Section 113A-113B Evidence Act vs Section 117-118 BSA — Presumption as to Abetment of Suicide and Dowry Death

In India, the two presumptions used when a married woman dies within seven years of marriage have moved. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) is now Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA): the Court "may presume" abetment of her suicide. Section 113B is now Section 118: the Court "shall presume" the accused caused a dowry death. Only cross-references and punctuation changed.

At a glance

What changed

• Minor edit — IEA s.113A → BSA s.117. The operative words are the same, including "within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage" and "having regard to all the other circumstances of the case". "the court may presume" becomes "the Court may presume". The Explanation changes from "the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)" to "the same meaning as in section 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023".
• Minor edit — IEA s.113B → BSA s.118. "it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected" becomes "it is shown that soon before her death, such woman had been subjected" (a comma is added). "the court shall presume" becomes "the Court shall presume". The Explanation now points to "section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023" instead of "section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)".
• Identical — structure. The presumptions remain separate sections: "may presume" in s.117, "shall presume" in s.118. The definitions of those verbs move from IEA s.4 to BSA s.2(1)(h) and (l) unchanged in substance.
• Minor edit — where "cruelty" is defined. The IPC defined it in the Explanation to s.498A; the BNS puts the same clauses (a) and (b) in a separate s.86 ("For the purposes of section 85"), which s.117's Explanation imports expressly.
• Placement. Both remain in Chapter VII, after BSA s.116 (formerly IEA s.112, legitimacy); IEA s.113 (cession of territory) has no BSA counterpart.

Statutory text (relevant extract)

Extract — Section 117, BSA (IEA s.113A is the same, with "court" and the s.498A IPC cross-reference):

When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Extract — Section 118, BSA (IEA s.113B is the same, without the comma after "death", with "court" and the s.304B IPC cross-reference):

When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death, such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

How it works — the two presumptions side by side

Section 117 in steps.

1. The question is whether the woman's suicide was abetted by her husband or his relative, typically on a charge under BNS s.108.
2. Suicide and timing: she committed suicide within seven years from the date of her marriage.
3. Cruelty by the accused in the BNS s.86 sense: (a) wilful conduct likely to drive her to suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical), or (b) harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security, or for failing to meet it.
4. All the other circumstances. Only then "may" the Court presume abetment, weighing everything else on record, such as a suicide note or dying declaration (see Ramesh Kumar below).

Section 118 in steps.

1. The question is whether the accused committed her "dowry death" in the BNS s.80 sense: death by burns, bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage.
2. Dowry-linked cruelty soon before death: "such person" subjected her to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a dowry demand, soon before she died.
3. The presumption follows: the Court "shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death", subject to disproof (s.2(1)(l)).

Worked example (from a decided case). Neither section carries illustrations. In Charan Singh the couple married in 1993 and the wife died in the matrimonial home on 22 June 1995, so the seven-year element was met. The witnesses spoke only of earlier demands for a motorcycle and land, and none described cruelty or harassment soon before the death. The Supreme Court held that the prerequisites for the s.113B presumption were not fulfilled (paras 21, 23).

What this means in practice

• For the investigating officer. Where a woman dies by suicide within seven years of marriage, or dies within that period in circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that someone committed an offence, the officer forwards the body for examination by the Civil Surgeon or another qualified medical person (BNSS s.194(3)(i)–(ii)). Record the facts each presumption needs: the date of marriage, the date and manner of death, and the date of each act of cruelty or demand.
• For the prosecutor. Neither presumption arises on the bare fact of an unnatural death in the matrimonial home. Prove the foundational facts first: cruelty for s.117, and dowry-linked cruelty or harassment close in time to the death for s.118 (Charan Singh, paras 21, 23; Kans Raj).
• For the accused and defence counsel. Under s.117, "all the other circumstances of the case" can defeat the presumption: suicide notes, dying declarations and the deceased's own writings were decisive in Ramesh Kumar. Under s.118, the contest is usually over proximity: whether the demand or cruelty had become stale, or whether the dispute had been resolved (Kans Raj). Rebuttal evidence has to be led; on the standard, see Sher Singh below.
• For the woman's family. A relative may ask the police to send the body for medical examination (BNSS s.194(3)(iii)); precise dates of each demand matter, because "soon before her death" turns on the interval.

