Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala ((2019) 11 SCC 1), the Sabarimala case, held by a 4:1 majority that the exclusion of menstruating-age women from the Sabarimala temple violates Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25 of the Constitution, striking down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules. For practitioners, the case establishes three operative frameworks: the essential religious practices test as a tool for challenging exclusionary practices within religious institutions, the expanded concept of untouchability under Article 17 to include gender-based biological exclusion, and the primacy of constitutional morality over popular or religious morality when fundamental rights are at stake. While the review has been referred to a 7-judge Bench (pending as of 2026), the original judgment remains operative and creates actionable precedent in religious freedom, gender equality, and anti-discrimination litigation.
Case overview
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case name | Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala |
| Citation | (2019) 11 SCC 1 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Bench | 5-judge Constitution Bench (4:1 — CJ Dipak Misra, Justices Nariman, Khanwilkar, Chandrachud; Justice Malhotra dissenting) |
| Date of judgment | 28 September 2018 |
| Ratio decidendi | The exclusion of menstruating-age women from a public temple violates Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25; the practice is not an essential religious practice; gender-based biological exclusion constitutes untouchability |
Material facts and procedural history
The Sabarimala temple in Pathanamthitta district, Kerala, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, has been governed by the Travancore Devaswom Board since the merger of princely states. Women between the ages of 10 and 50 years — the menstruating age group — were traditionally prohibited from entering the temple. This prohibition was codified in Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted the manager of a place of worship to exclude "women at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter." In 1991, the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board upheld the prohibition, holding that the exclusion was based on usage prevalent from time immemorial and that the temple deity's character as a naishtika brahmachari (eternal celibate) justified the restriction. In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL before the Supreme Court challenging the prohibition. In 2016, a 3-judge Bench referred the matter to a 5-judge Constitution Bench after identifying significant constitutional questions about the interplay between Articles 25-26 (religious freedom) and Articles 14-15 (equality).
Ratio decidendi
Devotees of Lord Ayyappa are not a religious denomination — The majority applied the tests from Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) and S.P. Mittal (1983) and held that devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala do not constitute a separate religious denomination under Article 26. They lack distinct common tenets, a distinct organisation, and a unique religious doctrine separate from Hinduism. The temple is a public Hindu temple, not a denominational institution.
Exclusion fails the essential religious practices test — The majority held that the prohibition on women of menstruating age is not an "essential religious practice" of Hinduism or of the worship of Lord Ayyappa. The test for essential practice is whether the practice is fundamental and integral to the religion such that the religion would be fundamentally altered without it. The exclusion is based on notions of ritual pollution associated with menstruation — a customary practice, not a theological imperative. Lord Ayyappa is worshipped in other temples without any gender restriction.
Violation of Articles 14 and 15 — The exclusion discriminates against women solely on the basis of a biological characteristic (menstruation), which is directly linked to sex. This violates Article 14 (equality before law) and Article 15(1) (prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex). There is no rational nexus between the exclusion of menstruating-age women and any legitimate purpose.
Article 25(1) guarantees equal right to worship — Article 25(1) guarantees to "all persons equally" the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion. The word "equally" is significant — it ensures that the right to worship is available to women on the same terms as men. The exclusion of women from a public temple violates this equal right.
Untouchability under Article 17 expanded — Justice Chandrachud held that the exclusion based on menstruation constitutes "untouchability" within the meaning of Article 17. Untouchability is not confined to its caste-based manifestation but encompasses "any practice treating persons as unworthy of human contact on the basis of inherent characteristics." Excluding women as "impure" during menstruation falls within this expanded understanding.
Current statutory framework
Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965: Section 3 provides that "every place of public worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class thereof, shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus." Rule 3(b) of the Rules under this Act — which permitted exclusion of women based on custom — was struck down by the Supreme Court. The Act itself supports the right of entry; it was the Rule that created the exception.
Article 25 and 26 framework: Article 25(1) guarantees religious freedom subject to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights. Article 25(2)(b) empowers the State to make laws for "throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus." Article 26 gives religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. The interplay between these provisions is the subject of the pending 7-judge Bench reference.
Pending 7-judge Bench reference: In November 2019, a 5-judge Bench (3:2) referred the following questions to a 7-judge Bench: (a) the scope of the essential religious practices doctrine, (b) the interplay between Articles 25 and 26, (c) whether the Court can reform religious practices, and (d) whether the Sabarimala issue should be considered alongside similar disputes from other religions. This reference is pending as of 2026. Critically, the original judgment has not been stayed and remains operative law.
Practice implications
Gender equality in religious institutions: The Sabarimala judgment provides precedent for challenging gender-based exclusionary practices in any religious institution that qualifies as a "public" place of worship. Practitioners can use the framework to challenge: exclusion of women from mosques (a question already flagged in the 7-judge Bench reference), gender-based restrictions in Hindu temples beyond Sabarimala, and practices in other religious institutions that restrict women's participation based on biological characteristics.
