Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala — Practice Guide on Right to Internet Access

Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 2976 — a single judge of the Kerala High Court (Justice P.V. Asha) on 19 September 2019 held that the right to access the internet is a facet of the right to privacy and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and of the right to education under Article 21A. The Court struck down a women's hostel rule restricting mobile-phone and internet use between 6 PM and 10 PM as gender-discriminatory under Article 14 and as a disproportionate interference with Articles 21 and 21A. For practitioners in 2026, the ratio now operates as the constitutional foundation for three overlapping dockets: (i) challenges to institutional (educational, workplace, hostel, custodial) restrictions on digital access; (ii) writ challenges to internet-suspension orders under Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023; and (iii) arguments under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 that data-principal rights presuppose meaningful internet access.

Case snapshot

Ratio decidendi — the Article 21 / 21A / 14 analysis

1. Internet access as a facet of Article 21 — the Puttaswamy application

The Kerala High Court anchored its holding in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 ('Puttaswamy') and extended its informational-privacy and personal-autonomy dimensions to internet access. The Court reasoned that:

• A student's ability to communicate with family, access academic resources, and consume digital content is inseparable from the informational-privacy dimension recognised by the 9-judge Bench in Puttaswamy.
• Personal-liberty under Article 21 cannot be reduced to physical liberty alone; it extends to the conditions that enable meaningful participation in public life — which, in the digital era, includes internet access.
• Institutional rules that extinguish this access without a proportionate justification fall foul of Article 21.

2. Article 21A right to education — the ICESCR and UGC anchor

The Court invoked the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recommendations requiring States to progressively realise the right to education, including through information and communication technology. It also cited University Grants Commission regulations and directions promoting technology-enabled learning, e-library access, and online course content. A rule that forbids internet access during study hours — when e-library resources and academic databases are most intensively used — "frustrates the very purpose" of Article 21A.

3. Article 14 non-arbitrariness — the gender-discrimination holding

The rule applied only to the women's hostel. The corresponding men's hostel was not subject to an equivalent restriction. The Court applied the classical Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, non-arbitrariness standard and held that:

• There was no intelligible differentia between men and women students justifying differential mobile-phone and internet rules.
• Even if there were, the stated objective (ensuring discipline during study hours) bore no rational nexus to a 4-hour blanket restriction on connectivity — especially given that online study material is most heavily used at that time.
• Institutional paternalism directed at adult women students "runs counter to the Constitution's egalitarian premise".

4. Article 19(1)(a) observations

Although the judgment turns on Articles 21, 21A and 14, Justice P.V. Asha observed that digital expression and communication engage Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The observation paved the way — along with Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 ('Shreya Singhal') — for the Supreme Court's later ruling in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 ('Anuradha Bhasin'), which four months later expressly located internet-based speech and trade within Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g).

Current statutory framework (as of April 2026)

Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 — data-principal rights presuppose access

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 ('DPDP Act') was enacted in August 2023 and operationalised in phases under the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 (G.S.R. 846(E)). It is the statutory embodiment of the informational-privacy dimension recognised in Puttaswamy. Faheema Shirin strengthens the DPDP Act's constitutional base in two ways:

• The right to access (Section 11 DPDP Act) and right to correction and erasure (Section 12 DPDP Act) presuppose the data principal's meaningful ability to engage digitally. A blanket denial of internet access to a data principal — whether by an educational institution, employer, or custodial authority — would therefore interfere not merely with Article 21 but also frustrate DPDP Act rights.
• Section 9 DPDP Act (processing of children's data) requires verifiable parental consent for processing of personal data of children. The provision must be read so that parental-consent and age-gating requirements do not operate as de facto internet-access bans on adolescents — a reading Faheema Shirin supports by treating internet access as constitutive of Article 21A education rights.

Information Technology Act, 2000 — Section 79 intermediary liability

Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ('IT Act'), read down in Shreya Singhal, grants intermediaries safe harbour for third-party content where actual knowledge comes via a court order or government notification. Where an intermediary is pressured (by private complaint or overbroad administrative direction) to restrict an individual's digital access, Faheema Shirin supplies a complementary Article 21 / 21A argument against compelled access deprivation.

