Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India — Practice Guide on Internet Shutdowns

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 — a 3-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India (Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice R. Subhash Reddy and Justice B.R. Gavai) on 10 January 2020 held that the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom to practise any profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution extend to the medium of the internet. Every order imposing restrictions under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('CrPC'), and every telecom-suspension order under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 ('Suspension Rules 2017'), must satisfy the proportionality test, be published, be limited in time, and be reviewed within seven working days. Six years on, Anuradha Bhasin remains the doctrinal anchor for every internet-shutdown challenge in India — and its ratio transfers seamlessly to Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS') and to Sections 20 and 24 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 ('Telecom Act'), which have now replaced the Section 5(2) Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 regime.

Case snapshot

Facts and procedural posture

On 4-5 August 2019, immediately before the revocation of the special status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution, the Union Government and the State administration imposed complete restrictions on mobile phone networks, internet services and landline connectivity across the State. District Magistrates in the Kashmir Valley issued orders under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prohibiting movement and public assembly.

The measures were imposed without public notification of individual orders. Internet services remained suspended for several months after 5 August 2019; in many districts 2G services were restored late in 2019 but 4G services remained suspended when the case was argued. Two lead petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution: Ms. Anuradha Bhasin, Executive Editor of Kashmir Times, alleging that the restrictions made publication of the Srinagar edition of the newspaper impossible — a direct violation of Article 19(1)(a); and Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad, then a Member of Parliament, alleging that the mobility restrictions violated Article 19(1)(d). The petitions were heard together by a 3-judge Bench presided over by Justice N.V. Ramana.

Issues and arguments

The Bench framed five principal issues:

1. Whether the Government was obliged to place all orders imposing restrictions in the public domain.
2. Whether freedom of speech and expression and freedom of trade and commerce over the internet are constitutionally protected.
3. Whether the Suspension Rules 2017 laid down sufficient safeguards for telecom suspension orders.
4. Whether the Section 144 CrPC orders were valid.
5. Whether the freedom of press was violated.

The Union of India and the State of Jammu & Kashmir argued that national security concerns justified the measures, that publication of certain orders could compromise operations, and that the Review Committee mechanism under the Suspension Rules 2017 supplied a sufficient internal safeguard. The petitioners relied on S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 149 for the principle that the right to know is a facet of Article 19(1)(a), and on Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (1970) 3 SCC 746 for the proposition that Section 144 CrPC cannot be used as a blanket preventive instrument.

Ratio decidendi

1. Internet access as a facet of Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g)

The Bench (per Ramana J.) held that the freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any trade or business, extend to the medium of the internet. The Court did not declare a standalone fundamental right to the internet, but placed the medium-based protection on the same footing as other media — print, broadcast and telegraph. This aligns with the earlier ratio in Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 that Article 19(1)(a) protects the right to communicate through any medium of choice.

Counsel should note the careful line the Bench drew: the fundamental right is to speech/trade over the internet, not to the internet itself. In practice this distinction has made no difference — every subsequent challenge to an internet restriction has proceeded on the Anuradha Bhasin framework — but it keeps the ratio tightly bounded within the existing Article 19 architecture.

2. Proportionality test — Puttaswamy imported

The Bench imported the four-prong proportionality test from K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, requiring every restriction under Article 19(2), 19(6) or the Suspension Rules 2017 to satisfy:

1. Legitimate aim — the restriction must pursue an Article 19(2)/(6) ground.
2. Rational nexus — the measure must have a direct link to the aim.
3. Necessity (least restrictive means) — no less restrictive alternative can achieve the aim.
4. Proportionality stricto sensu — the restriction's effect must be balanced against the infringement of the right.

This is the doctrinal heart of Anuradha Bhasin. Every subsequent internet-restriction challenge — in the Supreme Court, in the Karnataka HC's 2022 consideration of Twitter/X blocking orders, in the Kerala HC's continuing social-media cases, and in PIL challenges to localised state shutdowns — applies this four-prong test.

