The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment delivered on 10 November 2025, struck down key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 as unconstitutional. A Bench comprising Chief Justice BR Gavai and Justice K Vinod Chandran held that the impugned provisions undermined judicial independence and directed the establishment of a National Tribunals Commission to oversee the appointment, administration, and functioning of tribunals across India.
Background
The Madras Bar Association has been a persistent litigant on the question of tribunal independence, having filed multiple challenges over the past decade against legislative attempts to regulate tribunal composition and functioning. The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 consolidated provisions relating to the appointment, tenure, and conditions of service of tribunal members, but faced criticism for concentrating excessive control over tribunals in the executive branch.
The core constitutional concern has been the tension between the executive's power to create and regulate tribunals and the judiciary's insistence that tribunals exercising judicial functions must possess independence comparable to courts. The Supreme Court has previously struck down similar provisions — notably in the 2020 Madras Bar Association case — yet the legislature re-enacted substantially similar provisions, prompting the present challenge.
Key Holdings
The Supreme Court made the following determinations:
Unconstitutional provisions struck down: The Bench declared that provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 relating to the terms of appointment, tenure conditions, and executive oversight of tribunal members violated the constitutional principle of judicial independence. The specific sections permitting executive control over tribunal administration were held to be constitutionally impermissible.
National Tribunals Commission directed: The Court directed the Union Government to establish a National Tribunals Commission — an independent body to oversee the appointment, administration, budgetary allocation, and performance evaluation of all tribunals. The Commission is intended to function as a buffer between the executive and tribunal members.
Separation of powers reaffirmed: The Bench reiterated that tribunals adjudicating disputes that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of High Courts must meet the minimum constitutional standard of independence. Executive control over the terms and conditions of tribunal members creates an impermissible structural dependency.
Timeline for compliance: The Court directed the establishment of the National Tribunals Commission within a prescribed timeframe, signalling that this was not merely an advisory observation but a binding directive.
Implications for Practitioners
This judgment has far-reaching consequences for the Indian tribunal system, which adjudicates disputes across taxation, telecommunications, electricity, competition, insolvency, and numerous other domains. Practitioners appearing before tribunals should monitor the implementation of the National Tribunals Commission, as changes to tribunal governance structures may affect procedural rules, listing practices, and bench composition.
The directive for a National Tribunals Commission introduces a new institutional layer in the judicial architecture. If operationalised as envisaged, it would centralise tribunal administration under an independent body rather than the respective parent ministries — a structural shift that could enhance both the quality and perceived independence of tribunal adjudication.
For practitioners challenging tribunal orders on grounds of lack of independence or structural bias, this judgment provides additional constitutional ammunition. Conversely, the Union Government faces the challenge of implementing a Commission that satisfies the Court's requirements while remaining administratively workable across dozens of tribunals.