Sections 121–132 IEA vs Sections 127–137 BSA — Privileged Communications and Witness Privileges

In India, the privileges in Sections 121–132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) became Sections 127–137 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) on 1 July 2024. Advocate-client privilege is now Section 132, and Section 131 changes "whence" to "when" for police and revenue informants.

At a glance

These are rules of evidence; no offence or First Schedule classification is attached to them. The neighbouring provisions have their own treatment: IEA s.120 (competency of spouses) is BSA s.126, and IEA s.133 (accomplice) is BSA s.138 — see the accomplice evidence page.

What changed

The substantive change — s.125 IEA → s.131 BSA (Modified).

• IEA: "No Magistrate or police-officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence, and no revenue-officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information…". BSA: "…shall be compelled to say when he got any information…" (both places).
• The Explanation also changes: IEA "'Revenue-officer' in this section means any officer employed in or about the business of any branch of the public revenue"; BSA "'revenue officer' means any officer employed…". The words "in this section" are dropped, and the hyphens go.
• A reading. "Whence" asks from where the information came — its source. "When" asks about its time. On the literal words, s.131 protects the officer from saying when he got the information, not from where. The Gazette and the official BSA text both print "when". No judgment read for this page decides whether courts will read s.131 as still protecting the source.

Advocate-client privilege — ss.126–127 IEA → s.132 BSA (Minor edit, merged).

• "barrister, attorney, pleader or vakil" becomes "advocate" throughout, including the proviso, the illustrations and s.133. In In Re: Summoning Advocates the Supreme Court explained that the Advocates Act, 1961 created one class of persons entitled to practise law — advocates (para 60).
• "employment" becomes "service", and "professional employment" becomes "professional service". The Explanation reads: "The obligation stated in this section continues after the professional service has ceased."
• The proviso is relettered (1), (2) → (a), (b) and now reads "shall protect from disclosure of—". The words "illegal purpose" are unchanged; the IEA footnote records that "illegal" replaced "criminal" in 1872.
• The unnumbered sentence "It is immaterial whether the attention of such … was or was not directed to such fact…" becomes s.132(2), with "such advocate referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1)".
• IEA s.127 becomes s.132(3): "interpreters, and the clerks or employees of advocates" (IEA: "clerks or servants of barristers, pleaders, attorneys and vakils").

The rest.

• s.121 → s.127 (Minor edit): "any questions" → "any question"; "police-officer" → "police officer" in Illustration (c).
• ss.122–124 → ss.128–130 (Identical): marriage, affairs of State and official-communication privileges repeat the IEA word for word.
• s.128 → s.133 (Minor edit): cross-reference "section 126" → "section 132"; "advocate" for the four professional titles.
• s.129 → s.134 (Minor edit): "legal professional adviser" → "legal adviser"; heading "Confidential communications" → "Confidential communication". On a reading, dropping "professional" could be argued to widen the class of adviser; the Supreme Court applied s.134 to communications with an employer's "legal advisor" in In Re: Summoning Advocates (direction 4.1) without deciding that point.
• s.130 → s.135 (Minor edit): "as pledge or mortgagee" → "as pledgee or mortgagee".
• s.131 → s.136 (Identical): the text inserted in the IEA by Act 21 of 2000 (w.e.f. 17 October 2000) is repeated.
• s.132 → s.137 (Minor edit): the label "Proviso.—" before "Provided that" is dropped; the words are otherwise the same.

Statutory text (relevant extract)

Extract — Section 131, BSA:

No Magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to say when he got any information as to the commission of any offence, and no revenue officer shall be compelled to say when he got any information as to the commission of any offence against the public revenue.

Extract — Section 125, IEA (changed words):

No Magistrate or police-officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information …

Extract — Section 132(1), BSA:

No advocate, shall at any time be permitted, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his service as such advocate, by or on behalf of his client, …

Extract — Section 132(3), BSA:

The provisions of this section shall apply to interpreters, and the clerks or employees of advocates.

How it works

Advocate-client privilege (s.132). Three kinds of material are protected: (i) a communication made to the advocate "in the course and for the purpose of his service"; (ii) the contents or condition of a document the advocate became acquainted with in that course; (iii) advice given to the client. Only the client's "express consent" lifts it. Two things are not protected: a communication "made in furtherance of any illegal purpose", and a fact the advocate observes showing that "any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his service" (proviso (a), (b)). The Act's illustrations draw the line: a client's admission of forgery made to seek a defence is protected; a request to sue on a forged deed is not. The obligation survives the end of the engagement (Explanation). Section 133 adds that a party does not waive the privilege by giving evidence, and waives it by calling his advocate as a witness only on matters he questions him about.

Confidential communication with a legal adviser (s.134). This protects the client, not the adviser: "No one shall be compelled to disclose to the Court" a confidential communication with his legal adviser. It gives way only if he "offers himself as a witness", and then only to the extent necessary to explain his evidence.

Marital communications (s.128). Two branches, as M. C. Verghese described the identical s.122 IEA (p. 695). A married person cannot be compelled to disclose a communication made during marriage by the spouse. Nor may he disclose it without the maker's consent, except in suits between the spouses or a prosecution of one for a crime against the other.