3. Publication requirement — Section 144 CrPC and Suspension Rules 2017 orders

The Bench held that every order imposing a Section 144 CrPC restriction or a telecom suspension under the Suspension Rules 2017 must be placed in the public domain. A secret order cannot be tested for legality or proportionality and is therefore inherently unsustainable. Redaction of operational details (for example specific intelligence inputs) is permissible only to the extent strictly necessary; the existence of the order, the competent authority, the grounds invoked and the operative period cannot be withheld.

4. Time limits and periodic review

The Bench struck down the implicit assumption in the earlier administrative practice that a suspension order under Rule 2(1) of the Suspension Rules 2017 could continue indefinitely until revoked. Orders must be time-bound and must be re-issued — not merely continued — if the underlying emergency persists. The Review Committee constituted under Rule 2(5) of the Suspension Rules 2017 (comprising, at the Central level, the Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary (Legal Affairs) and the Secretary (DoT)) must review every order within seven working days and record its findings.

5. Section 144 CrPC — not a blanket preventive instrument

Following Madhu Limaye, the Bench reiterated that Section 144 CrPC is an emergency power and cannot be used as a blanket preventive instrument. Orders must be tailored to a specific threat, must identify the prejudiced interests, must record reasons and must be amenable to judicial review. Bulk identical orders passed without particularised reasoning are constitutionally infirm.

Obiter — the press-freedom observations

The Bench made strong obiter observations on the role of a free press in a functioning constitutional democracy. While refraining from recording a specific finding on press-freedom violation on the facts, the Bench noted that an indefinite suspension of telecommunication services in a region imposes a direct restriction on print and digital journalism — and that such restrictions attract the strictest form of judicial scrutiny. Counsel pleading press-freedom challenges should cite these passages alongside Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 788.

Current statutory framework (as of April 2026)

Section 144 CrPC → Section 163 BNSS, 2023

Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been replaced by Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS'). The substantive power, grounds and procedure under Section 163 BNSS mirror Section 144 CrPC; the proportionality and publication requirements in Anuradha Bhasin therefore transfer in full to orders issued under Section 163 BNSS. Counsel drafting fresh challenges post-1 July 2024 should cite Section 163 BNSS read with Anuradha Bhasin. Earlier orders pending challenge continue to be tested under Section 144 CrPC in the transitional regime.

Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 → Telecommunications Act, 2023

The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 was repealed by the Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act 44 of 2023) ('Telecom Act'), with effect from the phased commencement dates (first tranche — 26 June 2024). Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 — the enabling provision for the Suspension Rules 2017 — no longer exists.

The interception and suspension powers have been redistributed:

• Section 20 of the Telecom Act — interception, detention, disclosure in intelligible form, or suspension of messages on Article 19(2) grounds.
• Section 22 of the Telecom Act — cybersecurity of telecommunication networks and declaration of "Critical Telecommunication Infrastructure".
• Section 24 of the Telecom Act — suspension of telecommunication services in a specified area or class, on the occurrence of a public emergency on Article 19(2) grounds.

The Telecommunications (Procedures and Safeguards for Lawful Interception of Messages) Rules, 2024, notified on 6 December 2024 under Section 20 of the Telecom Act, codify the competent authority, review committee and time-bound review requirements — tracking the PUCL-Anuradha Bhasin safeguards. Sub-rules operationalising Section 24 (the suspension power) are at an advanced drafting stage; they are expected to re-enact the Suspension Rules 2017 scheme with the Anuradha Bhasin directions built into the text.

Practitioner point: until a successor rule under Section 24 of the Telecom Act is notified, there is a transitional question whether the Suspension Rules 2017 survive by operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the specific savings in Chapter XI of the Telecom Act. The better view — and the safer pleading — is that the Suspension Rules 2017 continue in force for acts done under their authority until replaced, and that any order issued under Section 24 of the Telecom Act after the first-tranche commencement should be tested against the Anuradha Bhasin framework directly, whether or not a specific sub-rule has been notified. Track regulatory-calendar.md for the successor sub-rule.

