The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment delivered on 6 January 2026, granted bail to Arvind Dham, promoter of the Amtek Group, in a money laundering prosecution initiated by the Directorate of Enforcement. A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe held that the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be eclipsed by the gravity of the offence charged.
Background
Arvind Dham, the promoter of the Amtek Group of companies, was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The accused had been in custody for a prolonged period while the trial remained at a preliminary stage. The bail application was resisted by the Directorate on the ground that offences under the PMLA are of a serious nature and that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Act — which require the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail — had not been met.
The right to a speedy trial has been recognised as an integral component of Article 21 since the decision in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) and has been reaffirmed in a series of subsequent decisions. The tension between this right and the stringent bail provisions of special statutes such as the PMLA has been a recurring issue before the higher judiciary.
Key Holdings
The Supreme Court made the following significant observations:
Speedy trial not subordinate to offence gravity: The Bench held that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 applies with full force regardless of the nature or seriousness of the offence. The severity of the charge does not diminish the constitutional guarantee against prolonged pretrial detention.
Prolonged detention amounts to punishment: The Court observed that where an accused has been in custody for an extended period without the trial reaching a substantive stage, the continued incarceration ceases to be preventive and effectively converts into punitive detention, violating Article 21.
Section 45 PMLA must be read with Article 21: While acknowledging the special statutory threshold for bail under Section 45 of the PMLA, the Bench held that these provisions must be harmoniously construed with constitutional guarantees. The twin conditions cannot be applied in a manner that renders the right to liberty illusory.
Implications for Practitioners
This ruling provides significant support for defence counsel representing accused persons in long-pending PMLA prosecutions. The Court's emphasis on the constitutional primacy of the speedy trial right over statutory bail restrictions strengthens the argument for bail in cases where trial proceedings have stalled or progressed at an unreasonable pace.
For the Enforcement Directorate and prosecution agencies, the judgment underscores the need to ensure expeditious completion of investigations and trial proceedings. Reliance on the severity of the offence alone, without demonstrating progress toward trial completion, may prove insufficient to resist bail applications where the accused has already spent a considerable period in custody.
Practitioners should also note the Court's formulation that pretrial detention can convert into punishment — a principle that may have broader application beyond PMLA matters to other special statutes with restrictive bail provisions.