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Internal approvals and an asserted strong case did not extend NCLAT's statutory power to condone delay. In Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Deepak Kumar Garg, the tribunal dismissed an application seeking condonation of an 80-day delay, and the appeal consequently failed. The decision concerned limitation, not adjudication of the underlying merits. Order, paragraphs 2–7 and 13–15.
The dates that determined the result
| Point | Verified record |
|---|---|
| Tribunal | NCLAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi |
| Members | Justice Mohammad Faiz Alam Khan and Naresh Salecha |
| Appeal/application | Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) No. 1673 of 2026; IA No. 6383 of 2026 |
| Order date | |
| NCLT order challenged | 22 April 2026, IA No. 631/2025 in CP(IB) No. 152/2024 |
| Appeal filed | 11 August 2026 |
| Delay described by NCLAT | 80 days beyond the prescribed period |
| Disposition | Condonation application dismissed; appeal dismissed; pending applications closed; no costs order |
The NCLAT recorded 22 May 2026 as the end of the ordinary thirty-day period. It found the August filing beyond even the additional period within which delay could be condoned. This note reports the calculation adopted in this record; it is not a filing-date calculator for a different order. Paragraphs 7–13.
What the appellant offered as an explanation
The appellant said that approvals had to be obtained from different authorities and that the delay was unintentional and outside its control. It also asserted diligence and strong merits. Those were the grounds advanced for relief, rather than findings that a statutory extension was available.
The distinction is important for institutional litigants. Explaining the chain of internal decision-making may be relevant when a court or tribunal has discretion to condone a particular delay. It does not itself enlarge the period for which the legislature permits that discretion. Paragraphs 3–5.
The ordinary period and the condonable period were separate
Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as applied in the order, prescribes thirty days and permits a further period not exceeding fifteen days where sufficient cause is established. The additional fifteen days are not an automatic extension available to every appellant.
The tribunal treated the outer limit as a limit on its jurisdiction to entertain the delayed appeal. Once this record fell beyond it, favourable equities or confidence in the merits could not create a larger condonation power. It rejected the application and held that the appeal would not survive. Paragraphs 8 and 12–15.
The existing primary statutory text, including its 2026 footnotes, was checked for this note. The 2026 insertion of subsection 61(6), concerning appellate disposal time, should not be confused with a change to the filing window in subsection 61(2). Official 2026 Amendment Act, section 43.
Copy preparation, pronouncement and filing require their own evidence
The order discussed exclusion of the relevant starting day, certified-copy preparation and e-filing through the authorities it applied. Those subjects should not be compressed into a rule that the website upload date always starts time, or that every period spent waiting for a copy is automatically excluded.
In particular, the NCLAT's discussion connected copy-time exclusion with a timely application for the certified copy. It also distinguished a procedural waiver concerning what must accompany a filing from the substantive computation of limitation. This note reports that discussion; the original Supreme Court authorities require their own review before advising on a contested computation in a live matter. Paragraphs 9–12.
The decisive finding here remained narrower: the tribunal recorded the NCLT pronouncement and August filing, found the delay outside its permitted reach, and dismissed on that basis. It did not conduct a trial of the appellant's substantive grievance.
An institutional filing review drawn from the case
Veritect's analysis suggests treating limitation and internal approval as parallel workstreams. Record the pronouncement and any relevant exclusions from contemporaneous evidence; obtain the certified-copy request details; identify the actual e-filing event; and escalate the approval timetable before the statutory window expires.
A file containing only an eventual approval note and a statement that the case has strong merits does not answer the jurisdictional objection exposed by this order. Conversely, the order should not be cited to deny an exclusion that another appellant can properly establish from its own record. The computation must precede the request for discretionary relief.
Questions arising from this order
Are the further fifteen days automatically available?
No. The provision as applied permits condonation on sufficient cause within that additional limit. It does not replace the ordinary thirty-day requirement with an unconditional forty-five-day filing period.
Did the tribunal reject the underlying claim on its merits?
No. Dismissal of the delay application meant that the appeal did not survive. The order is a limitation decision.
Does waiting for internal approval stop the statutory clock?
The appellant's approval explanation did not rescue this filing beyond the outer limit. The judgment identifies no general clock-stopping rule for internal approvals.
Primary source and scope
The official NCLAT order of 10 September 2026, paragraphs 2–15, establishes the dates, submissions and disposition reported here. It was checked on 1 November 2026. This analysis does not certify the absence of a later appeal or stay, and it does not calculate a deadline for another matter without its actual filing and copy records.