Foundation for Media Professionals and downstream applications

Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of J&K, (2020) 5 SCC 746, decided four months after Anuradha Bhasin, applied the Anuradha Bhasin framework to direct the Union Territory administration to constitute a Special Committee comprising the Union Home Secretary, the UT Chief Secretary and the Secretary (DoT) to examine the continuing restriction on 4G mobile internet services in Jammu & Kashmir. This is the leading authority for the proposition that Anuradha Bhasin's remedial directions are specifically enforceable — not merely declaratory.

High Court applications include:

• Kerala HC — in multiple petitions on social-media blocking and shutdown orders in 2021-2025, Kerala HC single-judge and Division Bench benches have applied Anuradha Bhasin's proportionality test to both state-level restrictions and Central blocking orders.
• Karnataka HC — X Corp v. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 13710 of 2022) engaged the interaction between Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 blocking orders and Anuradha Bhasin's publication requirement. The single-judge and subsequent Division Bench proceedings continue to surface this interaction.
• Delhi HC and Bombay HC — successive PIL challenges to state-level internet shutdowns (exam-time preventive shutdowns, policing-related shutdowns) have consistently applied Anuradha Bhasin's four-prong proportionality and seven-working-day review cadence.
• Gauhati HC — 2023 challenges to Manipur internet shutdowns relied on Anuradha Bhasin and Foundation for Media Professionals to secure judicially supervised phased restoration.

Practice implications (100% original Veritect analysis)

For counsel drafting writ petitions against shutdown orders

• Plead all four proportionality prongs expressly. Do not rely on a generic proportionality averment. Set out the legitimate aim asserted in the order, the rational nexus, the less restrictive alternatives available, and the balancing calculation. In appropriate cases, annex expert affidavits on less restrictive technical measures (for example, selective app throttling instead of network-wide shutdown).
• Demand publication. If the impugned order is not in the public domain, seek a direction under Article 226 for its production and publication. The Bhasin ratio makes continuation of a secret order impermissible.
• Demand the Review Committee minutes. Seek a direction for production of the Review Committee's deliberations and findings. Absence of timely review — or the absence of recorded reasons in the review — is an independent ground of challenge.
• Frame relief as prospective plus declaratory. Ask for (i) a declaration that the order is illegal; (ii) quashing; (iii) restoration of services; and (iv) a direction that any future order comply with Anuradha Bhasin. This forecloses the State from re-issuing the same order.

For counsel advising telcos on compliance with suspension orders

• Verify compliance with Anuradha Bhasin on receipt. Telcos are not the addressees of the Review Committee review, but they are the implementers of the suspension. A telco that implements an order subsequently quashed as disproportionate may face regulatory or reputational consequences. Counsel should review each order for (a) publication, (b) time-bound scope, and (c) a specific Section 24 Telecom Act / Section 20 Telecom Act reference.
• Document the implementation trail. Maintain timestamped records of the order received, the implementation date and time, the geographic scope implemented, and the lifting of the measure. This record is material in any downstream litigation or regulatory inquiry.
• Preserve the right to seek clarification. Authorised entities have a statutory path under the Telecom Act to seek clarification or modification of a suspension order affecting their network. Use it — silence can later be read as acquiescence.

For counsel advising media / platforms on operational continuity

• Build a shutdown-contingency plan into BCP. Media clients operating in regions with a history of shutdowns should have a documented business-continuity plan addressing editorial continuity, staff safety, delayed publication schedules, and alternative distribution channels. In shutdown litigation, a documented plan supports the Article 19(1)(a) injury narrative.
• Track publication of orders across State Gazettes and State websites. Many state governments publish Section 163 BNSS orders only in state-level official gazettes. Build a monitoring routine.
• Use the Anuradha Bhasin framework in representation to the State. Pre-litigation representations citing the Anuradha Bhasin proportionality prongs frequently secure scope-narrowing modifications.

For counsel advising corporate clients on BCP in shutdown-prone regions

• Stress-test digital-dependent operations. For financial services, logistics and software services clients, model the revenue and legal-compliance implications of a 24-hour, 72-hour and 7-day network suspension. Consider force-majeure clause drafting in key contracts.
• Evaluate insurance coverage. Business interruption policies may or may not cover regulatory shutdowns; review the specific policy wording.
• Maintain a response protocol. Appoint a single point of contact for State-level liaison; prepare a writ-petition template that can be filed on short notice.