Telecommunications Act, 2023 and internet-suspension orders

Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 ('Telecom Act 2023'), which received Presidential assent on 24 December 2023, empowers the Central and State Governments to take temporary possession of telecommunication services or suspend them in specified emergency circumstances — superseding Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017. Every such suspension order must now satisfy a twin test:

• Article 19(1)(a) / 19(1)(g) proportionality — Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637: orders must be published, time-bounded, judicially reviewable, and the least restrictive alternative.
• Article 21 / 21A proportionality — Faheema Shirin + Puttaswamy: the Article 21 privacy and personal-liberty dimensions, and the Article 21A educational dimension, must also be weighed.

Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021

The IT Rules 2021, as amended in October 2025 (Rule 3(1)(d) amendment) and February 2026 (synthetic-media amendment), impose due-diligence and takedown obligations on intermediaries. Where these operate so as to effectively deny a user's meaningful access to digital speech and services, Faheema Shirin and Anuradha Bhasin together are the lead pleadings against disproportionate access deprivation.

Subsequent developments

• Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 — 3-judge Supreme Court Bench. Internet shutdowns and Section 144 CrPC (now Section 163 BNSS, 2023) orders must be proportionate, published, and subject to periodic review. The judgment adopts a Faheema-Shirin-aligned analytical track and is now the Supreme-Court-level companion authority.
• Foundation for Media Professionals v. UT of J&K, (2020) 5 SCC 746 — Applied Anuradha Bhasin and, by implication, the Faheema Shirin direction of travel to the 4G restoration question in Jammu and Kashmir.
• Madras High Court — prisoner internet-access orders (2020-2024) — successive orders permitting supervised internet access for prisoners pursuing recognised higher-studies courses, citing Faheema Shirin's Article 21A reasoning.
• Karnataka High Court — cyber-cafe and institutional access (2021-2023) — orders invoking Faheema Shirin against overbroad municipal restrictions on internet-cafe access.
• Bombay High Court — institutional dress-and-device codes (2022-2024) — Article 14 arbitrariness challenges to institutional rules have used Faheema Shirin as the anchor precedent on the gender-equality dimension.

Practice implications

For counsel challenging institutional digital-access rules

• Plead simultaneously on three prongs: (a) Article 21 privacy and personal liberty via Puttaswamy + Faheema Shirin; (b) Article 21A right to education where the petitioner is a student; (c) Article 14 non-arbitrariness and anti-discrimination where the rule operates differentially by gender, caste, or community.
• Proportionality drafting: apply the four-limb Puttaswamy test (legality, legitimate aim, necessity, proportionality stricto sensu) to the specific institutional rule, matching each limb with record evidence — academic timetables, e-library usage logs, comparable rules in men's or other hostels.
• Relief: seek not merely readmission but a positive direction for the institution to withdraw the rule; a mere stay is inadequate because the rule will revive absent a final declaration of unconstitutionality.

For counsel challenging Section 20 Telecom Act 2023 suspension orders

• Plead both Article 19(1)(a) / 19(1)(g) (Anuradha Bhasin) and Article 21 / 21A (Faheema Shirin + Puttaswamy) — twin-track pleading maximises the proportionality and due-process grounds.
• Seek disclosure of the suspension order and the review committee's minutes; Anuradha Bhasin directs publication and judicial review of such orders.
• Frame interim relief narrowly — pressing for restoration of specific services (educational portals, banking, tele-medicine) tracks Faheema Shirin's recognition that internet access is instrumentally tied to Article 21 and 21A.

For data-privacy and DPDP-advisory practice

• When advising on DPDP Act 2023 compliance — particularly on Section 9 children's-data provisions and data-principal-rights frameworks — cite Faheema Shirin as the Article 21 / 21A anchor that prevents institutions from leveraging parental-consent or age-verification mechanisms into blanket access bans.
• In data-fiduciary advisory work, map institutional digital-access rules against Faheema Shirin's proportionality criteria before finalising acceptable-use policies; rules that restrict student or employee internet access to "study hours" or "work hours" in an overbroad way carry constitutional exposure.

For PILs on rural and public internet access

• Faheema Shirin supplies the Article 21 / 21A backbone for PILs on digital-divide issues — rural connectivity deficits, government-school internet infrastructure, public Wi-Fi under the PM-WANI scheme, and accessibility for persons with disabilities.
• Combine with Article 21A education arguments and Article 39(f) directive principles to press for positive obligations on the State to enable meaningful internet access.

