The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment delivered on 28 March 2025, quashed an FIR registered in Gujarat against Rajya Sabha MP Imran Pratapgadhi for sharing a poem on social media. The Bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that the poem was protected expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and that courts and law enforcement have a duty to safeguard free speech even when they find the spoken or written words disagreeable.
Background
The case arose from a social media post in which Pratapgadhi shared a video featuring a poem titled "Ae khoon ke pyase baat suno" (loosely translated as "Listen, you who are bloodthirsty"). The poem was recited at a mass wedding event in Jamnagar, Gujarat. An FIR was registered alleging that the poem promoted enmity between communities and disturbed social harmony, invoking provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita including Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57, and 3(5).
Pratapgadhi moved the Gujarat High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, but the High Court declined to interfere. The matter then came before the Supreme Court.
The legal question was whether sharing a poem that uses strong imagery and references to injustice constitutes a criminal offence under the BNS provisions relating to promotion of enmity or disturbance of public tranquillity, or whether such expression falls within the protected zone of Article 19(1)(a).
Key Holdings
The Supreme Court quashed the FIR on the following grounds:
No promotion of enmity: The Court examined the poem's content and concluded that by no reasonable interpretation did it promote enmity between communities. The poem addressed themes of injustice and offered non-violence as a response, which could not be characterised as incitement to communal disharmony.
No prima facie case: The FIR did not disclose a prima facie case under any of the invoked BNS provisions. The Court found that law enforcement demonstrated ignorance of the constitutional protections under Article 19(1)(a) in registering the FIR.
Judicial obligation to protect speech: The Court stated that judges are duty-bound to uphold fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a), even when they personally find the speech objectionable. The Court observed that a republic's strength is measured by its tolerance for dissent and artistic expression.
Counter speech, not suppression: The Court endorsed the principle that the appropriate response to speech one disagrees with is counter-speech, not criminal prosecution. Suppression through the criminal justice system violates the constitutional scheme.
High threshold for criminalisation: The judgment requires any allegation of criminal speech to meet a high threshold of demonstrable intent to cause harm, clarity of incitement, and proximate causal connection to the disruption of public order.
Implications for Practitioners
This judgment significantly strengthens the free speech framework under Article 19(1)(a), particularly in the context of artistic and literary expression. Criminal defence lawyers handling cases where creative expression has been criminalised now have a clear Supreme Court authority requiring courts to apply a high threshold before sustaining such prosecutions.
Practitioners should note the Court's observation regarding law enforcement's duty to understand constitutional rights before registering FIRs. This may provide a basis for seeking costs and compensation in cases where FIRs are registered without application of mind to Article 19(1)(a) protections.
The judgment is also relevant for practitioners advising public figures, artists, poets, and comedians, as the Court specifically referenced stand-up comedy and poetry as forms of expression that constitutional protections extend to. The ruling provides a precedential framework for challenging the increasing trend of criminalising creative expression.