Judgments that still matter

BSA ss.117 and 118 repeat the operative words of IEA ss.113A and 113B, so on a reading of the text judgments construing those words remain relevant. None of the judgments below construes the BSA sections themselves.

Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2001] Supp. 4 S.C.R. 247 (2001 INSC 515), decided 17 October 2001. R.C. Lahoti J. delivered the judgment of a three-judge bench. The wife died by suicide within a year of marriage, leaving a suicide note and a dying declaration. The Court read s.113A as requiring three foundational facts (suicide, within seven years of marriage, cruelty by the husband or relative charged), and held that the presumption "is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests". The words "all the other circumstances of the case" call for a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide, and the presumption is not irrebuttable (report pp. 256–257; no paragraph numbers). On the whole record the presumption was not raised. The s.306 conviction was set aside and the s.498A conviction maintained. Why it matters now: BSA s.117 keeps "may presume" and "all the other circumstances of the case" unchanged.

Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, [2000] 3 S.C.R. 662 (2000 INSC 251), decided 26 April 2000. Sethi J. delivered the judgment of a three-judge bench. It called the s.113B presumption "a presumption of law". On "soon before" it held: "The term "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before"". A proximate and live link between dowry-based cruelty and the death must be proved. "No presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty, and harassment thereafter." (report p. 680). Why it matters now: BSA s.118 uses the same words, "soon before her death".

Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 29 (2015 INSC 21), decided 9 January 2015. Vikramajit Sen J. delivered the judgment of a two-judge bench. It contrasted the two provisions: s.113A leaves the Court a discretion, while under s.113B Parliament "has mandated the Court to draw at least an adverse inference" (para 7). Reading s.113B with IPC s.304B, it held that "shown" has to be read up to mean "prove" and "deemed" read down to mean "presumed" (paras 14, 17). Once the prosecution proves the foundational facts, the husband's "deemed culpability would have to be displaced and overturned beyond reasonable doubt" (para 17). On the facts the prosecution had not shown dowry-linked cruelty even on a preponderance of probabilities, so the burden never shifted and the appeal was allowed (paras 22–24). Why it matters now: BSA s.118 still uses the word "shown"; the rebuttal standard is this two-judge bench's statement.

Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, [2023] 3 S.C.R. 511, decided 20 April 2023. Rajesh Bindal J. delivered the judgment of a two-judge bench with Abhay S. Oka J. No witness described cruelty or harassment soon before the death. "The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act" (para 21). An unnatural death in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage was held not sufficient to convict (para 23). The convictions under ss.304B, 498A and 201 IPC were set aside. Why it matters now: s.118 keeps that threshold.

Which law applies to your case

BSA s.170(2) provides that any application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal pending immediately before the Adhiniyam came into force (1 July 2024) is dealt with under the IEA "as if this Adhiniyam had not come into force". A case pending on that date applies ss.113A and 113B; on a reading of s.170(2), a proceeding begun later applies ss.117 and 118. Separately, BNS s.358(2) provides that the repeal of the IPC does not affect any liability incurred, or any penalty or punishment incurred in respect of offences committed, under it; on a reading of s.358(2), a death before 1 July 2024 is charged under IPC s.304B or s.306. BNSS s.531(2)(a) keeps pending investigations and trials under the CrPC. For the full analysis see which law applies to an offence before 1 July 2024.

Frequently asked questions

What are the BSA equivalents of Sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act? Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (abetment of suicide by a married woman) is now Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Section 113B (dowry death) is now Section 118. They remain two separate sections with the same wording, apart from capitalising "Court", one added comma, and Explanations that now refer to BNS Sections 86 and 80.