State and official privileges (ss.129, 130). Section 129 excludes evidence "derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State" unless the head of the department permits it. Section 130 lets a public officer decline to disclose communications made "in official confidence" when he considers the public interest would suffer. The Court decides objections to production under s.165 BSA — see the production of documents page.

Informants (s.131). A Magistrate, police officer or revenue officer cannot be compelled to say "when" he got information about an offence. See "What changed" for the effect of the change from "whence".

Documents (ss.135, 136). A non-party witness need not produce his title-deeds, documents under which he holds property as pledgee or mortgagee, or documents that might incriminate him, unless he agreed in writing to produce them. No one need produce documents or electronic records that another person could refuse to produce, unless that person consents.

Self-incrimination (s.137). A witness must answer a relevant question even if the answer may incriminate him or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. A compelled answer cannot be used to arrest or prosecute him, or be proved against him in a criminal proceeding, except in a prosecution for giving false evidence by that answer.

What this means in practice

For an advocate who receives a police summons. In Re: Summoning Advocates (para 67) directs that an investigating officer or station house officer shall not summon an advocate who represents the accused to learn the details of the case, unless an exception under s.132 applies. Any such summons must specify the facts said to bring it within the exception, with the written satisfaction of an officer not below Superintendent of Police, and is subject to judicial review under s.528 BNSS (directions 1.1–1.3). The Court held that the protection extends to advocates in litigation and in non-litigious or pre-litigation matters (direction 1.4; para 53).

For a client whose advocate holds documents. Production of documents is not covered by s.132 (direction 2). In a criminal case production is before the Court under s.94 BNSS, regulated also by s.165 BSA, and the Court decides objections after hearing the advocate and the client (directions 2.1, 2.3). A digital device may be directed to be produced only before the jurisdictional Court and opened in the presence of the party and the advocate (directions 3–3.2).

For in-house legal teams. In-house counsel are not "advocates" for s.132 (direction 4). In-house counsel are entitled to s.134 protection for any communication made to the legal advisor of the employer, but that protection "cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel" (direction 4.1).

For a spouse called as a witness. Object to questions about communications made during the marriage unless the case falls within the two statutory exceptions. Section 122 IEA (now s.128) only prevents disclosure in giving evidence of the communication; it does not bar other evidence not barred by s.122 or other provisions (M. C. Verghese, p. 696). Whether letters held by a third person can be proved in another manner is decided at the trial (p. 697).

For a public authority claiming State privilege. Claim it by an affidavit of the head of the department. The Court may call for further affidavits and may inspect the document (Raj Narain, p. 349).

Judgments that still matter

BSA ss.128–130 and 136 repeat the operative words of IEA ss.122–124 and 131, so on a reading of the text judgments on those words remain relevant. In In Re: Summoning Advocates the Supreme Court described the BSA provisions it extracted as in pari materia with the Indian Evidence Act (para 32).

In Re: Summoning Advocates who give legal opinion or represent parties during investigation of cases and related issues (2025 INSC 1275) — 31 October 2025. K. Vinod Chandran J. wrote the judgment, which is signed by B. R. Gavai C.J.I., K. Vinod Chandran J. and N. V. Anjaria J. A two-Judge Bench had referred questions after an investigating officer issued a notice under s.179 BNSS to an advocate appearing for an accused (para 2). The Court declined to frame guidelines under Article 142 but issued directions on an interpretation of ss.132–134 (para 67). It held the summons "illegal and against the provisions of Section 132" (para 48). It held that the power to summon under ss.179 and 175 BNSS, when directed at an advocate appearing for a party, is not "an absolute or a blanket power" to be exercised without regard to s.132 (para 52). It held that in-house counsel are not advocates for s.132 (paras 62, 66; direction 4). It set aside the summons in SLP (Crl.) No. 9334 of 2025 and disposed of the suo motu case (para 68). Why it matters now: it is the first Supreme Court construction of s.132 BSA.

M. C. Verghese v. T. J. Ponnan & Anr., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 692 — 13 November 1968. J. C. Shah J. delivered the judgment of a three-Judge Bench (with V. Ramaswami and A. N. Grover JJ.). A husband wrote letters to his wife defaming her father, who prosecuted him using the letters. The Court held that s.122 "only prevents disclosure in giving evidence in court of the communication made by the husband to the wife" (p. 696). If the complainant relied only on the wife's evidence, s.122 would bar it, but whether he could prove the letters "in any other manner" was for the trial (p. 697). A later decree of nullity did not lift the bar: it "attaches at the time when the communication is made" (p. 698). The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order (which had restored the discharge) was set aside, and the proceedings were remanded for trial (p. 698). Why it matters now: s.128 BSA is word for word the same.