Drafting tip — the twin-citation formula for internet-rights pleadings

In any writ petition touching internet access, pair Faheema Shirin with the appropriate companion authority: (i) Anuradha Bhasin for internet-suspension or shutdown challenges; (ii) Puttaswamy for privacy-inflected access restrictions (surveillance, monitoring, data-processing bans); (iii) Shreya Singhal for takedown / over-removal challenges; (iv) Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P., (2023) 4 SCC 1 for attempts to read additional grounds into Article 19(2). Twin-citation has become the standard pleading posture in Kerala HC, Bombay HC, Delhi HC and, increasingly, the Supreme Court.

Practitioner FAQ

Does Faheema Shirin bind private institutions such as colleges, coaching centres, and employers?

Faheema Shirin was decided in the State-instrumentality context (a UGC-recognised college receiving State affiliation) and is directly enforceable against State and State-like actors under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Purely private institutions are not directly bound by Article 21, but the judgment's reasoning — particularly on proportionality, Article 14 non-arbitrariness, and the informational privacy dimension of Puttaswamy — is regularly deployed to challenge overbroad employer or private-institution rules. For private actors, the complementary statutory anchor is now the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (for data-processing restrictions) and contractual proportionality doctrines for behavioural restrictions.

How does Faheema Shirin interact with the Supreme Court's ruling in Anuradha Bhasin?

Faheema Shirin (Kerala HC, 19 September 2019) was decided roughly four months before Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 (Supreme Court, 10 January 2020). The two decisions are analytically parallel: Faheema Shirin anchors internet access in Articles 21 and 21A, while Anuradha Bhasin anchors internet-based speech and trade in Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g). Practitioners pleading internet-rights challenges today should cite both — Faheema Shirin for the Article 21 privacy dimension and Anuradha Bhasin for the Article 19 proportionality framework. The Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin did not overrule or cast doubt on Faheema Shirin.

What is the DPDP Act 2023 implication of Faheema Shirin?

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 ('DPDP Act'), anchored constitutionally in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, creates a set of data-principal rights — access, correction, erasure, grievance redressal — that presuppose the ability to interact with digital services. Faheema Shirin's recognition that denial of internet access itself interferes with Article 21 reinforces the constitutional case for interpreting DPDP Act data-principal rights expansively. In particular, Section 9 of the DPDP Act (processing of personal data of children) must be read so that parental-consent and verifiable-age requirements do not operate as blanket internet-access bans on adolescents — such restrictions would collide with Faheema Shirin.

Can Faheema Shirin be used to challenge internet suspension orders under the Telecommunications Act 2023?

Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 ('Telecom Act 2023') empowers the Central and State Governments to take temporary possession of telecommunication services or suspend them on limited grounds, replacing the Section 5(2) Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 regime and the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017. Any suspension order must satisfy the proportionality test laid down in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637. Faheema Shirin supplies the Article 21 / 21A limb of the constitutional challenge — counsel should plead both: Article 19(1)(a)/19(1)(g) proportionality (Anuradha Bhasin) and Article 21/21A proportionality (Faheema Shirin + Puttaswamy).

Does Faheema Shirin protect prisoner or detainee internet access?

The judgment does not speak directly to custodial contexts, but its Article 21 reasoning has been extended in several High Court orders. The Madras High Court, in successive orders from 2020 onwards, has recognised limited internet access for educational and legal-aid purposes for prisoners pursuing higher studies, citing the Faheema Shirin analysis. Counsel seeking such relief should plead (a) the Article 21 internet access anchor from Faheema Shirin; (b) the Article 21A education anchor where the prisoner is pursuing a recognised course; (c) proportionality — internet access in supervised, time-bounded modes rather than unrestricted access; and (d) the prison administration's positive obligation to provide reasonable means of access where imposed restrictions would otherwise frustrate Articles 21 and 21A.

Source attribution

Primary source: High Court of Kerala — judgment in Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 19716 of 2019, decided by Justice P.V. Asha on 19 September 2019. Statutory text referenced from the consolidated Constitution of India, Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, Information Technology Act, 2000, and Telecommunications Act, 2023 on India Code. This analysis is provided for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Practitioners should verify current statutory text and consult the latest case law before advising clients, particularly on matters touching the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 phased rollout and Section 20 Telecommunications Act, 2023 enforcement.