What is the difference between Section 117 and Section 118 BSA? Section 117 says the Court "may presume" that a husband or his relative abetted a married woman's suicide, and Section 118 says the Court "shall presume" that a person caused a dowry death. Under BSA Section 2(1)(h), "may presume" lets the Court either treat the fact as proved or call for proof of it. Under Section 2(1)(l), "shall presume" requires the Court to treat the fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.

When can the Court presume abetment of suicide under Section 117 BSA? Three facts must be shown: the woman committed suicide, she did so within seven years from the date of her marriage, and her husband or his relative had subjected her to cruelty in the sense of BNS Section 86. Even then the Court decides "having regard to all the other circumstances of the case". In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001 INSC 515) the Supreme Court held that the presumption is permissive, not mandatory, and can be rebutted.

What does soon before her death mean in Section 118 BSA? The BSA does not define it. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (2000 INSC 251) the Supreme Court held that it is not synonymous with "immediately before" and that a proximate and live link between the dowry-related cruelty and the death must be proved. No presumption arises if the dispute is shown to have been resolved with no cruelty afterwards.

Does an unnatural death within seven years of marriage by itself attract Section 118? No. Section 118 requires it to be shown that soon before her death the woman was subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry. In Charan Singh v. State of Uttarakhand ([2023] 3 S.C.R. 511, paras 21 and 23) the Supreme Court held that an unnatural death in the matrimonial home within seven years was not enough without that proof, and acquitted the husband.

Can the accused rebut the Section 118 presumption? Yes. "Shall presume" under BSA Section 2(1)(l) means the fact is regarded as proved unless and until it is disproved, which is different from conclusive proof under Section 2(1)(b). In Sher Singh v. State of Haryana (2015 INSC 21, para 17) a two-judge bench held that the husband's deemed culpability must be displaced beyond reasonable doubt; the same judgment records differing statements in earlier decisions (paras 11 and 16).

Which definition of cruelty applies under Section 117 BSA? The Explanation to Section 117 gives cruelty the meaning in Section 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Section 86 covers (a) wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health, mental or physical, and (b) harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security. These are the same two clauses that formed the Explanation to IPC Section 498A.

Which Act applies to a death that occurred before 1 July 2024? Section 170(2) BSA keeps proceedings pending immediately before 1 July 2024 under the Indian Evidence Act, so Sections 113A and 113B govern those cases. Section 358(2) BNS provides that the repeal of the IPC does not affect liabilities incurred under it; on a reading of that provision, the offence itself, for a death before that date, is charged under the IPC. The presumptions read the same under both Acts.

Related

• Section 304B IPC vs Section 80 BNS — dowry death
• Section 306 IPC vs Section 108 BNS — abetment of suicide
• Section 498A IPC vs Section 85 BNS — cruelty by husband or relatives
• Section 114 Evidence Act vs Section 119 BSA — court may presume existence of certain facts
• Dying declarations — Section 32 Evidence Act vs BSA
• Offence before 1 July 2024 — which law applies
• Section 174 CrPC vs Section 194 BNSS — Police Inquest Report and Magistrate's Inquiry into Death (CrPC 174-176)

Sources

Acts and sections read (BSA, BNS and BNSS from the Gazette; Indian Evidence Act and IPC from the official texts): BSA ss.2(1)(b), (h), (l), 116–118, 170; IEA ss.4, 113A, 113B; BNS ss.80, 85, 86, 108, 358; IPC ss.306, 498A; BNSS s.194(3), s.531(2)(a) and First Schedule entries 80(2), 85, 108; Constitution, Art. 20(1).

Judgments read (full text, Veritect Supreme Court corpus): Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (S_2001_4_247_262_EN.md); Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (2000_3_662_683_EN.md); Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana (2015_1_29_54_EN.md); Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2023_3_511_522_EN.md).

This page explains the statutory text and the judgments cited as they stand. It is not legal advice; for a specific case, consult an advocate.