State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors., [1975] 3 S.C.R. 333 — 24 January 1975. A. N. Ray C.J. delivered the judgment of the Court for himself, A. Alagiriswami, R. S. Sarkaria and N. L. Untwalia JJ.; K. K. Mathew J. gave a separate concurring opinion. In an election petition the State claimed privilege over the "Blue Book" of security rules for the Prime Minister's tours. The majority held that "the foundation of the law behind sections 123 and 162" is that injury to public interest is the reason for excluding documents (p. 348). An objection is raised by an affidavit of the head of the department; the Court may direct a further affidavit and "If the Court in spite of the affidavit wishes to inspect the document the Court may do so" (p. 349). It set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter (p. 350). Mathew J., concurring, said the Court must consider whether the document relates to secret affairs of State and whether refusing evidence of it was in the public interest (p. 358). Why it matters now: ss.129 and 165 BSA repeat the words it construed.

Which law applies to your case

Section 170(2) BSA provides that any application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal pending immediately before the Adhiniyam came into force "shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as in force immediately before such commencement". The BSA came into force on 1 July 2024 (S.O. 849(E), 23 February 2024). A trial pending on that date applies IEA ss.121–132, including "whence" in s.125. See which law applies to an offence before 1 July 2024.

Frequently asked questions

Which BSA sections replace Sections 121 to 132 of the Evidence Act? From 1 July 2024, Sections 121 to 125 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are Sections 127 to 131 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Sections 126 and 127 IEA are merged into Section 132 BSA, and Sections 128 to 132 IEA are Sections 133 to 137 BSA.

What is the BSA equivalent of Section 126 of the Evidence Act? Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. It bars an advocate from disclosing a client's communications, documents learnt of in professional service, or advice given, without the client's express consent. Section 132(3) extends it to interpreters and the clerks or employees of advocates, which was Section 127 IEA.

Can the police summon a lawyer to question him about his client's case? Not to learn the details of the case in which he represents the accused. In In Re: Summoning Advocates (2025 INSC 1275, para 67) the Supreme Court directed that investigating officers shall not summon such an advocate unless the matter falls within an exception to Section 132 BSA, the summons states the facts relied on, and an officer not below Superintendent of Police records his satisfaction in writing.

Does advocate-client privilege cover in-house counsel under the BSA? No. The Supreme Court held in In Re: Summoning Advocates (2025 INSC 1275, para 67, direction 4) that in-house counsel are not entitled to the Section 132 privilege because they are not advocates practising in courts. Under direction 4.1 they may claim Section 134 protection for communications with their employer's legal adviser, but not for communications between the employer and the in-house counsel.

What changed in Section 131 BSA compared with Section 125 IEA? Section 125 IEA said a Magistrate, police officer or revenue officer shall not be compelled to say "whence" he got information about an offence. Section 131 BSA says "when". "Whence" refers to the source of the information and "when" to its time; no judgment read for this page decides whether the protection for the source continues.

Can a spouse give evidence about what the other spouse said during the marriage? Section 128 BSA, word for word the same as Section 122 IEA, bars compelled disclosure and bars disclosure without the maker's consent, except in suits between married persons or where one spouse is prosecuted for a crime against the other. In M. C. Verghese v. T. J. Ponnan ([1969] 2 S.C.R. 692, pp. 696-698) the Supreme Court held that the bar attaches when the communication is made, and that s.122 bars only disclosure in evidence by the spouse; whether letters in a third person's possession could be proved in any other manner was left to the trial.

Can a witness refuse to answer because the answer may incriminate him? No. Section 137 BSA, repeating Section 132 IEA, says a witness shall not be excused from answering a relevant question on that ground. The proviso protects him: an answer he is compelled to give shall not subject him to arrest or prosecution or be proved against him in a criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by that answer.

Which Act applies to a case pending on 1 July 2024? Section 170(2) BSA provides that any application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal pending immediately before the Adhiniyam came into force is dealt with under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as if the BSA had not come into force. Such a case applies Sections 121 to 132 IEA.

Related

• Section 162 Evidence Act vs Section 165 BSA — production of documents
• Section 133 Evidence Act vs Section 138 BSA — accomplice evidence
• Section 165 Evidence Act vs Section 168 BSA — Judge's power to question
• Section 91 CrPC vs Section 94 BNSS — summons to produce documents
• Sections 145, 154 and 155 Evidence Act vs BSA — hostile witnesses
• Evidence Act to BSA — full section mapping table

Sources

• Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Gazette text, cross-checked against the official text): Sections 126 to 137 and 170; commencement from footnote 1 to Section 1 of the official text.
• Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (India Code text): Sections 120 to 132, with the amendment footnotes to Sections 125, 126 and 131.
• Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Sections 94, 175, 179 and 528, as referred to in the 2025 judgment.
• Judgments read in full text (Veritect Supreme Court corpus): In Re: Summoning Advocates who give legal opinion or represent parties during investigation of cases and related issues (supreme_court/judgment_md/Diary_35619-2025_Judgment.md); M. C. Verghese v. T. J. Ponnan & Anr. (1969_2_692_698_EN.md, with the report PDF); State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors. (1975_3_333_364_EN.md, with the report PDF).

This page explains the statutory text and the judgments cited as they stand. It is not legal advice; for a specific case, consult an advocate.