The Supreme Court of India, in Gohar Sultan v. Sheikh Anis Ahmad (2026 SCC OnLine SC 246), issued notice to the Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh regarding the non-implementation of Section 4 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih observed that rules under Section 4 of the Act remain unframed nearly nine decades after the statute's enactment.
Background
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was enacted to provide for the application of Muslim personal law to Muslims in matters of succession, marriage, divorce, maintenance, and related areas. Section 4 of the Act empowers the relevant government to frame rules for carrying out the purposes of the legislation. Despite the Act being in force since 1937, the rules contemplated under Section 4 have never been framed by either the Central or State Governments.
The absence of implementing rules has created a practical vacuum in the administration of Muslim personal law across several states. While the substantive provisions of the Act have been applied by courts based on textual interpretation and established practice, the procedural machinery that Section 4 was designed to enable remains entirely absent.
The matter before the Supreme Court arose from a dispute in which the procedural framework under the Act became relevant. The petitioner raised the broader systemic issue of non-implementation, prompting the Bench to take note of the extraordinary delay.
Key Holdings
The Supreme Court's order addressed the following:
Notice to Union and State: The Court issued notice to both the Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh, requiring them to explain why rules under Section 4 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 have not been framed despite nearly 89 years since enactment.
Statutory obligation acknowledged: By issuing notice on this specific ground, the Court has implicitly recognised that the rule-making power under Section 4 carries a corresponding obligation, and that prolonged non-exercise of that power is a matter of judicial concern.
No final direction yet: The order at this stage is limited to issuance of notice. The Court has not yet directed the framing of rules or set a timeline for compliance. The matter will proceed based on the responses filed by the Union and State.
Implications for Practitioners
The Supreme Court's willingness to examine a nearly nine-decade regulatory gap raises significant questions about the limits of executive discretion in framing subordinate legislation. If the Court ultimately directs the framing of rules under Section 4, it would establish a notable precedent regarding the judiciary's power to compel rule-making where a statute expressly contemplates it.
Family law practitioners dealing with Muslim personal law matters should track this case closely. Implementing rules under Section 4 could introduce procedural standardisation in areas where practice currently varies significantly across states and courts. Matters such as succession disputes, maintenance claims, and property division under Muslim personal law could be affected by any rules eventually framed.
More broadly, this case may encourage similar challenges to other statutes where rule-making provisions have remained dormant for decades. The principle that a statutory rule-making power implies a corresponding duty to act within a reasonable time could have ramifications well beyond the personal law domain.