation format requires careful attention in drafting.
For pending cases: Offences committed before 1 July 2024 continue to be governed by Sections 299-300 IPC under the transitional provision in Section 531 BNSS. Since the substantive definitions are identical, this creates no interpretive difficulty — only the citation format differs.
For new cases: The four-clause structure of BNS 101 is functionally identical to the four-limb structure of IPC 300. Prosecution strategy remains unchanged: clause (c) of BNS 101 (corresponding to IPC 300 "Thirdly") remains the most frequently invoked ground for murder, as it requires proving that the intended injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death — without requiring proof that the accused intended to cause death itself. The Virsa Singh four-pronged test continues to be the standard analytical framework for this clause.
The critical distinction remains: Culpable homicide (Section 100/299) requires intention or knowledge that death is "likely." Murder under clause (c) of Section 101/300 requires that the bodily injury intended is "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." This elevated threshold — from likelihood to sufficiency in the ordinary course of nature — is the razor-thin but legally decisive line that separates life imprisonment under Section 105 BNS from death sentence under Section 103 BNS.
Does old case law still apply?
The entire body of jurisprudence on Sections 299-300 IPC remains fully applicable under Sections 100-101 BNS. These are among the most heavily interpreted provisions in Indian criminal law, and the substantive identity of the old and new text preserves every precedent.
State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya (1977) 1 SCC 467 — The Supreme Court provided the most authoritative exposition of the distinction between culpable homicide and murder. The Court identified the key differentiators: (a) the degree of probability of death, (b) the degree of intention, and (c) the degree of knowledge. This framework — treating the distinction as one of degree rather than kind — remains the foundational analytical tool under BNS 100-101.
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 — Justice Vivian Bose's four-pronged test for "Thirdly" of Section 300 (now clause (c) of Section 101 BNS): (i) bodily injury must be present, (ii) the nature of injury must be proved, (iii) the injury must have been intentionally inflicted, and (iv) the injury must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This test is cited in virtually every murder trial and remains good law.
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605 — The landmark case on the grave and sudden provocation exception (Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, now Exception 1 to Section 101 BNS). The Court held that the provocation must be grave and sudden enough to deprive a reasonable person of self-control, and the act must be done in the heat of passion before there is time for cooling. This interpretation governs the identical exception under BNS 101.
Reg v. Govinda (1877) ILR 1 Bom 342 — Justice Melvill's classic exposition distinguishing Sections 299 and 300, holding that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is the species. This foundational principle applies directly to the BNS provisions.
No cases require reconsideration, as the definitional text is substantively unchanged.
Frequently asked questions
What is the BNS equivalent of Sections 299 and 300 IPC? Section 100 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 replaces Section 299 IPC (culpable homicide definition). Section 101 BNS replaces Section 300 IPC (murder definition). The definitions are substantively identical; the clause numbering in Section 101 changes from "Firstly-Fourthly" to clauses (a)-(d).
Does old case law on the murder vs. culpable homicide distinction still apply? Yes, fully. Since Sections 100-101 BNS reproduce the same definitional text as Sections 299-300 IPC, every Supreme Court precedent — including R. Punnayya (1977) on the degree-based distinction, Virsa Singh (1958) on the four-pronged test, and Nanavati (1962) on grave and sudden provocation — continues to apply without modification.
Which section applies to cases before 1 July 2024? Sections 299-300 IPC apply to all offences committed before 1 July 2024, regardless of when the trial takes place. Sections 100-101 BNS apply only to offences committed on or after 1 July 2024. The transitional provision under Section 531 BNSS governs this cut-off.
How do I cite Section 300 "Thirdly" under the new law? The citation changes to "Section 101(c) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023." The four clauses map as follows: Firstly = (a), Secondly = (b), Thirdly = (c), Fourthly = (d). The legal content of each clause is identical.