Quick Answer
Sections 24-26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — governing involuntary confessions, confessions to police officers, and confessions in police custody — have been replaced by Sections 22-23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). The central rule remains the same: confessions obtained through inducement, threat, or promise are inadmissible, and no confession to a police officer is provable against the accused. The BSA makes three notable modifications: it adds "coercion" as an explicit exclusionary ground in Section 22, consolidates the police confession bar and the custody confession bar into a single Section 23, and incorporates the removal-of-impression and secrecy/deception rules as provisos rather than standalone sections.
What Changed
| Feature | Sections 24-26, Evidence Act | Sections 22-23, BSA |
|---|---|---|
| Involuntary confession exclusion | S.24 — inducement, threat, or promise | S.22 — inducement, threat, coercion, or promise |
| Removal of impression | S.28 (separate section) | First proviso to S.22 |
| Secrecy/deception/drunkenness | S.29 (separate section) | Second proviso to S.22 |
| Confession to police officer | S.25 (standalone) | S.23(1) |
| Confession in police custody | S.26 (standalone) | S.23(2) |
| Magistrate requirement | "immediate presence of a Magistrate" (S.26) | "immediate presence of a Magistrate" (S.23(2)) — unchanged |
| Person in authority | Judicially interpreted | Same — no statutory definition provided |
| Discovery exception | S.27 (standalone) | Proviso to S.23(2) |
Full Statutory Text
Section 24, Evidence Act
A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
Section 25, Evidence Act
No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
Section 26, Evidence Act
No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Section 22, BSA
A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat, coercion or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him:
Provided that if the confession is made after the impression caused by any such inducement, threat, coercion or promise has, in the opinion of the Court, been fully removed, it is relevant:
Provided further that if such a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such confession, and that evidence of it might be given against him.
Section 23, BSA
(1) No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
(2) No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person:
Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
Key Differences
Express addition of "coercion". Section 22 BSA adds "coercion" to the list of grounds rendering a confession irrelevant. Under the old Section 24, courts had to fit physical coercion within "threat" or "inducement" through interpretation. The express inclusion codifies decades of judicial recognition that physical force, sleep deprivation, prolonged interrogation, and other coercive tactics vitiate confessions. This is a meaningful strengthening of the accused's rights.
Consolidation into Section 23. Three separate Evidence Act provisions — Section 25 (blanket bar on confessions to police), Section 26 (custody confession bar with magistrate exception), and Section 27 (discovery exception) — are now a single section with two sub-sections and a proviso. The logical hierarchy is clearer: sub-section (1) states the absolute bar; sub-section (2) addresses the custody-specific bar with the magistrate exception; and the proviso to sub-section (2) preserves the discovery exception.
Merger of Sections 28 and 29 into provisos. The first proviso to Section 22 incorporates the "removal of impression" rule from old Section 28 — if the coercive impression is fully removed, the subsequent confession becomes relevant. The second proviso incorporates Section 29's rule that a confession is not rendered irrelevant merely because it was made under secrecy, deception, drunkenness, or without warning.
Magistrate requirement unchanged. The BSA retains the phrase "immediate presence of a Magistrate" in Section 23(2) without clarifying whether this means a Judicial Magistrate or includes an Executive Magistrate. The Punjab and Haryana High Court's interpretation that "Magistrate" under Section 26 includes Executive Magistrates remains relevant but contested.
Scope of discovery exception potentially narrowed. Under the Evidence Act, Section 27 operated independently and was not textually limited to custodial situations. Under BSA Section 23, the discovery proviso is appended to sub-section (2), which deals specifically with confessions "whilst in the custody of a police officer." This structural placement may be interpreted to restrict the discovery exception to custodial settings only.
What This Means for Practitioners
For defence practitioners, the addition of "coercion" in Section 22 creates a direct statutory basis for challenging confessions obtained through third-degree methods, prolonged detention without breaks, psychological pressure, or any form of physical force. Rather than arguing by analogy that coercion constitutes a "threat" under the old Section 24, counsel can now point to the express statutory term. This will be particularly valuable in bail applications where the voluntariness of a confession is contested.
Prosecutors must ensure that the chain of custody documentation for confessions explicitly addresses the absence of coercion — not merely the absence of inducement, threat, or promise. Prosecution case diaries and charge sheets should affirmatively record that the confession was free from all four vitiating factors enumerated in Section 22.
The consolidation of Sections 25, 26, and 27 into Section 23 means that arguments about the interrelationship between these provisions must now be framed within a single section. For instance, the question of whether a recovery can be proved under the discovery exception when the accused's statement was made to a police officer (but not while in custody) becomes more acute. Under the old Act, Section 27 was textually independent. Under the BSA, the proviso sits under sub-section (2) — the custody provision — creating an argument that non-custodial discovery statements may not benefit from this exception.
Does Old Case Law Still Apply?
The core case law remains authoritative. Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47), which defined "confession" as a statement substantially admitting all facts constituting the offence, continues to govern the threshold question of whether a statement is a confession at all. State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (AIR 1960 SC 1125), which held that excise officers, customs officers, and other revenue officials may be treated as "police officers" for purposes of Section 25, applies equally to Section 23(1) BSA.
Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424, which linked the confession exclusion rules to Article 20(3) of the Constitution (right against self-incrimination), remains directly relevant — particularly as the constitutional right has not been amended.
The case law on "immediate presence of a Magistrate" under Section 26, including discussions of whether the Magistrate must be physically present or merely available, carries over to Section 23(2) BSA without modification.
However, case law interpreting the independent scope of Section 27 (discovery statements) must be applied cautiously. The proviso's new structural position under Section 23(2) may lead courts to revisit some holdings about the breadth of the discovery exception. Early post-BSA judgments on this issue should be monitored carefully.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does "coercion" mean under Section 22 BSA? The BSA does not define "coercion" in the confession context. Drawing on the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Section 15) and constitutional jurisprudence under Article 20(3), it likely encompasses physical force, threats of violence, prolonged interrogation without breaks, sleep deprivation, psychological pressure, and any other conduct designed to overbear the free will of the accused.
Can a confession recorded on video before a Magistrate still be challenged? Yes. Even if a confession is made in the "immediate presence of a Magistrate" as required by Section 23(2) BSA, it can still be excluded under Section 22 if the court finds that it was caused by inducement, threat, coercion, or promise from a person in authority. The magistrate's presence addresses the Section 23(2) requirement but does not automatically satisfy the Section 22 voluntariness requirement.
Does the BSA change who qualifies as a "person in authority"? No. Neither the Evidence Act nor the BSA defines "person in authority." Courts have interpreted it broadly to include police officers, prosecutors, magistrates, employers, and anyone who can influence the course of proceedings. This judicial interpretation carries forward unchanged.
If an accused makes a statement to police while not in custody, can the discovery exception still apply? This is an open question under the BSA. Under the old Section 27, the discovery exception applied to information received from an accused "in the custody of a police officer." The BSA's proviso to Section 23(2) uses identical language. However, its structural placement under the custody-specific sub-section (rather than as a standalone section) may be interpreted more narrowly. Practitioners should frame arguments carefully pending judicial clarification.