Twin-citation formula for online-rights litigation

In any writ petition under Article 226 or 32 challenging a digital-rights restriction, pair Anuradha Bhasin with one of three companion authorities depending on the fact-matrix:

• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 — for Article 19(2) grounds analysis and intermediary-level interactions.
• K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 — for the four-prong proportionality test and for privacy-inflected restrictions.
• Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1 — for resisting State attempts to read additional grounds into Article 19(2).

This citation-pairing has become the preferred pleading posture in the Supreme Court and senior High Courts for digital-rights matters.

Practitioner FAQ

Do shutdown orders remain challengeable now that the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 has been repealed by the Telecommunications Act, 2023?

Yes. Section 24 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act 44 of 2023) preserves the power to suspend telecommunication services on the grounds set out in Section 20 of that Act — sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, and prevention of incitement to an offence. The proportionality, publication, time-limit and periodic-review requirements laid down in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 are Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) requirements that attach to the power itself, not the parent statute. Writ challenges under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution continue to be maintainable against any suspension order under the Telecommunications Act, 2023. Practitioners should plead Anuradha Bhasin alongside the specific sub-rules notified under Section 24.

How does Anuradha Bhasin interact with Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 blocking orders?

Anuradha Bhasin applies to telecommunications-level suspension orders that cut off internet access at the network layer. Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 operates at the content layer — directing intermediaries to block public access to specified information on the grounds listed in Article 19(2). The two regimes are cumulative. In any Article 226 challenge to a Section 69A blocking order, pair Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (on the Article 19(2) grounds and procedural safeguards under the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009) with Anuradha Bhasin (on proportionality and publication of orders). The Karnataka High Court's approach in X Corp v. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 13710 of 2022) engaged this twin-citation framework.

What is the periodic-review cadence and who constitutes the Review Committee?

Under Rule 2(5) of the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017, every suspension order must be forwarded to a Review Committee. The Review Committee at the Central level comprises the Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary (Legal Affairs) and the Secretary (Department of Telecommunications); at the State level, the Chief Secretary, the Secretary (Law) and a Secretary other than Home. The Anuradha Bhasin directions require the Review Committee to record its findings on whether the order complies with Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (now Section 20 / 24 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023) — and to do so within seven working days of the order. Counsel drafting a challenge should specifically seek the Review Committee's minutes in disclosure.

Can a blanket ban on a category of online services (for example an OTT communication app) be justified under the same framework?

A blanket ban on a category of online services would have to satisfy the same proportionality framework. If the ban operates by blocking URLs or IP addresses, it would typically be issued under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and would be governed by Shreya Singhal, the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, and by Anuradha Bhasin on proportionality. If the ban operates by network-level throttling or suspension, it falls under Section 24 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and directly under Anuradha Bhasin. In both cases, a blanket measure will struggle against the 'least restrictive means' prong of the proportionality test; targeted measures are more likely to survive challenge. See Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 2976 for the cognate Kerala HC approach.

Does Anuradha Bhasin apply to pending matters involving pre-2020 shutdown orders?

Yes. Anuradha Bhasin is declaratory of the constitutional position under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g); it does not create a new right but clarifies an existing one. Pending proceedings challenging pre-2020 shutdown orders should therefore be argued on the Anuradha Bhasin framework. Where the challenge is to damages or compensation arising from an earlier shutdown, cite Anuradha Bhasin together with Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of J&K, (2020) 5 SCC 746 on remedial directions, and seek disclosure of the order, the Review Committee minutes and the competent authority's reasons. Limitation issues should be assessed under Articles 226/32 (no statutory period; laches principle).

Source attribution

Primary source: Supreme Court of India — judgment in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1031 of 2019 with connected matters, decided 10 January 2020, reported at (2020) 3 SCC 637. Statutory text drawn from the Constitution of India and statutes on India Code, including The Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act 44 of 2023) and the Gazette of India notification (24 December 2023). This analysis is provided for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Practitioners should verify current statutory text and sub-rule position against egazette.gov.in before advising on any matter.