Essential religious practices arguments: Practitioners defending or challenging religious practices must engage with the essential religious practices test. To prove a practice is "essential": demonstrate it has textual support in religious scripture, show it is integral to the religion's core identity, and establish that the religion would be fundamentally altered without it. To disprove: show the practice is customary rather than doctrinal, demonstrate that the religion exists without the practice in other contexts, and argue that the practice is based on social prejudice rather than theological necessity.
Untouchability claims under Article 17: Justice Chandrachud's expansion of untouchability beyond caste creates a new cause of action. Practitioners can invoke Article 17 to challenge any practice that treats a class of persons as impure or unworthy of contact based on inherent characteristics (gender, disability, health status, descent). This includes practices like barring persons with certain diseases from public spaces, excluding menstruating women from communal activities, and social boycotts based on identity.
Navigating the pending reference: The 7-judge Bench reference creates strategic uncertainty. Practitioners seeking to rely on the Sabarimala judgment should note: (a) the original judgment is not stayed and remains binding, (b) the 7-judge Bench may affirm, modify, or overturn the judgment, (c) until the reference is decided, the 2018 judgment is the operative law. Practitioners should monitor the listing of the 7-judge Bench hearing, as the outcome will reshape religious freedom jurisprudence.
State government obligations: Following the judgment, state governments managing public temples through endowment boards have an obligation to ensure non-discriminatory access. Practitioners can seek writs under Article 226 directing state temple boards to remove gender-based restrictions, modify temple rules to comply with the judgment, and take enforcement action against temple authorities who resist compliance.
Limitation: The judgment applies to "public" Hindu temples. Private religious institutions that are not open to the general public, or institutions of recognised religious denominations that satisfy the Article 26 test, may have stronger claims to autonomy. The denominational status question is therefore a threshold issue in every case.
Key subsequent developments
Review petition referred to 7-judge Bench (November 2019) — A 3:2 majority referred broader questions about religious freedom, essential practices doctrine, and judicial intervention in religion to a larger Bench. The reference is pending as of 2026.
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) (2017) 10 SCC 1 — Recognised privacy as fundamental right, including autonomy in matters of gender and intimate association. Reinforces the autonomy dimension of the Sabarimala reasoning.
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) (2018) 10 SCC 1 — Decided 10 days after Sabarimala, the Section 377 judgment shares the constitutional morality framework, holding that constitutional values of dignity and equality override majoritarian morality.
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta (2004) (2004) 12 SCC 770 — Earlier application of the essential religious practices test, distinguishing essential practices from secular or superstitious customs.
Frequently asked questions
Is the Sabarimala judgment still in force despite the 7-judge Bench reference?
Yes. The 2018 judgment striking down Rule 3(b) has not been stayed by any court. It remains operative and binding law. The 7-judge Bench reference addresses broader doctrinal questions about the essential religious practices test and the interplay between Articles 25 and 26. Until the larger Bench decides these questions, the Sabarimala judgment continues to be the governing authority. Women have a legal right to enter the Sabarimala temple under the current legal position.
How does the Sabarimala judgment affect religious practices in other faiths?
The 7-judge Bench reference expressly framed the question as requiring consideration of similar issues across religions — including the entry of women into mosques and the practice of female genital mutilation among Dawoodi Bohras. The essential religious practices test and the constitutional morality framework from Sabarimala are potentially applicable to exclusionary practices in any religion. However, until the 7-judge Bench decides, direct application to other faiths is a matter of persuasive rather than binding precedent.
Can private religious institutions rely on Article 26 to exclude women?
Article 26 protects the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. If an institution qualifies as a "religious denomination" (distinct tenets, common organisation, unique religious doctrine), it has stronger autonomy claims. However, even Article 26 rights are subject to "public order, morality, and health" under Article 25(1), and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional morality — including gender equality — is part of "morality." The denominational status is therefore a necessary but potentially insufficient defence.
What is the practical significance of expanding untouchability under Article 17?
Justice Chandrachud's interpretation that untouchability under Article 17 extends beyond caste to include gender-based biological exclusion creates a powerful constitutional tool. Article 17 is absolute — it abolishes untouchability "in all its forms" without any exception. Unlike Articles 25 and 26, which have internal limitations, Article 17 admits of no balancing test. If a practice is characterised as untouchability, it is unconstitutional per se. This makes Article 17 a potentially more effective tool than Articles 14 or 15 for challenging deeply entrenched exclusionary practices.
How should practitioners handle the tension between religious freedom and gender equality?
Practitioners should structure arguments in three layers: (1) threshold — determine whether the institution is a public place of worship or a denominational institution under Article 26; (2) essential practice — apply the essential religious practices test to determine whether the exclusionary practice is protected; (3) constitutional morality — argue that even if the practice has some religious basis, constitutional values of equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14, 15, and 17 must prevail. The Sabarimala framework establishes that when religious custom conflicts with constitutional guarantees, constitutional morality takes precedence.